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ABSTRACT
Logic, Semantics, Ontology consists of three papers con-
cerned with ontological issues. The first, "That There Might
Be Vague Objects", is a critical study of Gareth Evans's
essay, "Can There Be Vague Objects", The author argues that
the formal argument presented in Evans's paper is valid and
that a contradiction can indeed be derived from the state-
ment that it is indeterminate whether a is b. However, the
deduction theorem fails in the required logic; Hence, one
can not derive the validity of the statement that it is
determinate whether a is b.
One who holds the view that there are vague objects is
committed to the legitimacy of those principles to which
appeal is required in the proof. Hence, the view that there
are vague objects is committed to the claim that no state-
ment of the form "It is indeterminate whether a is b" can be
true, but also to denying the validity of its negation.
Possible motivations for such a position are sketched and
its tenability is defended.
The second paper, "Whether Structure May Be Misleading", is
a critical study of Crispin Wright's Frege's Conception of
Numbers as Objects, in which Wright defends Platonism, the
view that there are Abstract Objects of various sorts. The
author argues that Wright's view is too promiscuous, that
Wright's view appears to commit us to the existence of far
too many sorts of objects. The causes of this ontological
extravagance are isolated, and the author suggests ways to
avoid it. In the process, however, the author also argues
that certain classical Reductionist arguments fail and that
their failure is closely connected with the strongest
motivations for Platonism.
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The final paper, "Trans-sortal Identification", continues
this discussion. It contains arguments against Reductionism
and a suggestion of a form of Platonism new to the litera-
ture. The author argues that names of abstract objects are
not eliminable and that, therefore, the fundamental question
in this area is not whether we have in our language expres-
sions which are truly names and which purport to refer to
Abstract Objects; rather, the question is to what such names
refer. The connection between this problem and Frege's
Julius Caesar problem is duly noted.
The author argues for a particular view about what deter-
mines the kind of object to which names in a given class
refer. From this principle it follows that names of abstract
objects may refer to objects of different sorts than do
names of concrete objects and, indeed, than do names of
abstract objects of other sorts. Integral to this claim is
the claim that there is a closely related principle which
states conditions necessary if names of abstract objects of
a given sort are to refer at all: That is, if abstract
objects of a given sort are to exist. It is this claim, the
claim that there is an important, non-philosophical question
whether there are abstract objects of a given kind, which
distinguishes the view from those previously discussed.
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Paper I
THAT THE REE MIGHT BE VAGUE OBJECTS
(SC FAR AS CONCERNS LOGIC)
15
0)
0. Opening
Some years ago, Gareth Evans presented an argument
which, he claimed, shows that there can be no vague
objects.' Evans's paper has been the subject of much discus-
sion. Little agreement, however, has been reached even on
the nature of Evans's argument: There is little agreement
regarding what is in dispute (what a 'vague object' is),
what sorts of arguments are relevant, how Evans's argument
addresses the problnm, or what objections to Evans's argu-
ment, in particular, would be relevant.
I shall attempt here to resolve some of these difficul-
ties. First, we shall look at what principles are required
if Evans's formal argument is to succeed; we shall then
consider objections to them. The most important of these
concerns the formulation of Leibniz's Law or the principle
of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. I shall argue that,
though the standard version of this principle begs the
question against one who maintains that there are vague
objects, there is a version of the principle which does not.
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"Gareth Evans, "Can There be Vague Objects?", Analysis
XXXVIII (1978), p. 208.
I shall thus be arguing that Evans's formal argument is
valid, but I shall reject his claim that that argument shows
that there can be no vague objects. This, the ultimate
conclusion of Evans's argument, depends upon a quite speci-
fic interpretation of the claim that there are vague
objects. I shall argue that there is a weaker, independently
plausible interpretation of the view, against which Evans
has no argument. I shall develop this alternative view only
to a very limited extent, only so far as is required to
support the claim that it is, first, rightly described as
committed to the existence of vague objects and, secondly,
not so implausible a view as to be utterly uninteresting.
I shall not even attempt to decide trhether, indeed,
there are vague objects. My claim is only that logic alone
does not show that there are not.
1. Evans's Formal Argument
Before beginning that discussion, however, it is worth
reminding or informing the reader of the formal component of
Evans's argunAnt. Where 'v' is an operator to be read "It is
indeterminate whether..." and 'Nx' is a predicate-abstrac-
tion operator, the argument is, in short:
v(a=b)
xx[v(a=x)](b)
•v(a=a)
-,x[v(a=x)](a)
m(a=b)
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Or, informally; Suppose that it is indeterminate whether b
is a. Then b has the property that it is indeterminate
whether it is a. But a itself does not have this property:
For it is perfectly determinate whether a is a. Hence, there
is a property, namely, 'being indeterminately a', which b
has but which a does not have. Therefore, b can not be a.
Evans remarks that this conclusion contradicts the
assumption with which we began, that it is indeterminate
whether a is b. It is not immediately clear why this is so.
We shall return to this question.
Evans's argument plainly relies upon a number of dif-
ferent principles, First, it relies upon the principle of
the Indiscernibility of Ilenticals. For the moment, we may
assume that Evans would maintain the validity of the schema:
(LL) a=b & Xx(Fx)(a) * Nx(Fx)(b)
This schema is, of course, equivalent to the following one:
(II) Xx(Fx)(a) & -vXx(Fx)(b) + v(a=b)
Such a principle justifies the transition from
"4(Xx)(v(a=x)](a)" and "(,x)[v(a=x)](b)" to "'(a=b)"?.
Secondly, the application of this principle rests upon
the claim that the predicate "v(a=t)" expresses a 'property'
of obj.,cts; that is, Evans is relying upon the claim that
the operator 'W' does not induce an opaque context, so that
the step of predicate-abstraction--from "v(a=b)" to
2 One might well wonder if Evans needs to appeal to such
a strong principle. We shall not be ready to consider such a
question until later: See section 5.
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",x[v(a=x)](b)"--is not, in general, invalidated by the
presence of the operator 'v'. Thirdly, the argument depends
upon the assumption that the specific inferences, from
"v(a=b)" to " • \x[v(a=x) ] (b)" and from " v (a -a)" to
",vx[vx(ax)](a)" , are valid. Fourthly, Evans relies upon the
claim that reflexive identities are not of indeterminate
truth-value. Where 'A' is an operator to be read "It is
determinate whether...", we may record the principle as;
(R) E (a=a)
Fifthly, if it is determinate whether A, it is not indeter-
minate whether A;~
(C') &A -,vA
From (R) and (C'), we pass to Evar 's third premise.4
Evans would seem also to accept the claim that a sen-
tence is determinate if, and only if, it is not indeter-
minate, We record this as the schema:
(C) AA * +vA
These are the only assumptions appeal to which is required
for the formal argument in Evans's paper.
"Throughout, 'A' is a syntactic variable for an arbi-
trary (open or closed) formula.
4 Evans does not so derive it in his paper, but simply
asserts that "-v(a=a)" is true. The question is, however,
what justifies the claim, and it would seem that only (C'),
or some stronger principle, together with (R) can do so--
unless, of course, we simply assume it as an axiom. I intend
to concentrate attention upon 'A', rather than 'v', however,
so I record (R) and (C') as axiom-schemata.
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I do not intend to question any of these assumptions in
its own right, with the exception of the formulation of the
principle of Indiscernibility. As I shall shortly argue,
Evans's appeal to some version of this principle is justifi-
able. However, we shall discuss, later, whether his appeal
to the principle, in this form, is legitimate, or whether
only some weaker formulation of the principle can be jus-
tified.
Evans also remarks that and are"duals". Wev' and 'A' are "duals". We
should thus probably ascribe the following principle to him:
(D) aA + 4vvA
In any event, the following is surely valid:
(Eq) aA " a(-A)
For, if it is determinate whether A, surely it is also
determinate whether not-A, and it does not matter which two
of (C), (D), and (Eq) one takes as valid, since, as is
easily shown, each of the three is derivable from the other
two.
Now, a great deal of confusion has been caused by a
slip which Evans made in his paper." The slip is the result
of an equivocation between the operator 'a' and a related
but distinct operator '0', which is to be read "It is defin-
5 A reference to Lewis's report of Evans's retraction of
this slip can be found in Francis Jeffry Pelletier, "Another
Argument Against Vague Objects", Journal of Philosophy
LXXXVI, 9 (1989), pp. 481-92. See the footnote on p. 482.
Lewis has not, to the best of my knowledge, published such a
report himself.
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itely true that..." (or simply, "Definitely:..."). The
principle
(To) QA + A
is a natural one; we may take
(DO) OA " "O"A
as the definitiou of a dual operator. Principles analogous
to (C) and (Eq), however, are plainly invalid: If it is
definitely true that A, not only does it not follow that it
is definitely true that not-A, it follows that it is not
definitely true that not-A.
If we do not keep these operators separate, we are
going to have some problems. At one point in his paper,
Evans appeals to the principno:
(T) AA t A
As was said, the analogue, (TO), of this principle is valid
for the operator "Definitely". But given the interpretation
of 'A', as "It is determinate whether...", (T) is plainly
invalid: If it is determinate whether A, it does not follow
that A is true; A may be either determinately true or deter-
minately false. One will have no great difficulty deriving,
from (Eq) and (T), that "-AA" is a valid schema. In the
'For AA + A-A, by (Eq), and AA + -A, by (T); hence, tA
* .A, so since, by (T), AA - A, it follows that aA A & -A,
and so AA.
Pelletier's attempt to derive a contradiction from the
conditional "va=b - na=b" is invalidated precisely by an
appeal to (T). Pelletier in fact notes Evans's retraction of
this slip, but he seems to miss the point. (In fairness,
Pelletier refers to writers who hold that (T) is valid; I do
not know if it is (T) or (TO) which they accept.) See pp.
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presence of (R), or of any principle asserting that not
every sentence is of indeterminate truth-value, contradic-
tion is immediate. The operators '0' and 'A' are closely
related, however. Given an operator '0', like "Definitely",
for which (TO) and (DO) are valid, we can define an operator
'A', like "Determinately", for which (Eq), (C), and (D) are
valid. Viz.:
AA EdJ OA v O"A
vA Ed? -,A
OA & 0-,A
(Eq) is then obvious; (C) is just the definition of 'v';
and, as mentioned above, (D) follows from (Eq) and (C).
Conversely, given our operator 'a', we can define an opera-
tor '0':
oA Ed? A & aA
(TO) is then obvious. We may take (DO) as the definition of
the dual, giving:
OA Ed? 'O'A
a-A v vA
But (C) and (Eq), again, are plainly invalid.
Operators akin to "It is determinate whether..." and
"It is definitely true that..." are thus interdefinable. Our
reading of 'A' as "It is determinate whether..." may now be
further explained: To say that it is determinate whether A
is to say that either A is definitely true or it is defin-
itely false. Since operators such as "Definitely" are rather
483-4.
23
more often discussed in this connection, perhaps this
reading is more helpful than the official interpretation
with which we began.
2. What Evans Argued
For the purposes of our discussion here, I shall
assume, as earlier, that Evans would hold the principles
(C), (D), and (Eq), as well as the unobjectionable (R), to
be valid.
Evans also assumes, for the purposes of argument, that
the operator 'A' does not induce an opaque context. Evans
is not arguing that no identity-statement is vague; he is
arguing that there can ½'e no vague objects. Now, I think
that we should know well enough what a vague object was
meant to be if we understood what Evans would need to prove
to show that there can be no vague objects. As a first
approximation, we may take the following: To say that there
are vague objects is to say that the vagueness of a state-
ment about such an object may be a consequence, not of how
the object is described, but of the nature of the object
itself. That is, whether certain statements of the form "Fa"
are of determinate truth-value must depend, in respect of
the term "a", only upon to what "a" refers; it can not
depend, as Evans here puts it, upon how the bearer of "a" is
24
'described' or, in Fregean terminology, upon what sense the
name "a" bears. 7
To say that whether "Fa" is of determinate truth-value
may, in certain cases, depend only upon to what "a" refers
is to acknowledge that the explanation why "Fa" is not of
determinate truth-value may be just that the expression "a"
is vague. Evans's claim is that a sentence of the form "a=b"
may be of indeterminate truth-value only if one of the terms
I'"a" and "b"' is vague, only if it is indeterminate to what
the terms refer. Conversely, Evans's opponent holds that
there may be (or are) identity-statements "a=b" which are of
indeterminate truth-value, whose truth-value is indeter-
minate not because it is indeterminate to ý.hat "a" and "b"
7 These remarks are in agreement with those of David
Lewis, "Vague Identity: Evans Misunderstood", Analysis
XLVIII, 3 (1988), pp. 128-30. Lewis's remarks are in a
rather different terminology: But the point is that, for one
who maintains that there are vague objects, the step from
"vFa" to "Xx(Fx)(a)" must be valid.
In Lewis's terminology, only one who holds that a vague
name does not "rigidly [denote) a vague object" can balk at
the transition from "va=b" to Nx(a=x)(b)". I avoid such
terminology, being rather unhappy about the use of the
notion of rigid designation here: I suppose that the notion
of necessity, the accessibility relation, with respect to
which such names are meant to be rigid, is that relevant to
a semantics for 'v'. That now seems no better an explana-
tion than that 'v' should be transparent. Moreover, it does
not seem quite right, since, as shall be shown below, one
who maintains that there are vague objects may accept a
modal semantics, based upon S4, which validates " a =b ÷ Oa=b"
but not "'a=b -, Oa=b". Hence, a given term need not refer
to the same object 'in every world'.
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refer, but because the objects to which they refer are
indeterminate.
A note on terminology is now required. I shall speak
throughout of "transparent" operators. In my usage, an
operator is transparent if it poses no barrier to predicate-
abstraction: An operator '0' is transparent if and only if
"Xx[((Fx)](a)" follows from "fl[Nx(Fx)(a)]", and vice versa,
so long as "a" is an expression of the appropriate sort. I
shall simply call such expressions names, for our purposes
(since it is common for the relevant class of expressions to
exclude descriptions, as in the case of necessity).' Hence,
the validity of "(Vx)(Vy)(x=y & OFx) + OFy" is a conse-
quence, not mere'y of the transparency of '0', but of the
above-mentioned principle (LL). If (LL) is valid, then '0'
(or 'A') will not only be transparent but will be exten-
sional, in the sense that "(Vx)(Vy)(x=y & OFx) + OFy" is
"Evans's opponent thus holds that, e.g., 'being defini-
,tely red' (or 'being definitely identical to a') is a
legitimate 'property' of an object, since--so long as the
names do not suffer some indeterminacy--whether "ORed(a)"
(or "Oa=b") is true must depend, in respect of "a", only
upon to what it refers. Likewise, 'being such that it is
determinate whether it is a' is a legitimate property of an
object, or so must one who maintains that there are vague
objects hold.
'The notion of a 'name' to which I am appealing here
will have to be specified in more detail for any particular
operator. In the case we are discussing, the relevant
names' are those in which there is no essential indeter-
minacy of reference, as argued in the last section. The
argument here does not depend upon any particular way of
specifying these names.
As mentioned above, Lewis suggests extending the notion
of rigidity to this case.
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valid. But there might be good reason to question the
validity of (LL), without questioning whether 'is definitely
red' is a predicate satisfied by (vague) objects; without,
that is, questioning the transparency of 'O'.C'
It is worth emphasizing that the argument just given
depends upon the assumption, if such it can be called, that
the ontological or metaphysical view that there are vague
objects has a. semantic component: Namely, that the fact that
we refer to such objects has some explanatory force, that it
explains certain features of our use of (apparent) names of
such objects. The view in question is" that there are vague
objects and (if it adds anything) that it is the vagueness
of such objects which is responsible for the vag..eness of
certain statements, including identity-statements, which we
make about those objects.
Now, it is tempting to conclude, from that argument,
that, if there are vague objects, any operator which means
something like "It is vague whether..." must be transparent.
But one who maintains that there are vague objects need not
hold that every such operator is transparent. She, like
everyone else, can make a place for epistemio or otherwise
intensional operators of this sort. What is essential to her
case is that there may be such operators; that there might
X The distinction between transparency and exten-
sionality will only become important when we discuss objec-
tions to the principle (LL) itself.
AAs Lewis too notes.
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be, or that we could introduce, an operator, which could
plausibly be read "It is vague whether..." or "It is inde-
terminate whether...", which was transparent.
Conversely, one who denies that there are vague objects
need not deny that operators like "It is vague whether..."
may be transparent. What is in question is not just whether
such an operator may be transparent, but whether, if such an
operator is transparent, there are any identity-statements
which are, in the sense of that operator, vague. That is:
One might have the view that there is a transparent operator
"It is vague whether..."; that some statements are (in that
sense) vague and others are not; but that "For all x and y,
it is not 'ague whether x=y" is valid.'2 On such a view,
there would be no vague objects, for any identity-statement
of indeterminate truth-value should be so because it was
indeterminate to what the expressions "a" and "b" referred,
not because to what they refer is indeterminate,
To summarize; The view that there are vague objects can
not properly be characterized as the view that some
identity-statemints are vague. Almost everyone (including
Evans) believes that some identity-statements are vague:
Many of these people (including Evans, again) believe,
X Similarly, one would hold that, so long as "a" and
"b" are (in the appropriate sense) names, "It is not vague
whether a=b" is valid.
It is, indeed, not even clear that it is relevant to
the dispute whether the operator "It is vague whether...",
in English, is transparent. I myself have no settled opinion
on this question nor on the question whether it is.
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however, that the vagueness of such statements is a product,
not of the vagueness of the objects themselves, but of our
language. One who maintains that the'e are vague objects
must, additionally, hold that operators such as "It is
determinate whether..." may be transparent and that, in that
sense, not every identity-statement is of determinate truth-
value even if it is determinate to what the relevant expres-
sions refer: For only if such an operator may be trans-
parent can it be said that the truth-value of a sentence
containing it (and so the vagueness of a sentence) depends
not upon how the objects to which we refer are 'desoribed'
but rather upon the nature of the objects themselves; only
if such an operator may be transparent does the hypoth sis
that we refer to such objects serve any explanatory func-
tion.
We may conclude that it is not to respond to Evans, but
to concede his point, to claim that "It is indeterminate
whether...'" can not be, and any similar operator would not
be, transparent. For, if so, then the indeterminacy of a
given statement depends upon how we refer to the objects to
which we refer; that is to say that the vagueness of the
statement is a product not of reality but of language; and
that is to say, at best, that the claim that we refer to
vague objects can be made only in a theoretical vacuum.
Given this account of what an argument designed to show
that there can be no vague objects must accomplish, we may
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formulate a simple restriction upon such arguments. To show
that there can be no vague objects, what one must show is
that, if 'A' is an operator which can plausibly be construed
as "It is determinate whether...", then, if '6' is trans-
parent, no identity-statement is of indeterminate truth-
value." But that is to say that the argument must show that
there is some special problem which arises if we treat 'A'
as an transparent operator. To contrapose: If "aA" is valid
whether or not 'A' is transparent, then we have not been
given an argument that there are no vague objects. Rather,
we have been given an argument that the principles taken to
govern 'A' are inappropriate for an operator intended to be
read s 'A' is intended to be read, namely, as "It is deter-
minate whether...".
3. Whence the Contradiction?
The question before us now is, therefore, whether
Evans's argument, the assumptions made thus far being
g-anted, establishes his claim. I am therefore granting that
the formal argument Evans sets out is one which must be
accepted by one who maintains that there are vague objects.
The question is whether one who maintains that there are
' I shall henceforth drop the qualifier "so long as 'a'
and 'b' are in the relevant sense names". When I speak of an
identity-statement, I shall always mean a statement which
asserts the identity of two objects a and b.
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vague objects is thus committed to the truth of a contradic-
tion.
Evans argues, recall, that we can derive, from the
assumption "va=b", the conclusion "•a=b", which, he says,
contradicts the assumption. As was said earlier, it is not
obvious why this should be so. We may take Evans to have
meant that, if "-sa=b" is true, then, since "azb" is false,
its truth-value is determinate. Hence, there would seem to
be an unrecorded step from "- a=b" to "Aa=b". Presumably,
Evans intended us to construe the argument in just this way:
He writes that "-a=b" contradicts the assumption "that the
identity-statement 'a=b' is of indeterminate truth-value". 4
But to what principle is Evans appealing here? Just what
justifies this transition?
The simplest principle to which we might take Evans to
be appealing is:
(N) A & AA
However, if he means to appeal to this principle, then his
argument might have avoided questions of identity alto-
gether. Viz. :"
A aA (N) (1)
-A & .- A (N) (2)
AA & a-A (Eq) (3)
"A + AA (2,3) (4)
A v -A t A (1,4) (5)
AiA (5)
4 Evans. My italics.
* Note that I am assuming the validity of classical
logic here. That is not to say that I am assuming Bivalence.
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No appeal to the transparency of 'A' is required: "AA" is
valid whether 'A' is transparent or not.
Thus, if Evans intends to appeal to (N), he has no
argument against the existence of vague objects. As I argued
in the last section, the possibility of an argument such as
that just given shows, not that, if 'A' is transparent, then
"aa=b" is valid; but, rather, that the theory in question--
namely, (N)+(C)+(Eq)--is an inadequate theory for an opera-
tor which is meant to express vagueness (or lack thereof),
as no statement is, in the sense of this operator, vague.
It might also be suggested that Evans intends to appeal
to some modal claim regarding 'A'. He writes that, "if a
determines a logic at least as strong as SS5", then "a((a=b)"
is derivable from "va=b"' .
As a version of the characteristic axiom of S5, i.e.,
"0A + DOA", we may take:
(5) vA * +vA
We also need to appeal to the following distribution prin-
ciple: 7
' Evans. As Bob Stalnaker pointed out, Evans's remarks
here are influenced by the 'slip' mentioned earlier, which
is to say that he seems to be best interpreted as discussing
not "A" but "0".
7 David Lewis pointed out to me that the standard
distribution principle, which would allow the inference from
'a(A - B)' to 'aA + AB' is invalid. To see this, just let A
be the falsum. Then 'A ÷ B' is true, and so determinate;
similarly, A is false, so 'aA' is determinate; but then 'aB'
is true, whatever B is.
To prove the restricted version, we use the equivalence
between 0 and A. 'A(A * B)' is equivalent to 'O(A - B) v
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A(A + B)
A & AA ÷ aB
The argument is then as follows:
va=b + a=b Evans's argument
a(va=b + a=b) Necessitation (analogue)
va=b & ava=b ÷ a4(a=b) (1) Distribution
va=b + ava=b (54)
va=b + va=b & ava=b (2) Last step, PC
v(a=b) + A(-a=b) (1,2) PC
*. va=b + aa=b (Eq), PC
That, indeed, is contradictory.
What sort of justification can be given for (54)
however? The most natural which comes to mind is the fol-
lowing: Every proposition is either (definitely) true,
(definitely) false, or (definitely) neither true nor false.
We may take "aA" to be (definitely) true if, and only if, A
is either definitely true or definitely false; otherwise, it
is (definitely) false. Similarly, "vA" is (definitely) true
if, and only if, A is (definitely) neither true nor false.
Hence, (54): If it is indeterminate whether A, it is (defin-
itely) true that A is neither true nor false; hence, it is
determinate whether it is neither true nor false; hence, it
is determinate whether it is indeterminate whether At.S
O'(A + B)'; hence, by distribution, PC: '(OA + OB) v O(A &
"B)'; so, '(oA - OB) V (DA & OB)'; hence, by PC, 'OA - (OB
v 0-B)'. But the consequent is just 'AB' and 'OA' is equi-
valent to 'A & aA'. Thus: "aA & A + aB'.
~ I should thank Bob Stalnaker for suggesting this as a
possible justification; the suggestion greatly improved this
section of the paper. In previous drafts, I had found myself
rather lost for a justification, since I was concentrating
instead upon (the equivalent) "VAA + aA". At first sight, it
is difficult to see why one should accept this principle.
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This justification of (5A), however, is one which one
who maintains that there are vague objects has no reason to
accept. Recall that we may define an operator 'O0' as fol-
lows:
OA =d A & AA
Note, then, that "OA" is either definitely true or defin-
itely false: For either A is definitely true, definitely
false, or definitely neither true nor false. If A is either
definitely true or definitely false, then "AA" is true; so
"ODA" is definitely true or definitely false, as A is true or
false. Similarly, if A is definitely neither true nor false,
then "aA" is false, so "OA" is false. That is: "OA" is
(definitely) true if, and only if, A is definitely true;
otherwise, it is (definitely) false. The justification for
(5,) thus also provides a justification for this prin-
ciple :
AOA
It follows that, by making use of the operator '0', we have
the means for speaking about our (by hypothesis) vague
subject matter with no vagueness whatsoever, using an opera-
Nonetheless, it is valid, given the suggested interpreta-
tion of 'A', since the antecedent is necessarily false.
' A formal derivation of this schema can be given, but
it is somewhat space-consuming, due to the fact that 'A' is
here the primitive operator. If we introduce '0' as our
primitive operator and define 'A' as earlier, the proof is
rather easier. For 'AOA' is equivalent to 'OOA v O0DA';
i.e., to 'ODA v O00A', which is provable in $5.
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tor which is transparent." All one need do is take care to
insert 'O' before anything one writes or says, and whatever
vagueness may have affectec' the original sentence will be
removed: All one's utterances will be (definitely) true or
(definitely) false.
But that is a possibility which one who holds that
there are vague objects has reason to reject: If the objects
themselves are respinsible for the vagueness of (identity-)
statements containing names of them, then all our talk about
such objects must be, in principle, vague. Surely the pio-
ture proposed, that there is vagueness in reality--any sort
of vagueness, whether that of properties or of objects--
could hardly be better explained than in terms of the claim
that the vagueness which characterizes our talk about such
objects is an essential feature of it, one which can not be
eliminated merely by the introduction of as-yet-unheard-of
operators into the language. For it is not our language
which is responsible.
That is just to say that on a conception of vagueness
according to which there is 'vagueness in reality', vcgue-
ness is ineradicable. While it will, on such a view, be
possible to introduce operators which "strengthen" vague
ZtNote that Pelletier's argument, in terms of many-
valued logic, relies upon the same sort of claim: His J-
operators may be defined in terms of '0', subject to S5. In
a slightly different, but hopefully self-explanatory, termi-
nology: J A •-d DA; JA -d? O'A; J,4A Ed? -OA & 'CA. It is then
not too difficult to derive a contradiction from "J, (a=b)".
See Pelletier, pp. 48d-90.
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statements--for example, "Definitely"--no such operator can
eliminate vagueness; If A is vague, so, in principle, is
"Definitely: A"."L But the semantic assumptions required to
justify (5S) are strong enough to justify the introduction
of operators, like '0', which eradicate vagueness from vague
statements. Indeed, the assumption that every (apparently
vague) statement is either definitely true, definitely
false, or definitely neither true nor false amounts to the
assumption that vagueness is eradicable and therefore begs
the question against one who maintains that there are vague
objects .'
In any event, it is hardly likely that Evans intended
to appeal to this sort of modal principle. For he says,
recall, that "if a determines a logic at least as strong as
55", then "aa=b" is derivable from "va=b". So he is not
intending to appeal to any such claim as part of his origi-
nal argument. The fact that we can derive "-'a=b" from "va=b"
is the real problem: The remark about S5 is but an aside.
I pursue it only to show that that avenue is definitely
closed.
"' See Michael Dummett, "Wang's Paradox", in his Truth
and Other Enigmas (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press,
1978), pp. 248-68, at p. 257.
It is worth emphasizing that this argument shows that
one who maintains that there are vague objects should not
attempt to provide a semantics for vague statements in terms
of a many-valued logic. (Note that this claim depends upon
the results of sections 5 and 6.)
Pelletier makes precisely the opposite suggestion, for
reasons I do not understand: See p. 482.
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But we ought nonetheless to be extremely puzzled by
this last remark from Evans's paper. Surely, if, as Evans
says, "'a=b" contradicts the original assumption that
"va=b', then "va=b" must be at least as strong as "'va=b"
If one statement contradicts another, then it must at least
imply the negation of that other statement. If so, then, for
whatever reason, "-va=b"--i.e., "&a=b"--must follow from
"-a-b". But why then does Evans say that it is only if the
logic governing 'A' is at least as strong as S5, then we can
derive "0a=b"? To this question, I can give no definitive
answer: But I think that Evans was trying to express a quite
different distinction between what he can and what he can
not prove, to which we now turn.
4. Whence the Contradiction
The most natural suggestion to make at this point is
that it is not the axiom (N) but the rule of inference (N*)
which is valid:
A
&A
Such a rule is surely valid: If A is true, then it is indeed
determinate whether A is true. That is all that is required
of a valid rule of inference: That its conclusion be true
whenever its premises are true.
The point of introducing the rule (N*) is to get the
effect of (N) without its disadvantages. Hence, we must
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renounce conditional proof: For if conditional proof is
valid, we shall be able to derive (N) from (N*). Similarly,
we must renounce proof by cases; For if proof by cases is
valid, we shall once again be able to demonstrate the valid-
ity of "aA" without appeal to the transparency of 'a':
CA] A-A
AA AA A v ,A
AA
(Note that 'CA]' indicates that A has been discharged.) And,
again, if proof by reductio is valid:
("A]C 
A
Hence, -AA F' A. Therefore, by substitution: .a6A F' A. But,
"&A"A" is equivalent to "~AA", by (Eq). Hence, -4,A F' 'A.
Hence, ~aA F' (A & -A); so, by reductio, again: F' AA.
Thus, if any one of conditional proof, proof by cases,
.and proof by reductio is valid," we shall be able to show
that "aA" is valid, without appeal to .4e transparency of
'a'. Just as in the case of (N), we shall yet be without an
argument that there are no vague objects.
We must, therefore, abandon conditional proof and its
kin: More precisely, we must renounce appeal to (N*) within
• If we assume the validity of classical propositional
logic, it is not difficult to show that proof by cases,
conditional proof, and proof by reductio stand or fall
together.
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so-called subordinate deductions; within, that is, deduc-
tions from premises which may subsequently be discharged.
Such rules are sometimes called "auxiliary" rules of infer-
ence; I shall refer to rules such as (N*) as 'rules of
deduction'. We may thus interpret Evans as having intended
that the rule (N*) be valid as a rule of deduction."
With the rule (N*) in hand, we can complete the deriva-
tion of the contradiction (omitting the lambda-notation):
va=b Premise
ova=a (R)
va=b (LL)
A(ia=b) by (N*)
vva=b by (D)
vazb & vva=b first and last lines
Contradiction. Because we have been forced to renounce
application of (N*) within proofs by reductio, however, we
can not infer that -va=b. Even given the hypothesis that 'v'
is transparent, we can not prove, via (N*), that "aa=b" is
valid; what we can do is derive a contradiction from
" va= b'" ,b
' Oft-expressed worries about the validity of condi-
tional proof thus prove relevant.
Such rules have a place in other contexts: For example,
one can formulate consistent theories of truth using such
rules. See Vann McGee, "Applying Kripke's Theory of Truth",
Journal of Philosophy LXXXVI (1089), pp. 530-9. See also
Harvey Friedman and Michael Sheard, "An Axiomatic Approach
to Self-Referential Truth" (draft), in which the term
"auxiliary rule of inference" appears in a similar context.
z* We can give models for this language as follows. Let
the underlying structure of the models be that for a quanti-
fied version of S4, with the domain fixed, in the sense
that, if an object exists in one world, it exists in all.
(We may, for the moment, abstract from the problem of exis-
tence.)
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Assuming, for the moment, that the (amended) formal
argument Evans has presented is one his opponent must
accept, the only problem with his argument is now the final
step; Namely, that by which he passes from the intermediate
conclusion that no statement of the form "va=b" can be true,
to the ultimate conclusion that there can be no vague
objects. We shall discuss this step after we discuss Evans's
appeal to the Indiscernibility principle.
5. Formulating the Indiscernibility Principle
Given the utility we have found the notion of a rule of
deduction to have in this context, one might well seek to
defend the view that "va=b" might be true by denying Evans's
appeal to the Indiscernibility Principle, in the form in
Instead of taking truth to be truth at some 'actual'
world, we define truth as truth in all worlds. Define "aA",
as usual, as "13A V 0-A". Then (Eq) is obvious. Take (D) as
the definition of the dual. One may also verify that (LL)
holds (on the assumption that "a=b + Oa=b" is valid).
Suppose A is true. Then A is true in all worlds; so
"OA" is true at all worlds; so "aA" is true at all worlds;
so "aA" is true. Hence, (N*) is valid.--Conditional proof,
however, clearly fails: "A + AA" is not valid, since A may
be true at one world, but not true at another.
",Aa=b" is not satisfiable. For suppose that "-sa=b" is
true at some world w. Then "Os-a=b" is true at w. Hence,
there is some world w', accessible from w, at which "a=b" is
true. But "a=b * Oa=b" is valid; hence, "Oa=b" is true at
w . And so, "aa=b" is true at w'. Hence, "-aa=b" is not true
at all worlds; so, "ea=b" can not be true.
Nonetheless, "ca=b" is not valid. Let there be two
worlds, w and w'. Take w' accessible to w, though not con-
versely. Let "a=b" be false at w; true, at w'. Then "aa=b"
is not true at w and so is not true.
It can be shown that S4+(N*), which I call "V4", is
complete with respect to this class of models.
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which it is required for his argument. In this section, we
shall look at the prospects of such a move.
Earlier, we recorded this principle in the form:
(LL) a=b & Xx(Fx)(a) AXx(Fx)(b)
Given the transparency of '0' and 'a', it is then easy to
derive the two schemata:
a=b + Oa=b
a=b ÷ aa=b
Both of t•Use principles have been questioned.' Consider,
for instance, the latter schema: Suppose that "a=b" is
neither (definitely) true nor (definitely) false; then
"•a=b" is false (or, at least, not true); hence, plausibly,
"a=b * Aa=b" is not true. No instance of this conditional
can possibly be false, since, if "a=b" is true, so is
"•a=b": But it does not follow that the conditional is
valid.
Hence, (LL) itself need not be a valid schema: If "a-b"
is neither definitely true nor definitely false, then "Fa"
might be true though "Fb" is neither true nor false. (Above,
we took the predicate "FC" to be "a=•".) Thus, both the
antecedent and the consequent might be neither true nor
false; plausibly, the conditional is then itself neither
true nor false. To assume the validity of (LL) would thus
2* See, for example, B.J. Garrett, "Vagueness and
Identity", Analysis XLVIII, 3 (1988), pp. 130-4.
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appear to beg the question against one who maintains that
there are vague objects.
One who maiantains that there are vague objects may
adopt, instead of (LL), the rule of deduction (LL*):'
a=b Fa
Fb
After all, if a is b, then a and b must share all their
properties: So, if it is true that a=b, then, if it is true
that, say, aFa, it must also be true that aFb.
If appeal to this rule alone is allowed, Evans's proof
fails. For we can not prove that, if "Fa" is true and "PFb"
is true, then "-a=b" is true. That is, we can not derive the
rule (II*):
Fa Fb
'a=b
We might try to do so as follows:
Fa [a=b]
Fb Fb
-a=b
But this proof by reductio is invalid, since appeal to
(LL*), a rule of deduction, is invalid within subordinate
deductions. In principle, then, one may accept the validity
of (LL*) while denying that of (I*). Thus, if only the rule
of deduction (LL*) is accepted as valid, we can not show
2 7 Henceforth, I omit the predicate-abstraction opera-
tors, since we are assuming that "Xx(Fx)(a)" is equivalent
to "'Fa", in the cases which interest us.
'2
that no sentence of the form "va=b" is true. Denial of the
validity of (LL) and its replacement by (LL*) will block the
derivation of a contradiction from "va=b".,
However, Evans does not require appeal to (LL) itself
to derive the contradiction. Rather, he requires only appeal
to the rule (II*). What he needs is to be able to derive
"aa=b" from "-va=a" and "va=b". The rule (II*) would license
this transition."
One who wishes to defend the view that sentences of the
form "va=b" might be true must deny, as we have seen, not
only that (LL) is valid, but also that (II*) is valid. But
it is difficult to see on what ground the denial is to be
' We can give models for such a language. Let the
underlying structure be that for a quantified version of S5,
without the assumption that a=b + Oa=b. We require only
that, if "FP" does not contain '0', then, if "a=b" is true
at a world, "Fa + Fb" is also true at that world. We again
define truth as truth in all worlds: Hence, (N*) is valid.
It is straightforward to prove, by induction on the
number of occurrences of '0' in "FP", that "Oa=b + (Fa +
Fb)" is valid, for any predicate "Ft". Hence, if °"a=b" and
"Fa" are (absolutely) true, then, since "a=b & Fa" is true
at all worlds, so must "Fb" be true at all worlds. Hence,
(LL*) is valid.
We may show simultaneously that (II*) fails--and so is
independent of (LL*)--and that "'Oa=b & -O4a=b" is satisfi-
able. Let there be two worlds w and w'. Let "a=b" be true at
w; false, at w'. Then, of course, "Oa=a" is true at both w
and w'; but "'Oa=b" is also true at both w and w'. Hence,
both "'Oa=a" and "-Oa=b" are true, though "'a=b" is not true,
since "a=b" is true at w. Furthermore, "-O'a=b" is true at
both w and w'. Hence, "-Q'a=b" is true and so "sQa=b &
u~Q'a-b" is true.
' There is some reason to think that Evans was aware of
this problem. If (LL) were the principle to which he was
appealing, he could simplify the proof. Viz.; a=b + aa=b;
hence, 'aa=b + -a=b; so, va=b * -a=b. But who knows?
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made. It is one thing to argue, as we did earlier, that if
"Fa" is true and "Fb" is not true, then "a=b" need not be
false, but need only fail to be true. Such an argument is
sufficient to call the validity of the schema (II)--i.e.,
"Fa & "Fb + -a=b"--into doubt. (For both the antecedent and
the consequent might then be neither true nor false.) This
argument should remind us of the argument for rejecting
(LL), which we discussed earlier: If "a=b" is neither true
nor false, then "Fa" might be true, though "Fb" too is
neither true nor false. That is to say, roughly, that if it
is indeterminate whether a is b, it might be similarly
indeterminate whether they 'share all their properties':
There might be biconditionals of the form "Fa 4 Fb" which
are neither true nor false.
It is another thing to suggest that, if it is indeter-
minate whether a is b, it might, in fact, be false that they
share all their properties, that there might be some predi-
.cate "Fe" such that "Fa" is true though "Fb" is false.t3:'
The talk of 'properties', which I have used heuristi-
cally, is, of course, rather slippery. We need now to remove
the appeal to the notion of a property.
The important disanalogy between the rejection of (LL)
and the rejection of (II*) is that the latter depends upon
' Nota that, if so, the semantio counterpart of (LL),
which states that the truth-value of "a=b" is the same as
that of the infinite conjunction of all biconditionals "Fa '
Fb", fails.
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the presence of the operators '0' and 'A' in the language.
Now, if we assume that the language contains only, as it
were, 'ordinary' predicates (which do not contain these
operators), then there is no reason to question the validity
of (II*).t (If, for example, "a is red" is true and "b is
red" is false, then "a=b" is false.) One may yet wish to
reject (LL), for reasons like those just discussed. That
ground for the rejection of (LL) does not depend upon the
presence of such operators as 0' and 'a'; it requires only
the claim that "a=b" itself may be of indeterminate truth-
value, for that claim entails the corresponding claim that,
if so, biconditionals of the form "Fa Fb" may be of inde-
terminate truth-value.
The rejection of (II*), on the other hand, depends upon
the presence of such operators as 'O' and 'a',' upon the
assumption that they are transparent, and upon certain
assumptions about the truth-values of sentences containing
such operators. If we assume the transparency of such opera-
tors, if we so explain '0' that, if "Fa" is not true, then
"DFa" is false, and if we assume that "a=b" might be neither
true nor false, then we shall find ourselves compelled to
3 As was reflected in the model developed for such a
language above.
More precisely, the case against (II*) depends upon
specific assumptions about what sorts of predicates the
language contains. The assumption that the language contains
operators like '0' and 'A' is one such assumption, appeal to
which is natural in this context.
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reject (II*). (Evans shows us why.) But it is not clear that
we are entitled to make such assumptions.
6. That the Re-formulation of Indiscernibility Amounts Not
to a Reply to Evans But to Capitulation
The intuition, which I hope some share, that any "real
property" is subject to Leibniz's Law, at least in the form
of (LL*) and (II*), finds a theoretical justification here.
Leibniz's Law may require re-formulation,' in the form of
(LL*) and (II*), in the case of languages whose semantics
allow for a (non-trivial) distinction between rules of
deduction and more ordinary rules of inference (in, that is,
cases in which the deduction theorem fails anyway). But it
ought not be re-formulated due to the presence of sentential
operators of certain sorts: The question whether a new
operator which we wish to introduce is transparent ought to
be answered by determining whether, if it is taken to be
transparent, Leibniz's Law remains valid, in whatever form
it was taken to be valid before the introduction of the new
operator. Surely it is quite special pleading to argue that,
conversely, we are so convinced that this new operator is
transparent that we must revise Leibniz's Law.
I am not suggesting here that Leibniz's Law ought to
be re-formulated at all.
I do not know whether the independence of (LL*) and
(II*) from (LL) can be demonstrated, if the underlying logic
is classical. (It is fairly easy to establish the indepen-
dence result if we do not require that the underlying logic
be classical.)
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To put the point differently: I argued above that
Evans's assumption that (LL) is valid begs the question
whether there are vague objects. What I am now arguing is
that the assumption that (II*) is valid does not beg that
question. It is, of course, true that the assumption that
(II*) is valid, even if the predicate in question contains
'O' or '&', is inconsistent with the claim that "va=b" might
be true: But that does not imply that its assumption begs
the question whether "'Va=b" might be true. (If it did, it
would be impossible to argue at all.)
The invalidity of (LL) is an immediate consequence of
the assumption that "a=b" might be neither true nor false.
The v.lidity of (II*), on the other hand, is inconsistent
with the following trio of claims: First, that "a=b" might
be neither true nor false; Secondly, that "OA" and "aA" are
false, if A is not true; and, Thirdly, that '0' and 'A' are
transparent operators. It is not at all obvious that one is
entitled simultaneously to make stipulations about the
transparency of an operator like 'A' and to make stipul-
ations about the truth-values of sentences which contain it.
On the contrary, it would seem that one ought explain
such an operator--settle how the truth-value of a sentence
"aA" containing it is determined by that of "A" itself--and
then ask whether it is transparent. Or, conversely, one
ought settle upon the transparency of the operator and then
ask how, consistent with its transparency, the truth-
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conditions of sentences containing it may be explained.? To
answer either of these questions, one must make reference to
that form of Leibniz's Law which is properly taken to be
valid prior to the introduction of the new operator: Hence,
if the new operator is transparent, it will be subject to
whatever form of Leibniz's Law is valid for sentences which
do not contain it.
The notion of transparency in use here, is not, of
course, self-explanatory: One might well wonder whether it
is any less slippery than the notion of a property. One
might similarly wonder whether the reliance upon the analogy
with the introduction of a new operator should be trusted:
Perhaps the remarks about the introduction of a new ot irator
are just irrelevant to the situation we face when an opera-
tor is already in general use. It is therefore worth re-
emphasizing the role the notion of transparency is playing
in this discussion.
The difficulty is that the rejection of (II*) can not
help but raise the question whether '0' and 'A', as they
must then be understood, are not merely epistemic operators.
'4 Operators like 'A' form a special class, since they
are truth-functional--or, at least, are intended to be by
one who adopts the view we are considering. The sorts of
remarks being made here apply also to other sorts of opera-
tors, however, and their force may be more apparent in such
cases.
The general problem is reminiscent of questions Dummett
has often raised concerning whether certain logical laws are
in harmony with other laws. See his The Logical Basis of
Metaphysics (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1991)
for an extended discussion of this problem.
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As was said earlier, what is really troubling Evans is the
following; Of course it is true that some identity-state-
ments are vague; but, if it is vague whether a is b, that is
not because a and b are vague objects. Rather, the vague-
ness of the statement is a product of oiir epistemic limita-
tions and of the vagueness of our language. Formally,
Evans's opponent is committed to the transparency of (some)
such operators as "It is determinate whether...". If what
transparency requires is itself in dispute, this formulation
will help us less than it otherwise might. What we may ask
instead is whether the rejection of (II*) is bound to rein-
force Evans's true worry: We may ask, that is, whether the
claim that sentences containing '0' and 'A' are not subject
to (II*) is bound to invite the charge that, if so, such
operators must be epistemic ones.
And, indeed, it is: For there are plainly epistemic (or
otherwise intensional) operators which are subject to (LL*),
but for which (II*) fails. For example, let 'BA' be read as
"Linguistic conventions so far laid down and the non-seman-
tic facts together determine that A"." Plainly, if A is
true, then 'eA' is true. So (N*) is valid. Similarly, if
"a=b" and "Fa" are true, then "Fb" is true. (If a=b and
linguistic-conventions-plus-reality determine that Fa, then
linguistic-conventions-plus-reality determine that Fb.) But
ZThis interpretation was suggested by remarks made by
McGee, in a rather different context. See p. 537.
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(II*) fails: If linguistic-conventions-plus-reality deter-
mine that Fa, but it is not the case (i.e., it is false)
that linguistic-conventions-plus-reality determine that Fb,
it does not follow that a is not b. Rather, it follcws only
that it is not the case that linguistic-conventions-plus-
reality determine that a is b. Further linguistic conven-
tions which we might lay down--i.e., a more precise specifi-
cation of what we mean by "a" and "b"--might decide the
question of their identity either way."
Given such an operator, then, there might well be some
true sentences of the form ",1Oa=b & -,a=b"--i.e., of the
form "va=b". But one who accepts the legitimacy of this
operator is in no way committed to the existenc • of vague
objects: So far as this particular operator is concerned,"
the 'vagueness' of a statement is but a matter of our not
having stipulated sufficiently many linguistic conventions
to determine its truth-value. Vagueness, so far as this
pperator is concerned, is indeed a product of epistemic and
linguistic phenomena.
Thus, rejection of the validity of (II*) would seem to
amount to acceptance of Evans's claim that, if some sentence
' Note, first, that the rule OFa, OFb V' a=b is just
equivalent to (II*) in the presence of (N,). Note, secondly,
that the rule Fa, Fb, v -Oa=b is that which one attracted to
this sort of view might well propose as a replacement for
(ii,).
• I say "so far as this particular operator is con-
cerned" because one who maintains that there are vague
objects may nonetheless accept its legitimacy.
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of the form "va=b" is true, then the operator 'v' is an
epistemic one. For Evans, or one who agrees with him, may
freely accept that there are operators which are subject to
(LL*), though not to (II*). If so, then, of course, there
may be some true sentences of the form "It is vague whether
a=b". But Evans had not intended to deny that there are
vague identity-statements: He thus had no need to deny that
there may be operators subject to (LL*), though not to
(II*). What he must deny, rather, is that, so understood,
"It is vague whether..." is transparent or non-epistemic:
And, indeed, at least one such operator is plainly epis-
temic.
I admit that I am hedging my bets. It is, in my
opinion, implausible that any operator which is not subject
to (II*) can be shown to be 'non-epistemic'. But it is
difficult to argue that there is no possible interpretation
of '0' and 'A' which would serve the purposes of one who
wished to defend the view that "va=b" might be true, 'in a
non-epistemic sense'. To do so would, as has become clear,
require the resolution of some sticky issues involving the
notion of a 'property' and the related notion of transpar-
ency. However, it should also have become clear that any
attempt to defend this view will have to negotiate a number
of obstacles. These obstacles are not formal: We have, after
all, seen precisely what is required of a formal system
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compatible with such a view. But neither does the existence
of such a formal system guarantee the coherence of the view.
7. The Existence of Vague Objects
For the purposes of this section, I shall assume that
the principle of Indiscernibility is valid in its classical
form; a=b & Fa + Fb. That is, I shall assume that, despite
the caveat at the end of the last section, it is not pos-
sible to defend the view that there are vague objects by way
of the rejection of the validity of (II*).' If so, then one
who wishes to defend the existence of vague objects must
accept as valid Evans's derivation of a contradiction from
"va=b"; she must, therefore, grant Evans t'Fat there neither
are nor could be any true sentences of the form "va=b"; the
question is whether she must not also grant that "aa=b" is
valid.
Whether Evans's argument shows that there can be no
vague objects may now seem to be but a terminological ques-
tion. We know what Evans's argument shows and what it does
not show: It does show that there is no true snntence of the
form "va=b"; it does not show that "4a=b" is valid. If we
identify the view that there are vague objects with the view
" As mentioned in the last section, one could assume
the validity of (LL*) and (II), and Evans's argument would
still succeed. However, the only reason given for the aban-
donment of (LL) itself is that "a=b" might have some truth-
value other than true or false, an assumption I have now
rejected.
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that there are (or might be) true sentences of the form
"va=b", then Evans has shown that there are no vague
objects. If, on the other hand, we identify the view that
there are vague objects with the view that "'aa=b" is not
valid, then he has not.
But the dispute is not merely verbal. Evans certainly
took himself to be arguing a metaphysical point, namely,
that there can be no vague objects. Any argument for such a
conclusion must rest upon some characterization of the
nature of the dispute; in this case, it rests upon a charac-
terization of the view that there are vague objects. Evans's
view, I suggest, can only have been that one who maintains
that there are vague objects is committed to the claim that
there may be true sentences of the form "va=b". Indeed, he
opens his paper by saying that one who maintains that there
are vague objects is committed to maintaining that it can be
"a fact" that a particular identity-statement is of indeter-
minate truth-value."7 This is not an unnatural way to under-
stand the view: The dispute does not concern whether some
identity-statements are vague; the view that there are vague
objects is the view that the vagueness in question is due
not to language but to the nature of reality itself; and
that view may be explicated as the view that it might be a
'fact' that some identity-statements are of indeterminate
truth-value.
S'Evans.
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Nonetheless, in the remainder of this section, I shall
argue that there is a view, which can plausibly be iden-
tified as committed to the existence of vague objects, which
is not committed to the possibility that there might be
truths of the form "va=b". I shall thus argue that Evans's
claim to have proven that there are no vague objects fails,
even though the (formal) argument he gives is valid. For we
need not accept Evans's characterization of this view, and
there is an alternative which can be independently moti-
vated.
It is worth considering, for a moment, an objection to
my claim that we need to resolve the question how to oharao-
terize the view that there are vague objects. The objection
is that we can extend Evans's argument to show that "Aa=b"
is valid. Evans has, it is now being granted, shown that we
may deduce a contradiction from "va=b". Hence, no sentence
of the form "va=b" can possibly be true (since no contra-
diction is true). Hence, since every statement is either
true or false, (each instance of) "va=b" must be false; it
follows that (each instance of) "aa=b" must be true, and so
that "Aa=b" is, as a schema, valid.
This argument is naturally understood as appealing to
the principle that every statement4" is either true or
false. It is this principle that licenses the cruoial in-
"The word 'statement' here is used in the sense of
'sentence fit to be uttered assertorically' and so in the
sense of 'sentence fit to be assigned truth-value'.
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ference from the non-truth of "va=b" to its falsity.
Plainly, one who wishes to reject Evans's argument must
reject this principle, the principle of Bivalence." More
precisely, she must reject the claim that every statement
about vague objects (and, in particular, every statement of
the form "Aa=b") is either true or false. That is to say,
one who rejects Evans's argument must reject the principle
of Bivalence, as it applies to statements about vague
objects.
Plausibly, the principle of Bivalence is yet more
intimately connected to our subject. The (metaphysical)42
4" Bivalence is often said to be the principle that
every statement is determinately either true or false. The
qualifier 'determinately' does help, I think, to convey what
is intended--i.e., that Bivalence is a stronger principle
than is Excluded Middle. But, on the other hand, I do not
think that, ultimately, it really helps us to explain the
principle of Bivalence.
The use of the word "determinately' in this context
should not be confused with the use of the same word in this
paper.
My own view is that Bivalence can not be distinguiished
from Excluded Middle until the notion of truth is itself
explained as a notion of semantic theory, rather than, say,
directly in terms of Convention T. The problem is thus to
explain why the notion of truth is needed in semantic
theory, why the explanation directly in terms of Convention
T will not suffice to explain the notion as it is there
needed, and, finally, how the notion, as it is needed in
semantic theory, is connected to the intuitive notion of
truth.
4 2 The relevance of Bivalence to such issues has, of
course, been argued by Michael Dummett, in a variety of
places. See, for example, his "Realism", in Truth and Other
Enigmas, pp. 145-65.
Note ;hat one who holds such a view need not deny that
"a=b v .a=:>" is valid: The rejection of Bivalence need not
commit one to rejection of Excluded Hiddle, unless one's
notion of 'absolute) truth distributes over disjunction.
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view that there are no vague objects is itself plausibly
explained as the view that the 'boundaries' of any given
object are perfectly determinate; because its boundaries are
determinate, the identity of such an object--whether it is
b, say--is also perfectly determinate. Every identity-
statement is therefore either (definitely) true or (defin-
itely) false, is of determinate truth-value: Thus, the view
that there are no vague objects is committed to the claim
that the principle of Bivalence holds for all identity-
s ta temen ts."ý
The view that there are vague objects is simply the
denial of the view just explained: Hence, it is committed
only to the claim that not every identity-statement is of
determinate truth-value. The conclusion may be reinforced by
reflection upon the picture characteristic of the view that
there are vague objects: The 'boundaries' of such objects
are, so to speak, fuzzy. Because the boundaries of these
objects are fuzzy, the identity of such objects may itself
be fuzzy: Because the objects do not themselves have deter-
minate boundaries, an identity-statement containing names of
Since truth, in this sort of case, is unlikely to do so,
acceptance of Excluded Middle is consistent with rejection
of Bivalence.
4 One may hold this sort of view even if one maintains
that Bivalence fails for such statements as "The table is
red". One who hold. this sort of view may accept a many-
valued semantics: Identity-statements, however, will take on
only the values True and False.
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such objects need not have a determinate truth-value, need
not be determinately either true or false.
It follows that the view that there are vague objects
need be committed to no more than the invalidity of "Aa=b":
For, given that any such view is incompatible with Biva-
lence, one can consistently hold that, though not every
instance of "&a=b" is true, no instance is false.
The difficulty is not, however, to motivate the olaim
that the view that there are vague objects is committed to
the denial of the principle of Bivalence. The view that
there are vague objects has usually been explained in terms
of the claim that identity-statements might be neither true
nor false, that is, might have some truth-value other than
True or False. In general, however, to claim that state-
ments may be neither true nor false, may have some inter-
mediate truth-value, is to allow for the introduction of an
operator 'v' interpreted as follows: A sentence "vA" is true
if, and only if, A has some truth-value other than True or
False, and is false otherwise. This sort of view, which
proceeds via a many-valued semantics, is thus committed to
the view that statements of the form "va=b" may be true: For
the view just is the view that identity-statements may be
neither true nor false.
That view, we have seen, is probably not tenable. But
it is not the only alternative to the view that every state-
ment is either true or false. An additional alternative to
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Evans's view that there are no vague objects is a view
committed both to the denial of Bivalence and to the denial
of the principle of Multi-valence, the principle that there
are (usually finitely) many truth-values and that each
statement has some one of these." One who is attracted to
the view that there are vague objects is naturally drawn to
the view that some icentity-statements may be neither true
nor false. Such a view reflects the commitment to the rejec-
tion of Bivalence but retains a commitment to Multi-valence;
That, or so I am now arguing, is the source of its defeat.
Any view which rejects not only Bivalence but also
Multi-valence, which rejects the idea that every statement
has some particular trut!-value, constitutes a substantial
departure from the view that every identity-statement is
either true or false. To reject the claim that every state-
ment has some one of however many possible truth-values is
to reject the claim that what truth-value a statement has is
independent of our knowledge and of our capacities for
knowledge. The view is not that there is something other
than True or False for sentences to be: It is rather that
our model of truth and falsity, as objective properties of
sentences, whose possession of various truth-values is
epistemically unconstrained, fails to apply in this case.
44 It is again usual to add the qualifier "determi-
nately" here. I think that the term "Multi-valence" origi-
nated with Hichael Dummett, but I am not sure.
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The view that there are not two, but three (or more), truth-
values can only seem comparatively familiar.
We have, at least, a model of such a more unusual view
in the Intuitionistic philosophy of mathematics.4" An Intui-
tionist rejects the principle of Bivalence and so denies
that every statement is either true or false. Yet she also
maintains that no statement can be neither true nor false.
Her view is emphatically not that, objectively speaking,
some statements are true (i.e., provable), others false
(i.e., refutable), and yet others neither true nor false
(i.e., neither provable nor refutable). Her view is that
statements of mathematics do not merit the sort of objec-
tivity which we naturally accord to them: We may speak only
of what is provable, and we may speak of what is provable
only in terms of what we can prove, of what we might be able
to prove.
Whether the alternative to Evans's view which I have
sketched is even ultimately explicable depends upon whether
it is possible to formulate a semantic theory which would
4 5 One might well want to say that Intuitionistic real
numbers, or more generally Choice Sequences (which appear
primarily in Intuitionistic Analysis), are vague objects.
(Identity for natural numbers is decidable, so Bivalence
holds here.)
Wittgenstein too hints at such a picture, when he
writes: "And if you say that the infinite expansion must
contain the pattern * or not contain it, you are so to speak
shewing us the picture of an unsurveryable series reaching
into the distance. But what if the picture began to flicker
in the far distance?"--Remarks on the Foundations of Mathe-
matics, 3rd ed., tr. by G.E.M. Ansoombe (Oxford: Blackwell,
1978), Part V, section 10.
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accord with such a view. I have not even attempted to pre-
sent such a semantic theory here, and I do not know how to
do so. Nonetheless, the analogy with Intuitionism is meant
as a promissory note; The formulation of an alternative to
the view that the vagueness of identity-statements is a
product of the vagueness of our language requires the
development of a view which is similar to Intuitionism.'
Short of providing such a semantic theory, we can best
understand the nature of this alternative view by consi-
dering by what sorts of arguments it might be motivated.
We may envisage, in the first instance, an argument
which parallels arguments for Intuitionism and other forms
of Anti-Realism."7 Bivalence is to be abandoned, perhaps,
0 There is a formal similarity between the views which
is worth mentioning here. One who holds such a view will
probably maintain the validity of "s-Ova=b". Suppose the
usual definition of 'A' in terms of '0'. Then Evans's proof
shows that "va=b + ,a=b". So, necessitating and distrib-
uting, we have (1) "Ova=b + Ona=b". By (TO), (2) "Ova=b +
va=b"; and by the definition of 'a' and (C), (3) "'Oa=b +
'va=b". So by (1) and (3), "Ova=b + aa=b"; so, conjoining
with (2), "Ova=b - va=b & sva=b"; hence, by PC, "'Ova=b".
This may well be compared to the Intuitionist's accep-
tance of the validity of "--(A v sA)".
The similarities of which I speak should not be taken
to imply that the alternative is committed to the abandon-
ment of classical predicate logic.
It is also worth noting that a proof like Evans's can
be given for any sentence "vv...va=b". So "vV...va=b + -a=b"
is valid and we shall thus also be able to show that
"'Ovv...va=b" is valid, for any finite string of v's.
4 I refer, of course, to the well-known arguments due
to Michael Dummett. See his "The Philosophical Basis of
Intuitionistic Logic", in Truth and Other Enigmas. See also
the helpful explication of these arguments in the "Intro-
ductiol•" to Crispin Wright's Realism, Heaning, and Truth
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 13-29.
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because the identity of objects of any sort is essentially
connected to human practices: It is our language and related
social institutions which provide criteria for the identity
of objects, and those criteria do not in all cases decide
(or provide for the decision of) all questions of identity.
The objects whose identity is not decided by the criteria
provided by the practice of speaking our language are the
vague objects; Standard Anti-realist considerations might
then lead one to hold that, not only are we sometimes unable
to decide the identity of a vague object, whether say a is
b; there is, moreover, nothing here which we do not know.
The counterargument would, as in the case of Intuitionism,
presumably be that the apparently undecided cases are really
decided, that every identity-statement must be either true
or false. But there is at least precedent for resistance to
this sort of claim.
However, it need not be the general sorts of considera-
tions which motivate Anti-realism which motivate the pro-
posed alternative to Evans's view. It may be essential to
the view that there are vague objects that criteria for the
identity of such objects be connected to social practices in
some more specific way than, as required by standard Anti-
realist arguments, meaning is in general (supposed to be)
connected to social practices. Paradigmatioally, vague
objects are artifacts, objects of human creation, in quite
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an ordinary sense." This sort of fact may well impress one
who is attracted to the view that, say, there really are
such things as ships and clocks, over and above mereological
fusions or collections of clock- and ship-parts (appropri-
ately arranged). One might suggest, for example, that it is
only because people create clocks, or use them for certain
purposes, that we need distinguish between the clock and the
parts which make it up, between the history of the clock and
the history of the parts. 49
Indeed, one might find oneself attracted to the idea
that, were there no people, no minds, or were there no
practice of telling time or of sailing, there would be no
such things as clocks or ships (though there might be col-
lections of ship-parts, arranged just as the parts of a ship
are arranged). If so, one might find it an attractive idea
that the truth about the identities of such objects just can
not transcend the criteria for their identity which are
contained in our social practices (even if that sort of
principle does not generally attract one): There is, as it
were, nothing more to the identity of such objects than what
' Mountains would likely fall outside the scope of such
a view. Mountains are vague, in the sense that it is unde-
termined what a mountain's precise boundary is. But one
might think that that is quite inessential, that we are
talking imprecisely about the physical stuff which not only
makes up (constitutes) the mountain but which really is the
mountain. Compare David Wiggins on constitution, in his
Sameness and Substance (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), pp. 43-4
and elsewhere.
4
'Compare Wiggins, pp. 90-9, 124-6.
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is provided by our language and other social institutions,
for such things are what they are only in virtue of certain
of our social institutions.
8. Closing
That, of course, is but an outline of the kind of
considerations which might attract one to the view that
there are vague objects. For our purposes here, it is not
important that they should be convincing: I make no claim to
be convinced myself. The important point is that nothing
about the fundamental motivation of the view commits one to
the existence of truths of the form "va=b". To what it
commits one is, again, the rejection of Bivalence and Multi-
valence, and so, in my opinion, the rejection of Realism.
The view is that vague objects are objects of human creation
in a not so ordinary sense: Vague objecta are mind-depan-
dent .5"
It is for this reason that I have consistently spoken
of the view that there are vague objects, rather than of the
view that vagueness is 'real' or of the 'reality of vague-
"
5 Dummett has suggested a similar-sounding view (though
I do not claim anything by way of interpretation): "Realism
about vagueness is anti-realism about the world". See his
"Reply to Wright", in Essays on the Philosophy of Michael
Dumwmett, ed. B. Taylor (Dordrecht: Maritnus Nijhoff, 1987),
p. 229.
Vagueness has never fit very well into Dummett's analy-
sis of metaphysical isFues. The above remark is, in fact,
taken from a discussion of just this sort of problem. This
paper does, I think, help to bring the problem of vagueness
into the fold.
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ness'.M The view that there are vague objects is incom-
patible with a Realist treatment of statements containing
names of them: One who is committed to Realism about the
material world and all that it contains is therefore commit-
ted to denying that there are vague objects. That is what
Evans's argument, it seems to me, really shows: That there
are no vague objects which are mind-independent; that
Realism about the physical world is incompatible with the
view that there are vague objects."
" As does Pelletier, passim. The phrase also fails to
distinguish 'Realism' about vague objects from 'Realism'
about vague properties.
" I should like to thank George Boolos, Jim Higgin-
botham, Paul Horwich, and Bob Stalnaker for their enoourage-
ment and criticism. I should also like to thank Prof.
Michael Dummett for related discussions. Reflection on his
now revised William James Lectures, The Logical Basis of
Metaphysics, inspired many of the underlying ideas of this
paper.
Most of my discussion of Franois Jeffry Pelletier's
paper has been quite critical. I should like to emphasize my
debt to it.
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APPENDIX
I mentioned earlier that there are logics well adapted
to the purposes of the view that there are vague objects. I
shall sketch the completeness proof here for these logics:
The language contains sentence-letters, terms, n-place
predicates, the usual sentential operators, and identity,
along with 0 and a. The extension to predicate logics poses
no difficulty of principle.
We formalize these logics within a generalized natural
deduction system. We write sequents not just as [:A, but as
(r;a);A. Here C is a set of premises; A, a set of hypothe-
ses. Intuitively, a premise is something we assume to be
true, from which we deduce the conclusion; an hypothesis, on
the other hand, is something we assume for the sake of
argument. Rules like &-introduction are largely unchanged:
(;a):A (B
(r,r' ;A,0'):A & B
Rules which discharge premisses are now written as follows:
(r;aA):B
(C;a):A B (;a): A
The sentence to be discharged must be an hypothesis, not a
premise. We may then have other rules, which will be the
rules of deduction, such as the following, for 'O' read as
'Definitely':
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(r;A):A
(r,A; a):OA
All hypotheses on which 'A' depends are, thus, converted to
premises by this rule. Hence, the rule can not possibly
occur within a subordinate deduction, since subordinate
deductions discharge only hypotheses.
Let 'O0' be subject to the laws of any complete, com-
pact, normal modal logic, which we may call A, suitably
formalized as a natural deduction system of the usual sort.
We define a logic VT as follows. Formalize 1 itself as a
natural deduction system of this new sort, and add to the
logic the rule of deduction mentioned above, which I shall
call Vo.
Basic sequents are of the form (0;A):A or (A;O);A. (We
allow also for a rule, analogous to th•aning rules, which
moves sentences from the set of hypotheses to that of premi-
ses,) Every proof in A may thus be converted to a proof in
VA by replacing basic sequents, in 4, by basic sequents, of
the former sort in VA, and by replacing applications of the
rules in 1 by their related rules in VA. (Since no rule of A
will introduce sentences into the set of premises, the VA-
rules which discharge premises remain applicable.) Note,
importantly, that if (F,A):A is provable in I, then, not
only is (O;r,A):A provable in VI, but (r;a):A is provable in
VR. For no sentence per is discharged; hence, no such sen-
tence figures as hypothesis of a subordinate deduction.
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Take, as models of the new language VY, standard models
of A (with respect to which A is complete and, which, there-
fore are strictly characteristic for R), but define truth as
truth in all possible worlds; VI is complete with respect to
these models.
The proof is fairly straightforward. First, just the
same formulas are provable in the two systems: For, if VO is
ever applied to a sequent with non-empty antecedent, the
result is a sequent with non-empty premise; and no premise
can be discharged. If VO is applied to a sequent with empty
antecedent, it can be replaced by an application of neces-
sitation. It follows that every VY-provable formula, being
R-; rovable, is valid in all models of R and, given that it
follows that it is true at each world in every such model,
it is true in all models of VY. On the other hand, if a
sentence A is valid in all models of VR, it is, plainly,
valid in all models of R; hence, it is provable in A (since
' is complete) and so in VA.
The proof that these models are strictly characteristic
for VA is a bit more complicated. (The models are strictly
characteristic if, and only if, a sequent is valid when and
only when provable.) We say that a sequent (F;s):A is valid
if, whenever each sentence Per is true at each world in a
model, A is true at each world in that model. (Note that I
shall discuss, shortly, the more general case of provable
sequents of the form (C;A):A.)
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Suppose that (r;s):A is provable in VW. Consider an
application of the rule VO, above which there is no other
application of it:
(F" ;6V ):A'
(F' ,a' ;0):;OA'
Thus, "',a':A' must provable in 11. Since 1 is normal,
O"',Oa':OA' is also provable in ft (here, if =({G,H,...},
Or={OG,OH,... ). We now replace the proof of ("',6';0):A, in
VA, by this proof of ' ,6':A in A. By induction, since
proofs are finite (and well-founded), if ([;0):A is provable
in VA, there is some n such that OnF:A is provable in A.
Suppose that each sentence in C is true in some arbi-
trary model of VR. If p is such a sentence, then, for an, k,
Okp is true at each world, since p is true at each world in
the model. Hence, if we now construe the model as a model
for i (choosing some 'actual' world a), for each pe,, Onp is
true at a; hence, A must be true at a. Thus, A must be true
at all worlds (since the 'actual' world was arbitrary);
hence, A is true in the (original) Vi-model. And so the
class of such models is faithful to VA.
Conversely, suppose that (C;0):A is valid in VA. Then,
in any model in which each sentence in F is true at every
world, A is true at every world. It follows that C,OF',...
OnF',. .:A is valid in T. (Proof: Let 1 be a model of i, with
a the actual world. Suppose that the antecedent is satisfied
at a. Consider the sub-model 1la of ¶, which consists of
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worlds w for which there is a sequence a=4tR? R...RL~ =w
connecting w to a. Suppose that, for each n, On[ is true at
a. Then since each world wemla is some finite distance n
from a, it follows that each sentence in f is true at each
world in ¶la. Considering 1la as a model of VRI, then, we
have that A is true at each world, since each sentence in r
is true at every world and (C;0):A is valid in VR. Hence A
is true at a.)
But 4 is compact. So there is some k such that
r,...,OkV:A is valid in A. Hence, it is provable in 4, since
standard models for R are strictly characteristic for it.
Hence, (r,...,OkF;0):A is provable in VR, and it is easy to
construci a proof, inr VI, of (r;0):A. We need only take our
proof in n, and append it to as many VO steps as are require
to take us, for each sentence p in r, from p to Okp.
So the c)ass of models is strictly characteristic for
VII.
We may now define a more general notion of validity for
sequents of the form (r;"):A. We say that a sequent of this
form is valid if, whenever each sentence per is true at each
world in a model, A is true at each world at which each
sentence qce is true.
It is now easy to see that our original class of
models, given this definition of validity, is strictly
characteristic for Vi. Since no sentence pea can be an
hypothesis of a sequent which is the basis of an application
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of VO, not only may we conclude that, for some n, Onr,Ona:A
is provable in I, we may conclude that OnU,:;A is provable
in t. (For the induction step of our origiral proof operated
only cn applications of VO, and so only on sentences which
become premises.) Since At is compact, there is some finite
A'CA such that On,F',:A and, hence, On;:(&A')+A is provable
in P1 (where "&4'" means the conjunction of all sentences in
' ), by the deduction theorem for R.
Now suppose that I is a model of VA in which each
sentence in I is true at each world. As earlier, Onp is true
at each world, for each peU. Hence, we have that &a'-A is
true at each world (since D^U:&A'+A is provable in t and,
again, the actual world is arbitrary). And so, if is a
world at which each qe~ is true, since A'CA, &A' is true at
w, so A is true at w. Hence (C;A):A is valid, and the class
of models is faithful to Vf.
Conversely, suppose ([;A):A is valid. As earlier, it
follows that U,...,,n ,...,a:A is valid in f. By compact-
ness, again, we have that, for some n and for some finite
A'CA, U,...,OnU:&A'+A is valid and hence provable in f.
Hence, (U;0):&A'+A is provable in V'; it is therefore easy
to construct a proof of (r;a'):A in Vt. So (U;a):A is prov-
able in Vf, and the class of models is strictly character-
istic for V'.
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Paper II
Whether Structure
Na3y Be Mis lead ing
Wright on Red!uctionism
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0. Opening
Ontological questions arise, perhaps, nowhere more
frequently, nor more intractably, than where we are con-
cerned with abstract objects: Directions, numbers, letter-
and word-types, and the like. On the one hand, the fact that
expressions which purport to refer to abstract objects
function in much the same way as names of concrete objects
might incline one toward the view that there are such
objects. On the other hand, philosophers have found abstract
objects to be, among other things, epistemologically proble-
matic. Such objects apparently do not have causal powers and
can, therefore, neither be perceived nor be known by their
effects: It thus becomes an important question how, if such
objects do exist, we can know anything about them. Moreover,
if abstract objects have no causal powers, it is not clear
why science, say, should have any use for them: It is at
.least plausible that no causal explanation must make refer-
ence to entities which have no causal powers; and, if not,
science need not, and therefore ought not, recognize the
existence of such entities.'
Those who have been impressed by such epistemological
considerations, if they have not rejected the existence of
abstract objects entirely, have at least thought an Ontology
For a good expression of this line of thought, see
Hartry Field's Sceience without Numbers (Oxford: Blackwell,
1980).
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virtuous in so far as it is parsimonious, i.e., is committed
to the existence of as few different types of objects--and
in particular, abstrEct objects--as possible. These episte-
mological concerns, however, have rarely been taken to
constitute a conclusive argument for the view that there are
no abstract objects. Rather, philosophers have taken them-
selves to need to show that we can, so to speak, do without
names for objects of one sort or another: The task which
confronts such a view is to show just how we can--or,
indeed, if it is correct, how we do--do without reference
to, say, numbers.
Russell's Theory of Descriptions provides, and was
surely taken as providing, a model fo such demonstrations.
Russell did not explicitly define the word "the", nor the
phrase "the King of France"; rather, he showed us how syste-
matically to replace sentences in which they occur by sen-
tences in which the quantifiers 'all' and 'some' occur.
Similarly, one might think, to show that we can do without
reference to numbers, one need only show how systematically
to translate sentences containing expressions which purport
to refer to numbers into sentences which contain no such
expressions; into sentences which, instead, contain only
expressions which refer to, or quantify over, epistemologi-
cally less problematic entities.
Such a translation is, classically, to be accomplished
by means of a Contextual Definition. Crispin Wright takes as
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his standard example of a Contextual Definition a version of
Frege's definition of names of directions. The definition is
motivated by the observation that the direction of a is the
same as the direction of b if, and only if, a is parallel to
b: What appears to be a relation of identity between direc-
tions is, in some sense, just the relation of parallelism
between lines. A sentence which says something about a
'direction' is really just a sentence which says something
about a given line (and, by implication, any line parallel
to it). Hence, we have the following:"
dir a = dir b if, and only if, a II b
F(dir a) if, and only if, fa
Here, 'dir a' is to be read 'the direction of a'; 'fC' is a
pr.dicate of lines which is a congruence with respect to
parallelism" and which is suitably related to 'FU' (so that
the truth-conditions come out right).
The important feature of the relation, parallelism, is
that it is an equivalence relation: The fact that it is an
equivalence relation guarantees that "=", as it occurs in
sentences of the form "dir a = dir b", has the formal pro-
"Crispin Wright, Frege's Conception of Numbers as
Objects (Aberdeen; Aberdeen University Press, 1983), pp. 29-
30.
"A predicate 'Ft' is a congruence with respect to a
relation 'iR~' if, and only if, (Vx)(Vy)(Fx & xRy + Fy). A
relation 'iRf' is an equivalenre relation if it is
reflexive--if Vx(xRx)--symmetric--VxVy(xRy a yRx)--and
transitive--VxVyVyYz(xRy & yRz + xRz). If 'iRE' is an equi-
valence relation, then it follows that a predicate 'FP' is a
congruence with respect to it if, and only if, VxVy(xRy *
[Fx " Fy]).
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perties of identity. This, together with the fact that each
predicate 'ft' is a congruence with respect to parallelism,
guarantees that a form of Leibniz's Law is valid, namely;
VxYy[dir x = dir y & F(dir x) + F(dir y)]
Note that "Ft• here is required to be a predicate defined in
accordance with the Contextual Definition given above.
There is nothing wrong with this sort of Contextual
Definition. Wright properly emphasizes the need to define,
not just identity, but predicates of directions as well. The
definition does, however, mask an important fact: Namely,
that a Contextual Definition may, in principle, be given in
terms of any equivalence relation, that there need not be
any simple (or primitive) predic. 'Ces (in the language in
which the Definition is given) which are congruences with
respect to that relation. That is no obstacle to the produc-
tion of complex (or defined) predicates which are congru-
ences with respect to it.4 To give the form of Contextual
Definition, in the more general case, we may assume that the
predicates, on the right-hand side, in terms of which the
predicates on the left-hand side are defined, are of the
form "(Vx)(xR+ ÷ fx)', where "'IRE" is the equivalence rela-
tion in terms of which the definition is given.
4 The distinction between simple and complex predicates,
which I am using here, is intuitively clear but difficult to
explain. For more on the distinction, see Michael Dummett,
Frege: Philosophy of Language, 2nd ed. (London; Duckworth,
1980), pp. 28-33.
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In the case of directions, then, the more general form
of the Definition is;
F(dir a) Ed (Vx)(x 1 a + fx)
And, in the more general case:
F(fnc a) EdF (Vx)(xRa + fx)
Here, "fnc V" is a functional expression, like "dir •";
"••R" is an equivalence relation such that fnc a = fnc b if,
and only if, aRb; "ff" is, again, a predicate suitably
related to "Fet. which, now, need not itself be a congruence
with respect to '"R',.
For the purposes of this paper, I am going to under-
stand the term "Reductionism" as a common name of such views
as hold that, if a Contextual Definition of this sort can
successfully be given, then the names which have been elimi-
nated from the class of sentences in question do not in fact
refer.
It is worth re-emphasizing that Reductionism, as I
understand it, is not committed to the view that the best
argument against the existence of objects whose names are
capable of elimination is just that those names are elimi-
nable. The best argument may well be an epistemological one,
that, even if there were such objects, we could know nothing
of them. Nonetheless, few Reductionists would want to sug-
gest that we abandon Arithmetic, because there are no num-
bers, or Linguistics, because there are no types: Hence the
importance of showing how we can make sense of Arithmetic
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without supposing ourselves to refer to Numbers; of Linguis-
tics, without supposing that we refer to types. This sort of
Reductionism is thus here being understood as committed to
the view that, if we can do without reference to objects of
a given sort, then there are no such objects, even though
that does not tell the whole story.
Wright has argued that Reductionism is "fundamentally
misguided"." He has argued, in particular, that a version of
the Context Principle, originally due to Frege," provides
sufficient material from which to construct a justification
of the view that there are abstract objects. In this paper,
I am going to argue that, as I understand Wright's view, it
is mistaken. The arguments y means of which he defends,
say, the existence of directions, despite the Contextual
Definition of names of them, are powerful enough to defend
the existence of objects, names of which may be introduced
by Contextual Definition, which just do not exist.
'Both Wright and I attempt to avoid the thorny question
when a Reductionist should take a Contextual Definition
successfully to eliminate names. Such blatantly circular
attempts as
type(a) - type(b) iff a is a word of the same type as b
should not be. If I am correct, the best arguments for the
non-eliminability of names of abstract objects present a
problem even for this sort of circular 'definition'. That
constitutes a strong sense in which worries about what
constitutes a 'successful' definition are irrelevant to this
debate. See "Trans-sortal Identification", in this thesis.
'Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, tr. by
J. Austin (Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press,
1980), p.x,
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1. Understanding Contextual Definitions
We are supposing, for the sake of argument, that names
of directions may be eliminated and, indeed, could have been
introduced by means of the Contextual Definition discussed
in the last section.
The least restrictive possible view would hold that, if
a speaker understands such a Contextual Definition, then she
is able to refer to directions. But, plainly, it is not
sufficient for a speaker to be able to refer to abstract
objects that she be introduced, by means of a Contextual
Definition, to terms which purport to refer to such objects;
not, at least, if all that she is able to do is to use the
Definition as a scheme of translation. A speaker might well
come to grasp the scheme of translation embodied in the
Contextual Definition for directions without knowing that
parallelism is an equivalence relation; if she did not know
this, she would not know that "=", as it occurs in state-
nents of the form "dir a = dir b", has the formal proporties
of identity. To adapt a famous phrase, our speaker can not
refer to directions if she does not know what determines the
identity of a given direction; and she can not know that if
she does not :.now that "=", in this use, is (or at least has
the formal properties of) the identity-sign.
For similar reasons, our speaker must know that the
structure of the Definition guarantees that, if "=" is so
understood, Leibniz's Law holds. She must, that is, know
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that the predicates, in terms of which these predicates "FE"
are defined, are congruences with respect to parallelism.
Wright emphasizes that his view requires that the terms
introduced by a given definition be able sensibly to flank
the identity-sign.' Presumably, it is not essential that the
sign for identity be the same in all parts of the language,
that there be such a thing as "the" identity-sign. What
Wright has in mind, I think, is rather that the sign which
occurs, as it were, where one would expect an identity-sign
to occur, has the formal properties of identity; that, so
far as the definition is concerned, an identity-sign might
just as well occur there, We have now seen that this amounts
to a requirement that the relation in terms of which the
Defintion is given be an equivalence relation and that the
predicates thus introduced be congruences with respect to
it.
Wright speaks, in most cases, of what is required if
there are to be certain abstract objects. I shall here
content myself with discussion of the related question what
is required if a given speaker is to be able to refer to
such objects. If one understands a given Contextual Defini-
tion and knows that the relevant relation is an equivalence
relation, and if she knows that the defined predicates are
congruences with respect to it; then I shall say that she
has a Theoretical Understanding of that Definition. I hereby
7Wright, pp. 149-52.
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attribute to Wright the view (or a view which entails) that,
if a speaker has a Theoretical Understanding of a Contextual
Definition, then she understands the terms so defined to be
able to refer to (ordinarily abstract) objects. Or again: A
speaker who has a Theoretical Understanding of a Contextual
Definition is, herself, able, so far as her oonceptual
resources are concerned, to refer to (ordinarily abstract)
objects by means of such names."
Whether a given term does refer, or whether our speaker
is in fact able to refer, to such an object is a question
outside the domain of philosophy per se. One way of under-
standing what is, additionally, required can be extracted
from an idea of Wright's; The question is wh ther there are
any true sentences which contain the term.' That question is
SWright does not explain his view in anything like
these terms. I should mention that he does make certain
remarks which conflict with this interpretation of his
:iews: Namely, that it is unclear to him why a philosopher
might seek to defend "a general policy of contextual defini-
tion"--p. 9. As the view just attributed to him entails that
just such a policy would be quite reasonable, I do not see
how to reconcile his views with this remark. On the other
hand, it is not entirely clear that Wright means to reject
this view at all.
In any event, there is a great deal of tension between
this remark and other aspects of his view, already, as we
shall see.
'We probably need to say something like "true simple
sentences". 'Simple' is just the best way to exclude sen-
tences of tihe form "Such-and-such does not exist". (Wright
does not emphasize this point and I am not sure he would
agree.)
My use of the notion of a simple sentence, here, should
not be taken as having any connection with my use of the
notion of a simple predicate, earlier, nor with the related
notion of a variant predicate, which I explain shortly.
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to be answered by the science (in a very loose sense) whose
province such questions are. In the case of, say, the Con-
textual Definition of directions, it is geometry which will
answer the question; in other cases, it will be other
fields.
This distinction only becomes important in other con-
texts; but it is worth mentioning it here. As it is not of
great import to our discussion of Wright's view,"u however,
I shall ignore this, and an earlier, complication, since
most terms able to refer will refer to abstract objects. I
shall thus speak of Wright's view as the view that a speaker
who has a Theoretical Understanding of a Contextual Defini-
tion understandv- the terms so defined to refer to abstract
objects; or I shall say that such a speaker is able to refer
to such objects.
3O Indeed, it is not really clear that Wright would
accept the distinction. Wright seems to think that there is
just no additional question, once the Contextual Definition
has been given, whether the objects in question exist: See
FCNO, pp. 146-53. Admittedly, no general principle is laid
down: But how else is one to understand "[T]here seems to be
a kind of incoherence in the idea that a line might lack a
direction, a geometric figure a shape..."? Especially is
this so when it has just been said that a comparable situa-
tion exists "whenever an equivalence relation between things
of one sort is taken as necessary and sufficient for iden-
tity of things of another sort" (p. 148, my emphasis).
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2. Initial Difficulties with Wright's View
A Reductionist may offer, it seems to me, three sorts
of objections to Wright's view. The first, classical objec-
tion is simply that we do not need to ascribe reference to
the 'names' which have been introduced by Contextual Defini-
tion. This objection, as Wright emphasizes,LA itself prompts
the question just when we do need to ascribe reference to
names. To answer this question, we must ask what theoretical
work the notion of reference does for us. An object, the
referent of a name, is primarily that of which predicates
are true or false: We require the notion of reference to an
object, primarily, because a simple sentence "Fa" must be
explained as being true if, and only if, the objet t to which
'a' refers satisfies the predicate "FE"."
That said, we may re-state the objection: It is just
not sufficient, for us to be justified in ascribing refer-
ence to a singular term, that that expression function,
syntactically, as a singular term. What is required,
instead, is that--in a sense as yet unexplained--that ex-
pression function, semantically, as a constituent of (at
least some) sentences in which it occurs. As a first
approximation, we may say that a speaker does not under-
stand a term to refer to an object unless she understands
~' Wright, FCNO, section v, esp. pp. 31-5.
'2 For a discussion of this point, as contrasting with
Quine's (one time?) view of the matter, see Chapter 15 of
Dummett's Frege.
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that term, not as a kind of code for some hidden quantifica-
tional structure, but as a semantically unitary expres-
s ion. Z
One who is attracted by this sort of objection need not
deny that the notion of an object is primarily to be
explained in terms of the notion of a proper name. She need
not, that is, deny the Fregean thesis that the notion of an
object is in part a theoretical notion, one which is in part
explained by its role in semantic theory. Indeed, the objec-
tion would seem largely to rest upon a similar claim: The
point of having a notion of reference for sub-sentential
constituents of sentences--for words in general and for
names in 1 -rticular--in a Semantic Theory, is as part of an
explanation how the constituents of a sentence contribute to
the determination of its truth-value. If an expression
functions as a singular term, and if it functions as a
constituent of certain sentences in which it occurs, then
the Theory can do no other than assign it, presumably, an
object as its reference (unless, again, it is merely empty).
If, on the other hand, what is syntactically a singular term
does not function as a constituent of sentences in which it
occurs, then it is wholly otiose to assign it a reference.'"
" Compare Wright, FCNO, pp. 67-9.
L' And here we may want to see, for example, Dummett's
discussion of abstract nouns in just this light: See Frege,
pp. 72-80.
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The second sort of objection which a Reductionist might
offer is the following: Granted that a speaker does not have
a conception of (say) directions as objects's if she does
not k owr that parallelism is an equivalence relation, how
can her knowledge that it is an equivalence relation give
her the ability to refer to dire.tions? It is true that, if
she has such knowledge, she will be able, as it were, to use
the symbol "=", in such contexts as "dir a = dir b ' , as if
it were the identity-sign: But the question is, how can the
mere knowledge that "=", in such contexts, has the formal
properties of identity justify an ascription of an ability
to refer to directions? granted that, without such knowl-
edge, one lacks this ability?
As we said earlier, it is presumably of no great impor-
tance whether the same sign (say, "=") is used in this case
and in other cases. So suppose that there is, in a given
language, no single sign of identity, which occurs both in
,more usual contexts and in this newer one. Suppose, further,
that our 'iypothetical speake: knows that parallelism is an
equivalence relation and that
(Z) YxYy[x II y & F(dir x) + F(dir y)]
is valid. Since the mere roplacement of "x I y" by "dir x =
dir y" will not give our speaker the ability to refer to
directions if she did not a)ready have it, it is the knowl-
'~ I borrow this turn of phrase from the title to
Wright's hook.
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edge that t is valid which, in addition to the knowledge
that parallelism is an equivalence relation, is required if
she is to have a Theoretical" Understanding of the Defini-
tion, if she is to be able to refer to directions. But how
can this sort of knowledge serve to distinguish those who
can from those who can not refer to directions?
The third objection is really a combination of the
first two. Sentences of the form 'Vx(x 1 a . fx)' may well
have been in common use before sentences of the form
'F(dir a)' were introduced. Suppose so. If we were to learn
that parallelism is an equivalence relation, we might well
come to know that, for any a, b, and 'f"',
(Z') a II b ((Vx)(x II a + fx) + (Yx)(x II b + fx))
We may well notice that Z' bears a formal resemblance to
Leibniz's Law: We may then start re-writing 'a I b' as
'dir a = dir b'; we may re-write the constituents of the bi-
conditional as "F(dir a)" and "F(dir b)". We may, indeed,
record this scheme of abbreviation in a Contextual Defini-
tion. But all we are doing, at this late stage, is merely
re-writing those sentences: What is important must be the
knowledge which we have, which makes it possible to give the
Contextual Definition, not the Definition itself.
'~ Hence the name "Theoretical": The knowledge which is
required is capable of being explicitly formulated and
could, indeed, be had even in the absence of the Definition.
Similar remarks will apply to the jredioate "FE" and its
replacement of the original complex predicate.
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It should be emphasized here that the problem is not
that Wright (or anyone else) is committed to the view that
an understanding of a Contextual Definition is the crucial
ingredient in one's conception of directions (say) as
objects. That would be absurd. What is important, according
to Wright, is whether one understands that sentences of the
form "(Vx)(x NI a 1 fx)" constitute a kind of sentence:
Whether one knows that it is sentences of this kind to which
one's knowledge concerning the 'identity of directions'--
or, the truth-values of statements of the form "dir a
dir b"--is relevant. What the Contextual Definition does is
to record that these sentences are of a kind and to intro-
duce a special notation for them. What is problematic, from
the point of view of a Reductionist, is, again, the claim
that knowledge of a certain sort is alone sufficient to give
one the ability to refer to directions. (That knowledge,
again, is the knowledge that parallelism is an equivalence
relation and the knowledge that Leibniz's Law--in whatever
form, that of X or V' or some other form--is valid.)
The problem may, perhaps, be illustrated as follows:
Let us introduce an equivalence relation by arbitrarily
pairing all individuals who were alive on 21 March 1990. The
relation 'fPt' is defined as the smallest equivalence rela-
tion which holds between individuals in a pair. We may now
introduce, as names of what I shall call by the common name
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"poursons", terms of the form 'pour a'. We do so by means of
the Contextual Definition:
F(pour a) =dl (Vx)(xPa + fx)
Since 'IPf' is defined as an equivalence relation, and since
I know that, if aPb, then F(pour a) if, and only if,
F(pour b), I have a Theoretical Understanding of this Defin-
ition. But do I now have the ability to refer to poursons?"
Wright is fully aware that his views commit him to a
rich Ontology, one which admits all sorts of strange and
wonderful objects. In itself, that is no objection. But I
for one am at least inclined to think that there are no such
things as poursons. And, if that were not trouble enough, we
could have chosen any equivalence relation to construct this
example: At the very least, there are not distinct sorts of
objects corresponding to every (extensionally distinct)
equivalence relation. Surely something must be wrong. "'
"7 What sort of thing is a pourson? What can be said
about them? Suppose that I have been paired with Dan
Quayle. Then I know that the statement "Red-headed
(pour(rh))" has been defined as equivalent to "(Vx)(xP(rh) +
red-headed(x))"; moreover, I know the latter to be false,
since Dan Quayle does not have red hair. Hence, I know that
"Rad-headed(pour(rh))" is false.
One can now amuse oneself to no end with such sen-
tences.
XOne might wish to reply that poursons are just equi-
valence classes. I am not going to discuss this sort of move
here. First, a discussion of it belongs with a more general
discussion of the Julius Caesar problem, since the iden-
tification of, say, directions and classes is problamatic,
if it is, in the same way that the identification of numbers
with persons would be. Secondly, I do not want to make any
assumptions about the existence of sets, whioh are, of
course, themselves abstract objects (if they are anything).
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Now, one may well be further inclined to think that the
reason that there are no such things as poursons is because
we can eliminate names of poursons, by Contextual Defini-
tion. One of the great attractions of Reductionism is that
it provides a safe haven from the ontologically explosive
consequences of a view like Wright's. But whether it is the
only serious alternative to Wright's view is another ques-
tion.
3. That a Theoretical Understanding Might Suffice:
Theoretical Understanding and the Context Principle
What good, theoretical reason can there be for ascri-
bing Reference to names introduced by Contextual Definition?
Why is it not sufficient to state the truth-conditions of
such sentences in terms of the Contextual Definition itself?
We shall be considering, in this section, a strategy for
answering this question, on the assumption that speakers
have a Theoretical Understanding of the Definitio-a.
Before we do so, it is worth remarking that we shall
not be considering a strategy which may seem promising:
The difference is one of emphasis only, in any event.
My view is that, if we refer to poursons at all, then the
objects to which we refer are sul generis, distinot from all
other sorts of objects to which we can otherwise refer. We
may not refer to poursons, but refer to objects of some
other kind by means of terms of the form "pour(a)": But the
question is whether we refer, by means of such terms, to
objects which are sui generis; and the claim that we do not
is just the claim that, in the sense in which poursons are,
if they exist, sui generis, there are no such objects.
89
Namely, to argue that the knowledge which is required, if a
speaker is to have a Theoretical Understanding of a Contex-
tual Definition, is precisely the knowledge required if she
is to grasp a criterion of identity for the objects whose
inames are introduced by the Definition. Such a move would
answer one of the main, underlying worries which troubles my
sort of Reductionist: For one would then be maintaining that
the knowledge whose possession is distinctive of a Theore-
tical Understanding is linguistic knowledge; and, if so, we
can begin to understand how possession of such knowledge can
determine whether one can refer to objects of a given sort.
However promising the prospects of this strategy,
though, it ultimately fails, for reasons I can not discuss
in detail here. Later, we shall see some of the reasons it
fails: My objections to it concern precisely the Theore-
tical, or explicit, character of the knowledge which it
requires of speakers."
It might be said that we have so far wholly and wrongly
ignored the most important question: What is the effect of
the possession of the knowledge constitutive of a Theore-
tical Understanding of a Contextual Definition? On the one
hand, of course, our speaker simply grasps the scheme of
translation embodied in the Definition. If that were all she
understood, she would not be able to refer to the 'new
" For further discussion of criteria of identity, in
this connection, see "Trans-sortal Identification".
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objects. But whatever else she may or may not know, however,
she does know that the terms 'dir a', 'dir b', and so on,
and the predicates "FC", "GC', and so on, make some regular
contribution to the truth-conditions of sentences in which
they occur. She knows, for example, that the predicate "FC"
is always to be translated, say, as "(Vx)(x II C + fx)"; and
she knows that, whenever 'dir a' occurs as argument of a
predicate, 'a' will occur as argument of the translation of
the predicate.
Her knowledge that 'copies' is an equivalence relation
and that predicates of the form "(Vx)(x II C - fx)" are
congruences with respect to it has yet greater effect. Our
speaker knows, for example, that if 'F(dir a)' is true and
'dir a = dir b' is true, then 'F(dir b)' is true. She knows,
that is, that, if a is parallel to b, then the question
whether every line parallel to a satisfies 'ff' is just the
'same question as whether every line parallel to b satisfies
'fQ'.
To put the point differently: She knows that, whatever
contribution 'dir a' makes to the determination of the
truth-value of 'F(dir a)', then, if a is parallel to b,
'dir b' makes just the same contribution. She knows, that
is, that, so far as the truth-value of the sentence is
concerned, it matters not at all if 'a' is replaced by 'b'-
-if a is parallel to b. This, of course, is just to re-
emphasize that 'dir a' and 'dir b' are intersubstitutable,
91
salva veritate, in such circumstances; and our speaker, if
she has a Theoretical Understanding of the Definition, knows
that they are.
The ascription of a capacity to refer to an object by
means of a given expression is, indeed, only intelligible if
the speaker knows that that expression makes some uniform
contribution to the determination of the truth-values of
sentences which contain it. But our speaker does know that.
Moreover, Reductionism, as we discussed earlier, properly
emphasizes that reference can not be ascribed to names
except insofar as we conceive of those names as semantic
constituents of sentences, as making a regular contribution
to the determination of the truth-values of sentences. But
if that is why we are in the business of assigning reference
to names, we must ask ourselves another question: Given
that, if a II b, 'dir a' and 'dir b' are intersubstitutable
and that our speaker knows it, what reason can there be to
assign different references to 'dir a' and 'dir b'?
It is at best pointless to ascribe different references
to expressions which make the same contribution to the
determination of the truth-values of such sentences: Indeed,
it is theoretically unjustifiable. The Ontology of this
(part of the) language ought not be any more rich than is
required to explain the behavior of the sentences in ques-
tion, If we ascribe different references to 'dir a' and to
'dir b', then it is utterly obscure why there could not be a
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predicate, say '9Q', which, though a and b were parallel,
dir a satisfied but dir b did not. It is not an accident, a
result of the impoverishment of the language, that there is
no suich predicate: There can be no such predicate, if
speakers understand sentences 'about directions' in accord
with the Contextual Definition."' Hence we can not ascribe
different references to 'dir a' and 'dir b'.
The general principle for which I have just argued
might well deserve the name "The Context Principle"."f What
it states is that the notion of reference is subject to
certain theoretical constraints deriving from the role it
plays in semantic theory. Frege says that one ought not to
ask after the meaning (or reference) "of a word in isola-
tion, but only in the context of a proposition".-  Why not?
"' Surely it is now time to clear up any worries about
intensional contexts. One may have been saying to oneself
that I must be, perhaps understandably and legitimately,
setting such contexts aside for now, But, in fact, the
Contextual Definition we are considering requires that we do
so. Since the form of the definition requires that we quan-
tify into the predicates 'ft' on the right-hand side, those
predicates must themselves be extensional, with respect to
the argument-place bound. This in turn guarantees that the
predicates "(Vx)(xRft fx)" are extensional.
" The great advantage of this interpretation of the
Prinoiple, to my mind, over such interpretations as that due
to Wright, is that it once again makes the Principle one
which is relatively uncontroversial, which is motivated by
broadly accepted, indeed now common, features of Frege's
philosophy of logic. A plausible interpretation of the
Context Principle must explain why Frege thought that no
argument was required for it.
a Frege, p. x. Of course, Frege had yet to distinguish
Sense from Reference when he wrote the Grundlagen. See
Dummett, Frege, pp. 192-8, 494ff., and his The Interpreta-
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Because the ascription of reference to names only makes
sense as part of the explanation of the truth-conditions of
sentences containing those names, as part of a particular
theoretical project. The Context Principle amounts to an
injunction never to lose sight of the wider theoretical
context in which the notion of reference--placed there by
Frege--has its home; and, as I have interpreted it, it
states constraints which this theoretical context puts upon
our use (in semantic theory) of the notion of reference.
As I am now understanding it, the Context Principle has
two parts, Firstly: The ascription of reference to an
expression is only intelligible if that expression makes a
regular, or uniform, contribution to the determination of
the truth-values of sentences in which it occurs. This first
claim entails that the general explanation of, say, the
notion of the reference of a name can only be given in terms
of the kind of contribution which names mak• to the deter-
mination of the truth-values of sentences: For it is only
because names make such a contribution that a notion of
reference is needed for them at all.*"
tion of Frege's Philosophy (London: Duckworth, 1981), pp.
369-74, 380-87.
2 Other of Frege's theses also fall into place here.
Most of these follow from the fact that, for Frege, the word
"object" is now to be explained in such a way that objects
are, precisely, the referents of names. (See Dummett, Frege,
p. 471.) The claim that "the referents of our words are what
we talk about" can now be seen, indeed, as an expression of
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Secondly, the ascription of different references to
expressions which make the same contribution is unjusti-
fiable. This part of the principle is a sort of converse of
Frege's view that the sense of every name must include a
criterion of identity for the object which is its referent.
It states, instead, that if speakers have some criterion for
the identity of the referents of some class of names, if
speakers treat such names as intersubstitutable salva veri-
tate if a certain circumstance obtains, and so as co-refer-
ential if that circumstance obtains, then, if that circum-
Frege's realism: Namely, that "what we talk about"--namely,
people, stars, and so forth--are the referents of our
words--are what contribute to the determination of the
truth-values of sentences.
It is, in my opinion, simply a mistake to worry that
the notion of reference, as I have expounded it here, is
neither the notion of raference to which we ordinarily
appeal, when we ask, philosophically, whether a term refers,
nor the notion of reference we use in ordinary language,
when we ask to what someone is referring. For, first, this
notion of reference is an unabashedly theoretical one, which
relates to the ordinary notion in the usual way, as the
physicist's notion of temperature relates to our ordinary
one.
Secondly, there is now welcome space for debate about
the nature of reference in any given case: Frege's view that
"the referents of our words are what we talk about" may be
adopted, opposed, or whatever, in individual cases.
Dummett's discussion of the Context Principle, at pp. 499ff.
of Frege, is best understood as raising just this sort of
question. And, indeed, Dummett must be correct about at
least this much: That the Context Principle alone does not,
and can not, even begin to address the more metaphysical
worries one might have regarding whether abstract objects
are, as Frege would have it, mind-independent or are, as
Dummett himself suggests (regarding a specific sort of
abstract object), mind-dependent, 'mere reflections of
language'.
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stance in fact obtains, the names are co-referential
(unless, like names of demons, they fail to refer at all). 4
The importance of this Principle to our problem can not
be over-stated. Consider again the Contextual Definition of
identity-statements containing names of directions;
dir a = dir b if, and only if, a II b
What, according to a Reductionist, are the references of
'dir a' and 'dir b'? The question may seem plainly unfair,
but it is not: These are expressions of the language,
expressions which make a regular, uniform contribution to
the determination of the truth-conditions of sentences of
the language. Our semantic theory must explain the truth-
conditions of sentences which contain these expressions,
just as it explains the truth-conditions of any other sen-
tence. In the broad sense in which I am using the word
'reference' here, to explain what contribution 'dir a' makes
to the determination of the truth-values of sentences in
which it occurs just is to explain what its reference is.
The most immediate temptation is to say that 'dir a
refers to a; that 'dir b' refers to b; and that it is the
use of '=' which is misleading. The symbol '=' is ordinarily
used for the identity-relation: In this case, however, it is
244 One should not confuse the use of 'criterion' in
'criterion of identity' with the use made by Wittgenstein.
As I am using the term, a 'criterion' of identity is just a
sufficient condition for identity. The notion of a criterion
has no epistemological biases built into it. (The notion of
a criterion of identity, on the other hand, has non-trivial
epistemological aspects.)
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being used as a symbol for the relation of parallelism. (As
for the apparently functional expression 'dir f', thore are
lots of options.f) This construal of 'dir a = dir b',
however, is inconsistent with the Context Principle, as
interpreted above: If a is parallel to b, then 'dir a' and
'dir b' make the same (semantic) contribution to sentences
in which they occur. Hence, if, as we are assuming for
argument, a is parallel to b, it is theoretically otiose,
and unjustifiable, to assign different references to 'dir a'
and to 'dir b'. Hence, that proposal fails.
So, we may now conclude, 'dir a' and 'dir b' refer to
the same entity; and so, all we need conclude now is that
'dir a' and 'dir b' refer to the same object.
It would be nice if, granted the cogency of this argu-
ment, we could declare Wright the victor and go home, as
once I was happy to do. But we can not pass from the inter-
mediate conclusion that 'dir a' and 'dir b' have the same
reference, that they make the same semantic contribution, to
the claim that they refer to the same object. One is plainly
tempted to make that inference: The expressions 'dir a' and
'dir b' are indeed singular terms. This temptation may well
feed a sense that al. is too easy so far, as well: One may
well misplace one's criticism, arguing that the notion of
reference is here too formal, too thin. But it is not the
" Among them, that it is a name of the identity-func-
tion; that it is uemantically inert, but serves as a kind of
reminder; and so forth.
97
generalized notion of reference, sometimes known as the
notion of semantic value,' which is at fault: The funda-
mental difficulty with Wright's view--with the view that a
Theoretical Understanding suffices for possession of an
ability to refer to abstract objects--is that this infer-
ence, from co-referentiality to co-reference to some object,
is unjustifiable.
4. Two Kinds of Predicates
We saw earlier that there are a number of reasons to be
dissatisfied with Wright's view. In particular, we saw that
his view leads to wild ontological proliferation; the diag-
nosis of the cause of this proliferation is now our chief
task. Moreover, we saw that there is some question how the
knowledge which Wright's view requires a speaker to have, if
she is to be able to refer to abstract objects, can possibly
play the role assigned to it. How can whether one knows that
a relation is an equivalence relation and whether one knows
that certain predicates aro congruences with respect to it
determine whether one is able to refer to objects of a given
sort?
The short answer to the latter question, one would
expect, is that the knowledge in question constitutes grasp
of a criterion of identity for the objects in question. As
2 See Michael Dummett, Th~> Interpretation ot Frege's
Philosophy, Ch. 7.
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we saw earlier, possession of such knowledge amounts pre-
cisely to knowledge that, since 'fnc a = fnc b' is defined
to be true just in case 'aRb' is true (where 'VRC' is the
relevant equivalence relation), '=', in this context, is--
or, has the formal properties of--identity; and that, since
each of the predicates "Fe", which can occur in a sentence
of the form "F(fnc a)", is defined as equivalent to a predi-
cate which is a congruence with respect to 'IRC', Leibniz's
Law holds.
Whether possession of such knowledge suffices for grasp
of a criterion for the identity of the objects in question
is, however, not yet decided by these considerations: One
might well be troubled by what seems an excessively formal
characterization of what one needs to know if one is to
grasp a criterion of identity. Moreover, even if such objec-
tions were answered, we should still need to ask ourselves
whether, so explained, grasp of a criterion of identity for
a sort of object necessarily confers an ability to refer to
those objects.
As I intend to avoid the notion of a criterion of
identity, so far as is possible, I shall say no more about
it here. What is important for the moment is that the ques-
tion, whether speakers who have a Theoretical Understanding
of a Contextual Definition are therefore able to refer to
abstract objects, may be raised directly whether or not the
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claim that they are is defended by means of an appeal to the
notion of a criterion of identity. 7
We need to consider a distinction which may seem quite
distant. For the purposes of our discussion here, it will be
more convenient to present it in the context of a discussion
of a Contextual Definition other than that of names of
directions. Let us consider a language which contains names
of (physical) books, of word-types," and so forth; but
which contains no names of book-types or, as I shall call
them, works (in the sense of a work of literature). We may
define an equivalence relation, 'f copies UE, by stipulating
that a copies b if, and only if, the book a contains pre-
cisely the same (type) words as the book b, in the same
order. We may thus introduce expressions of the form 'work
a' and a range of predicates suitable for use with such
names, by means of a Contextual Definition.
There are two quite different sorts of predicates which
speakers of the augmented language might understand. On the
one hand, there are predicates like 't contains the word
"fantasy"'; on the other, there are predicates like 't is
SI should argue that the distinction I draw in the
remainder of this section is also relevant to this issue.
But we can not pursue that problem now.
Of course, if speakers who have a Theoretical Under-
standing are not therefore able to refer to abstract
objects, that may itself give us good reason not to charao-
terize the notion of a criterion of identity in this way.
Z"I am making no assumption that there are any such
things: It is quite irrelevant whether these 'names'
actually refer or are capable of elimination.
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such that all copies of it (i.e., all books which copy it)
have a torn page'. Both predicates are, of course, congru-
ences with respect to the equivalence relation 'copies'.
Intuitively, however, the predicates are quite different:
One is tempted to say something like, "The former predicate
expresses a property of works; the latter does not".
This talk of 'properties' is notoriously slippery,
though heuristically useful. I can not explain this distinc-
tion in full generality: What is required, for present
purposes, is that we understand the distinction between
predicates which express properties and those which do not
as it arises in the cases in which we are interested,
namely, cases of names and predicates introduced by Contex-
tual Definition.
The phenomenon is not, however, limited to such cases.
One is just as tempted to say that such predicates as 'has
only blue-eyed children' or 'has a son who is in London' do
not express properties of a person in the same sense that
'has blue eyes' or 'is now in London' do. Indeed, a dif-
ference precisely analogous to that we discussed above
arises with respect to the sentences "The father of RH is 48
years old" and "The father of RH has only male children".
Now, one feature of the latter sentence is that, ordinarily,
in order to determine its truth-value, one must know whether
the father of RH has any other children and, if so, who they
are. In the case of the former sentence, however, one does
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not, ordinarily, need such knowledge; to determine its
truth-value, one does, naturally, need to know who RH is,
who his father is, and so forth; but one does not ordinarily
need to know whether he has any paternal half-siblings and,
if so, who they are.
Similarly, to determine the truth-value of the sentence
"The work of which this book is a copy has only copies which
have torn pages"," one ordinarily must know which other
books copy it. But to determine the truth-value of the
sentence "The work of which this book is a copy contains the
word 'fantasy'", one does not, ordinarily, need to know any
such thing: One need only have a look at the book in ques-
tion or, indeed, any book which copies it.
What distinguishes the two sorts of predicates which I
am here discussing is, thus, precisely this: Whether, to
determine the truth-values of sentences containing such
predicates, one is ordinarily required to know whether and
which other books copy some given book. I shall say that a
predicate of (say) works is variant if one may ordinarily
determine the truth-value of a (simple) sentence containing
it without knowing whether and which books copy some given
SIt is worth remarking here that such 'constant'
predicates can be formed by means of quantifiers other than
'all'. For example: "C is such that some copy of it is owned
by Quine"; "C is such that most copies of it are in
libraries"; "C is such that exactly five copies of it have
torn pages". All such predicates are congruences with
respect to 'copies'.
Reflection on such predicates may help persuade one of
the intuitive basis of the distinction drawn here.
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book. I shall say that a predicate is constant otherwise.
The generalization of the distinction to predicates of other
sorts of objects, names for which are defined in terms of
other equivalence relations, should be obvious.""
By saying that one must ordinarily know whether, and if
so which, other books copy a to determine whether each copy
of it has a torn page, I mean to recognize that, one may, on
any given occasion, be able to determine that not all copies
of some work have a torn page without knowing whether any
other books copy the given copy a--if a itself has no torn
page--or without knowing which other books copy a--if, say,
b copies a and has no torn page. In general, however, one's
ability to determine whether each copy of a has a torn page
depends upon one's ability to determine which books copy a.
There is a generally (or universally) applicable procedure
for determining whether each copy of a has a torn page, and
:' It would be nice to be able to formulate a more
general distinction here. One promising way to do so would
be as follows. Every object is capable of being identified
in a variety of different ways. Now, there are certain
predicates of, say, people such that one can, in general,
determine whether a particular person satisfies the predi-
cate if one identifies the person in any of a variety of
ways. In particular, one does not, in such oases, need to be
able to identify the person in any way other than the given
way. So, for example, I can determine how tall John Doe is
if am able to identify him as John Doe, or as John Smith, or
as the Grim Reaper, or however. To determine whether the
father of John Doe has only blue-eyed children, however, I
need to know--basically--whether it is possible to identify
him in various other ways: As, say, the father of Jane Doe.
There is plainly work to do to make such a distinction
work, but, if it did work, it would be possible to derive
the version given in the text from the more general version.
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the application of this procedure requires one to determine
which other books copy a. On the other hand, while there is
such a procedure for determining whether a given work con-
tains the word "dog", there is also a procedure which does
not require one to determine which other books copy a.'" It
is the existence of such a generally applicable procedure in
the one case, though not in the other, which distinguishes
the two sorts of predicates.
With the use of the word 'ordinarily' explained in this
way, we may continue to use it as it was used above.
5. That a Theoretical Understanding Will Not Suffice:
Reference and Logical Type
I said earlier that, though expressions, introduced by
a Contextual Definition of which a speaker has a Theoretical
Understanding, refer, that, indeed, though expressions which
one would expect refer to the same entity do, we can not
pass from this claim to the conclusion that these expres-
sions refer to the same object. With the distinction between
variant and constant predicates in place, we are now in r
position to see why.
' There is an obvious connection here with Dummett's
distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' means of verifi-
cation. See his "What Is a Theory of Meaning? (II)", in
G. Evans and J. McDowell, eds., Truth and Meaning (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 67-138, at pp. 115ff.
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The difficulty concerns cases in which most of the
predicates which a speaker understands are constant.'~ Let
us, then, consider a case in which we can give a Contextual
Definition and in which, plausibly, most predicates we do in
fact understand are of this sort. The Definition in question
is one we have already discussed, namely, that of names of
poursons. Recall that the definition is given in terms of an
equivalence relation '"IP', defined as the smallest equi-
valence relation holding between arbitrarily paired indi-
viduals who were alive on 21 March 1990. The definition is
then of the form:
F(pour a) Edf (Vx)(xPa + fx)
There are many predicates of poursons which we can thus
define: One, "Brown-haired(E)", is defined as equivalent to
"(Vx)(xPf * Brown-haired(x))". This predicate is clearly
constant: In order to determine whether "Brown-haired(pour
(George Bush))" is true or not, I must know who is paired
with George Bush. The same can be said of most other predi-
cates which we can define."
' The use of the term 'most' here will be further
explained below.
'One may have been wanting to remark that there seems
to be a connection between the notion of a variant predicate
and the notion of projectibility: Perhaps the reason there
are no variant predicates of poursons is because there are
no predicates of persons which project over the relevant
equivalence classes. See Sylvain Bromberger, "Types and
Tokens in Linguistics", in A. George, ed.. Reflections on
Chomsky (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 58-89.
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Now, I have argued above that the expression 'pour a
has a reference. I have also argued that, if aPb, then
pour a' and 'pour b' have the same reference. But, on the
other hand, I do not want to allow that 'pour a' refers to
an object. So what is this common reference?
What does it look like their common reference is? What
is, from our present perspective, peculiar about the name
pour a' is that, in order to determine the truth-value of a
sentence of the form "F(pour a)", one must, ordinarily, know
just which other person has been paired with a; what is
peculiar about names like 'pour a' is that one must ordi-
narily know the contents of the relevant equivalence class
(x: pour(x)=pour(a)) in order to determine whe her a sen-
tence containing the name is true. The sort of expression
which typically induces this sort of requirement is a quan-
tifier; in particular, a quantifier restricted to a given
equivalence class. For example, the sentence "All copies of
Grundlagen have a torn page" contains such a qunatifier; it
is because the sentence contains such a quantifier that one
can not, ordinarily, determine its truth-value unless one
knows just which copies of Grundlagen exist.
There are complications here. For each predicate "f°",
the predicate "(Vx)(xPt + fx)" does project over the rele-
vant equivalence classes. After all, it is a logical truth
that it is i congruence with respect to "flP'". Whether the
idea is salvageable, I do not know.
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One might suggest, therefore, that the true logical
form of "F(pour a)" is;
Pour ,(a)(fx)
Here, "Pour, (C)($x)" is an operator which forms a quantifier
from a term; It is equivalent to "(x)(xPi + *x)". This
quantifier is itself a congruence with respect to 'RCP', for
the same reason that predicates of the form "(x)(xPC + fx)"
are. Hence, when 'pour a' is understood as a quantifier,
pour a' and 'pour b' do have the same reference, if a is
parallel to b. The two expressions do not refer to the same
object, for they are not names. Rather, in the usual Fregean
parlance, these expressions refer to the same second-level
concept, as is their lot, their being quantifiers. Such an
account thus takes full notice of the effects of a
Theoretical Understanding of the Definition; And if so,
there is no theoretical justification for taking 'pour a',
and other such 'names', to refer to (abstract) objects.
However, the fact, if it is one, that there is some
sort of quantificational structure in "F(pour a)" does not
entail that 'pour a' must itself be read as a quantifier: We
may interpret "Brown-haired(pour a)", not as suggested
above, but as would be obvious in the case of "All copies of
Grundlagen have a torn page". In the latter case, the most
natural interpretation would be:
(Vx)(work x = Grundlagen + torn-page(x))
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Hence, in this case, we may try:
(Vx)(pour x = pour a + brown-haired(x))
Here, 'pour a' is treated as a singular term: The quantifi-
cational structure is located not in 'pour a' itself, but in
the predicate "Brown-haired(f)"I
I said earlier that the difficulty concerned cases in
which most--rather than all--of the predicates speakers
understand are constant. We can now see why. Identity is
itself, in the obvious extended sense, a variant relation;
To know whether "pour a = pour b" is true, one must, indeed,
determine whether aPb: But one does not, in general, need to
know whether any objects other than b bear P to a." It is
certainly true that one may provide a qp ntificational
construal of identity-statements containing names of pour-
sons. Viz.:
pour a = pour b iff (VY)[Pour,., (a)(tx) *4 Pour,. (b)(tx)]
But the motivation for such a construal is absent in this
case: We are assuming, for the moment, driven to construe
sentences containing constant predicates as having a quanti-
ficational structure by the fact that such sentences do
contain constant predicates. There is no such requirement in
this case,"
SThis point is slightly obscured by the nature of the
relation '4P?': For exactly one other object bears P to a.
But the general point should be clear.
"~There is a general argument that such names can not
be eliminated, though for reasons different from those given
by Wright: See "Trans-sortal Identification".
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The claim that the ,xpressions 'pour a' are quantifiers
thus seems dubious. But if identity is the only variant
(one- or many-placed) predicate one understands, then the
only contexts one understands, in which 'pour a' occurs, are
identities: These contexts include not only identity-state-
ments but (partially) open identities embedded in more
complex sentences. Nonetheless, the only (primitive or
simple) predicate one understands which is applicable to
names of poursons is the identity-sign.
There is thus very little which we speakers can say
about poursons. Any sense one might have had that, whatever
these objects are, they are very peculiar, now vanishes:
Such objects have neither psychological nor physical proper-
ties; indeed, the only properties they seem to have are
identity with and distinctness from one another. Such
objects can play almost no role in our thought. More to the
point, there seems little reason to deny that the objects to
which we refer, if we refer to any, by means of names 'of
poursons' are just equivalence classes. For consider the
functional expression 'poureq(t)' defined as:
poureq(a) =d {(x: aPx}
Clearly, poureq(a) is identical with poureq(b) if, and only
if, pour(a) is identical with pour(b).
We should, I suggest, be utterly stumped if asked to
say what in our use (or understanding) of names of the form
pour(a)' distinguishes our use of them from our use of
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names of the form 'poureq(a)'. If nothing does, then it is
difficult to see how we can defend the claim that names of
the two kinds refer to objects of different kinds. (And, as
was said earlier, the claim that names of poursons refer to
equivalence classes is, so far as I am concerned, equivalent
to the claim that there are no poursons, in the sense in
which poursons are supposed to be sui generis.)
I can not pursue this point very far here.' The gene-
ral claim upon which this argument depends is that, if a
speaker is to grasp a criterion of identity for names of a
given class, then she must understand a wide range of
variant predicates fit for use with those names. The notion
of a variant predicate is, recall,, losely connected to the
intuitive notion of a property of an object: So, intui-
tively, the claim is that one's understanding of a criterion
of identity for names of objects of some sort depends upon
one's understanding what sorts of properties those objects
are to be understood as having or failing to have. Our
conception of the kinds of properties such objects may have
informs our conception of the kind of objects these are: Our
conception of the sort of objects to which names in a given
class is informed by an Ideology about those objects.--One
might well say that, at least, how 'robust' the objects seem
* See "Trans-Sortal Identification" for a discussion of
it. My approach to these problems is quite different in that
paper, so this point is also treated quite differently
there.
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to be is closely connected with how 'robust' our Ideology
about those objects is.
I shall have to leave this claim undefended here:
Nonetheless, the strategy of the argument is easily con-
veyed, and, as should be clear, it is closely related to
what was said earlier about the case of poursons. Consider,
again, the Contextual Definition of directions: The Defini-
tion introduces expressions of the form 'dir C', with which
we associate particular identity-conditions. There are a
variety of other functional expressions which, extensionally
(rind indeed necessarily), have the same identity-conditions.
Among these are 'the line through the Origin parallel to C',
'the set of all lines parallel to C', 'the angle at which C
intersects the x-axis', and so forth.
Despite the fact that these functional expressions all
have the same identity-conditions, we conceive of the last
three as referring to distinct sorts of objects: The former,
to a line; the next, to a set; the last, to a real number.
In what does it consist that the three refer to different
sorts of objects? One might say that the sortal predicates
which occur in the different functional expressions provide
for the distinction: But the question is precisely how they
do so. And one plausible, partial answer to this question is
this one: Our conception of the sorts of properties which
the line through the origin parallel to a has is quite
different from our conception of the sorts of properties
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which the set of all lines parallel to a has; our Ideology
about the former is quite different from our Ideology about
the latter.7
If that is correct, then, an understanding of the sort
of object to which such an expression refers depends upon a
grasp of the sorts of properties such objects may have: That
is, upon an understanding of a variety of variant predicates
of such objects. The argument against Wright's view would
then be complete, and, moreover, the foundations for an
argument for the existence of abstract objects and for their
distinctness, in general, from sets would have been laid:
For the Ideology which we associate with, say, directions or
letter-types have is quite djiferent both from the Ideology
we associate with sets and from that we associate with
concrete objects of any sort.
6. Meaning and Understanding, and Variant and Constant
Predicates
Thus far, I have merely suggested that expressions
introduced by Contextual Definition, of which speakers have
but a Theoretical Understanding, are not the names they
appear to be, but are, instead, quantifiers. In the next two
sections, I shall argue for this view. I shall argue that,
'7 There are a number of similarities between these
ideas and Wittgenstein's discussion of ostensive definition,
by which they were inspired. See Philosophical Investiga-
tions, tr. by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958),
§§28ff.
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in cases in which a speaker understands some variant predi-
cates of the objects in question, there is a difference
between her understanding of sentences which contain variant
predicates and those which contain constant ones This
difference must then be reflected in the semantic theory for
this (part of the) language. If sentences which contain
variant predicates are, as Wright's view should have it, to
be accorded a simple (subject-predicate) structure, sen-
tences which contain constant predicates can not be. Thus,
even if there are no variant predicates which speakers
understand, sentences which contain constant predicates can
yet not be accorded a simple structure, but must be accorded
a quantificational structure.
It is worth reminding ourselves how the distinction
between variant and constant predicates was drawn. A variant
predicate of a sort of object is one with respect to which
speakers have certain sorts of abilities: In particular,
speakers are required to be able, ordinarily, to determine
the truth-value of a sentence "F(fnc a)", containing such a
predicate, without knowing which, if any, other objects bear
the relevant equivalence relation to a. A predicate is
constant otherwise. Note that the distinction is one between
sorts of predicates: We are to consider a variety of sen-
tences of the form "F(fnc a)" to determine whether "F•" is
variant or constant. That is just to say that the abilities
which distinguish these two sorts of predicates relate to
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sentences of a certain form; Hence, if our semantic theory
is to take account of this distinction, it must distinguish
sentences of the form "F(fnc a)"--where "F•" is a variant
predicate--from those of the for'm "C(fnc a)"--where "C•" is
not,
It is also worth remarking, here, that the distinction
is drawn in terms of abilities which speakers may or may not
have. I am not assuming that the distinction is one between
predicates of which speakers have one sort of understanding
and those of which they have some other sort of understand-
ing. Furthermore, if the distinction is, in fact, a distinc-
tion between sorts of understanding, that, in itself, does
not in any way entail that possession of one sort of under-
standing or the other consists in possession of just the
abilities in terms of which the distinction has been drawn;
nor does it entail that it consists in the possession of any
other abilities whatsoever. The argument here is entirely
independent of the answers to such questions.
It should not, however, be assumed that, because the
distinction is drawn in terms of abilities which speakers
may or may not have, it can not be a distinction between
sorts of understanding.
The importance, to certain sorts of metaphysical views,
of the claim that understanding is constituted by possession
of certain (linguistic) abilities has wrongly made philoso-
phers who are not enamored of those arguments wary of any
114
introduction of linguistic abilities into discussions of
ontology or metaphysics. However, whether or not such argu--
ments should stand, they are motivated by a genuine insight:
Namely, that it is the linguistic abilities which speakers
have whose possession theories of meaning are intended to
explain. However one thinks semantics ought to be done--a la
Hintikka, Lewis, Davidson, Dummett, or a host of others--
the task is essentially the same; To explain speakers'
possession of the linguistic abilities whose possession
their linguistic behavior manifests. '
The implications of this point are difficult to ascer-
tain: Hence the debate over anti-realism. Fortunately,
however, it is one of its relatively immediate implications
which is crucial here. Suppose that there are two classes of
sentences, both having the same surface structure, with
respect to which speakers have the same linguistic abili-
ties, except that speakers have some linguistic ability with
respect to sentences in the former class though not with
' Use of the notion of manifestation, it is worth
saying here, also invites the suspicious reaction of which I
am complaining. The notion is, however, not in any way
peculiar itself. As I use it, and, indeed, as Dummett him-
self uses it, to say that one's behavior manifests the
possession of a linguistic ability is just to say that that
behavior reveals that one has that ability; or, that evi-
dences that one has the ability; or, that it provides good
reason to believe that one has the ability. Why it does so
is another question, a possible, indeed, popular, answer to
which is that possession of that ability is causally impli-
cated in production of that behavior. There are, of course,
other answers to the question, one of which Dummett has made
famous,
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respect to those in the latter. No theory of meaning which
fails to explain this difference can be adequate: Any ade-
quate theory must explain why speakers possess the ability
in question with respect to the one class though not with
respect to the other. Hence, no adequate theory can treat
sentences in the two classes in the same way: There must be
some difference in the way speakers understand sentences in
the two classes (for the difference, by hypothesis, concerns
an ability speakers have, generally, with respect to a class
of sentences). For, if a uniform treatment were adequate to
explain speakers' possession of the ability in the former
case, it would of necessity also be adequate to explain
their possession )f that same ability in the latter case, a
case in which the ability is, by hypothesis, absent.
The claim for which I have just argued may thus be
stated as follows; If a speaker has linguistic abilities
with respect to one class of sentences which she does not
have with respect to another, then she must understand
sentences in the two classes differently. This principle
entails that the distinction between variant and constant
predicates, on which we are focusing, is a distinction of
which any semantic theory must take notice. In order to draw
this conclusion, however, we must show that the abilities,
in terms of whose possession the distinction was drawn, are
in fact linguistic abilities: For the argument just given
depends upon the supposition that speakers have different
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linguistic abilities vis-a-vis the relevant classes of
sentences; and the argument promised is concerned solely
with the different abilities which speakers have vis-a-vis
sentences containing variant and constant predicates.
A full argument that these abilities are linguistic
ones would depend upon the defense of a general distinction
between linguistic and non-linguistic abilities, which,
sadly but not surprisingly, I am in no position to present.
I should urge that the fact that these abilities concern how
speakers are, quite generally, able to determine the truth-
values of a broad range of sentences makes it quite plaus-
ible that these abilities are linguistic, if any are. More-
over, I should claim that zhe distinction is crucial to a
correct explanation of the notion of a criterion of iden-
tity." But I am not going to pursue that point here.
Instead, I shall offer a more direct, though somewhat
speculative, argument that the distinction between variant
and constant predicates is one of which a theory of meaning
must take notice. The argument appeals to a principle about
the meanings of predicates: Namely, that evidential rela-
tions among sentences are relevant to the theory of meaning;
that predicates "Ft" and "GC", which bear different eviden-
tial relations to other predicates, differ in meaning, in
Sense. (As earlier, this principle in no way entails that
"YSee, again, "Trans-sortal Identification".
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the notion of meaning is itself to be explained in terms of
the notion of evidence.)
To say that, in order to determine the truth-value of
"F(dir a)°", one need not know which, if any, other lines are
parallel to the line a, is precisely to say that there is a
very strong evidential relationship between a sentence "fa"
and "F(dir a)"--where "ff" is a simple predicate.i:' Were
there, then, a predicate "Ce", which was constant, however
strongly equivalent to "Fe", the two would have to differ in
at least this respect: Namely, that "FU" should bear
strongeri" evidential relations to certain sentences than
should "CV". For, by hypothesis, it is not the case that
knowledge c" the truth of any sentence of the form "fb"--
where b is parallel to a--suffices for knowledge that
"C(dir a)", since, otherwise, one could determine whether
"C(dir a)" was true by determining whether or not any such
sentence was true.
Now I am not claiming that there must always be dif-
ferences, in this respect, between any given variant predi-
cate and some particular constant predicate in a given
4
"The predicate "ff" is, in general, just that predi-
cate in terms of which "F•" itself was defined: I.e., the
"fC" of "(Vx)(xRa + fx)".
A variant predicate is, thus, one which is defined in
terms of a predicate itself a congruence with respect to the
relation in question. (But note, not every such predicate is
variant: Consider "(Vx)(xRa * (Vy)(yRx + fx))".)
4 "Stronger", of course, because "CC" may bear some
evidential relation to "fU".
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language. Rather, I am arguing that there is a sort of
sentence to which sentences containing variant predicates
bear strong evidential relationships, to which sentences
containing constant predicates do not. What distinguishes
variant predicates from constant ones, from this point of
view, is that, in general, variant predicates bear a utrong
evidential relation to such sentences--particular simple
sentences to which they are closely related: Constant predi-
cates on the other hand, do not. And for this reason, I
claim, there is a difference between the sorts of meaning
which the two sorts of predicates have.
7. That a Theoretical Understanding Will Not Suffice (TI):
Quantification and Logical Form
Any adequate semantic theory must, therefore, treat
variant predicates, as a class, differently from constant
predicates. The question which we must now address is just
how the theory must treat them. In order to argue, at last,
that a speaker who has a Theoretical Understanding of a
Contextual Definition need not be able to refer to abstract
objects, we need to argue that any adequate theory must
accord sentences containing constant predicates a quan-
tificational structure.
To show this, I am going to argue that, if there are
both constant and variant predicates in the language, the
theory must accord sentences which contain constant predi-
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cates a quantificational structure. This argument depends
upon quite general features of constant predicates and how
those features distinguish them from variant predicates, not
upon any specific relationship between constant predicates
and the variant predicates which, I am supposing, are also
present in the language. The argument, that is to say, is
designed to show that, because constant predicates are
unlike variant predicates, the two must--in general--be
treated differently.
The argument is, again, being offered against the view
that speakers who have a Theoretical Understanding of a
Contextual Definition are, thereby, made able to refer to
absti ct objects. Hence, we may assume that (simple) sen-
tences containing variant predicates are to be assigned a
simple, subject-predicate structure: The semantic theory is
assumed to treat a sentence such as "The work of which a is
a copy contains the word 'fantasy'" by assigning it the
structure of "F(work a)": That is, the sentence is, accord-
ing to the theory, true if, and only if, a particular
(abstract) object--namely, the work of which a is a copy--
satisfies the predicate "t contains the word 'fantasy'".
There will, of course, be other sentences which contain
constant predicates of works, such as "The work of which a
is a copy has only copies which contain torn pages". Since
this sentence does contain a constant predicate, it can not
be treated as are sentences which contain variant predi-
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cates. The most plausible way to treat it is to assign it
the semantic structure of "(Vx)(work x = work a + fx)". And,
of course, there are sentences, like "All books which are
copies of Grundlagen have a torn page", in English, Such
sentences have a plainly quantificational structure: The
difficulty, so far as I can see, is thus not to show that
sentences containing constant predicates have a quantifica-
tional structure. Rather, the difficulty was to find a way
of distinguishing them without assuming that they have such
a structure.
Treating sentences which contain variant and constant
predicates in these different ways offers an explanation of
the differences between them. On the one hand, sentences
which contain variant predicates are assigned a simple
structure: Simple sentences, those of the form "Fa", para-
digmatically are susceptible to verification wichout any
particular knowledge concerning other objects:"4 Plainly,
,the semantics of these sentences does not lead one to expect
that one should need any such knowledge. What typically
needs to be done, in such a case, is to identify the object
in question and to determine whether it satisfies the predi-
cate: In the case of "The work of which a is a copy contains
the word 'fantasy'", we need to identify the work in ques-
tion--to do which we must identify some one, any one of its
42 It is worth comparing with this point what Wiggins
calls the "Only a and b" condition on identity: See his
Sameness and Substance (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), pp. 94ff.
121
copies--and determine whether it contains the word
'fantasy'.
On the other hand, sentences which contain constant
predicates contain a quantifier, whose domain is restricted
to other copies of the work in question. Since the truth-
value of the sentence depends upon what truth-value each of
its instances has--upon whether, in particular, each copy of
the work satisfies some given predicate--one ordinarily will
need to know, in order to determine the truth-value of the
sentence, whether and which other copies of the work exist.
Thus, drawing on our earlier discussion, if speakers do
not understand certain sorts of variant predicates fit for
ase with a class of names introduced by Contextual Defini-
tion, then the only contexts in which speakers understand
the use of those names are identities; for the variant
predicates speakers do understand are derived from the
Definition of identity itself, and sentences containing
constant predicates have a quantificational structure. As
was said above, there is reason to be skeptical that, if
that is all speakers understand, they are able to refer, by
means of such names, to objects to which they were not
already able to refer. But, for the moment, it is perhaps
sufficient to note that the distinction between variant and
constant predicates has a relevance to our Ontological
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problems and that it is not clear how Wright can make a
place for it. '"
8. Closing
I have argued here that Wright's attempted defense of
the view that there are abstract objects fails. There are
cases in which, as I have put it, speakers understand only
'constant' predicates of certain (supposed) objects; in such
cases, we are unable to justify the claim that the expres-
sions introduced by the Contextual Definition, singular
terms though they may appear to be, are proper names. We
are, that is, unable to justify the claim that these expres-
sions require to be treated, in a semantic theory, as
expressions fit to refer to objects. Indeed, so to treat
them would be to treat them as like expressions variant
predicates of which speakers understand; it would therefore
be to treat them in such a way as to make possible an expla-
nation of speakers' possession of just those abilities
characteristic of an understanding of variant predicates in
a case in which they have no such abilities,"
4 For more on the relevance of the distinction, see
"Trans-sortal Identification".
• I should like to thank George Boolos, Sylvain Brom-
berger, Michael Dummett, Jim Higginbotham, Tom Kuhn, Jim
Page, and Bob Stalnaker for comments upon and criticism of
earlier drafts of this paper. I should also like to thank
those who attended readings of earlier versions at the
Wolfson Colloquium, in Oxford, and at the graduate collo-
quium at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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0. Opening
Nominalism, in its modern form, is the view that there
are no abstract objects. We may refer to its more specific
relatives as various forms of Reductionism, the view, in
each case, that there are no (abstract) objects of some
specific kind. Hence, we may speak of Reductionism about
Number Theory, the view that there are no Numbers, and of
Reductionism about linguistic objects, the view that there
are no letter- or word-types. It is, of course, possible to
hold a Reductionist view about some subject-matters, while
rejecting the corresponding views about other subject-
matters: Nominalism is thus Reductionism about every class
of sentences in which occur terms purporting to refer to
abstract objects.
Both Reductionism and Nominalism come in a variety of
flavors. Following Dummett, I shall refer to the part of our
language upon which any specific ontological dispute is
focused as the Disputed Class of sentences. We may make,
first, a distinction between those positions according to
which statements in the Disputed Class have some truth-
value, some such statements typically being true, and others
false, and those positions which deny this claim. We may
refer to views of this latter sort as Fictionalist views:
For it is often said, by those who defend such positions,
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that, for example, statements of Number Theory should not be
thought of as up for evaluation as true or false; rather,
our talk of Numbers should be thought of as a convenience, a
fiction, which facilitates the process of drawing inferences
within science.'
I shall not be concerned, in this paper, with Fiction-
alism.' The Reductionist views which I shall discuss here
are thus committed to the view that some statements of, say,
Number Theory are true; others, false. The chief problem
then facing such a view is to explain how such statements
may be true, despite the fact that there are no objects of
the sort to which names occurring in them purport to refer.
While thr motivation for Reductionism may differ from
case to case, and from philosopher to philosopher, this
problem is constant. One form of Reductionism, which we may
call Semantic Reductionism, is motivated by the observation
that it may be possible to eliminate names of, say, letter-
and word-types from sentences in which they occur; The
'See here Hartry Field, Science Without Numbers
(Oxford: Blackwelt, 1980). There are plainly a variety of
options here: One may say, for example, that statements of
Number Theory are, strictly speaking, false, and then
attempt to explain their apparent utility in terms of the
idea of a convenient fiction. On the other hand, one might
want to appeal to some notion of truth-within-a-fiction, so
that some statement like 'In the fiction of Number Theory,
2+2=4' would be true. However such views are developed,
however, no statement of Number Theory will, on any such
view, be true.
"ZFor a discussion of such views, see Bob Hale, Abstract
Objects (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), Ch. 5.
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elimination shows that no names which purport to refer to
abstract objects actually occur in the sentences in the
Disputed Class. There is thus no need to take seriously the
idea that we refer to such objects and, correspondingly, no
need to recognize their existence.
A different sort of Reductionism, which we might call
Epistemological Reductionism, is motivated by epistemologi--
cal difficulties connected with abstract objects. Abstract
objects, such as Numbers, are often said to be causally
inert; If so, then they can neither be perceived (perception
presumably being a causal notion), nor known by their
effects: How, then, even if there are such objects, can we
know anything about them? Now, we are assuming that there
are a variety of true statements of Number Theory, some of
which there is no reason to doubt we know: Hence, if we had
some account of how such statements could be true, though
there were no Numbers, and how we could know the truths they
express, we could avoid these epistemological difficulties.
Classically, such an account would be provided by means of
precisely the sort of analysis discussed earlier, the object
being to show that 'names of abstract objects' are nothing
of the sort; that they merely disguise the true logical form
of sentences in which they occur; that they may be elimi-
nated, leaving us without any need for a notion of reference
to abstract objects.
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Thus, whatever the motivation for Reductionism, the
question how statements containing what purport to be names
of abstract objects can be true (and which an elimination of
names of abstract objects would answer) arises. I do not
mean to be suggesting that the problem can only be resolved
by means of an elimination of purported names of abstract
objects. What must be eliminated is reference to abstract
objects: The notion of reference to abstract objects might
be eliminable, even if names 'of abstract objects' are not.
Names which purport to refer to abstract objects might
refer, not to abstract objects, but to objects of some less
problematic sort. I shall argue in the first section of this
paper 'hat names of abstract objects can not be eliminated
and that, therefore, Reductionism of any sort other than
Fictionalism is committed to the elimination only of refer-
ence to abstract objects, to the view that names 'of
abstract objects' refer, but to objects which are not
abstract.
The traditional opponent of Nominalism is Platonism,7
the view that there are abstract objects of various kinds.
We may distinguish between views according to which the
existence of abstract objects of any given kind is largely
independent of empirical matters, and views which according
"This term is used by Crispin Wright and, following
him, by Bob Hale. See Wright's Frege's Conception of Numbers
as Objects (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1983), p.
xviii, and Hale's Abstract Objects.
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to which abstract objects of a given sort may exist, or may
not exist, as the empirical facts may have it.4 The former
view, it should be emphasized, is not committed to the claim
that the existence of all particular abstract objects must
be necessary: And, indeed, if the existence of, say, word-
types is dependent upon the existence bf their tokens, then
one who held this view could well deny that it is necessary
that word-types exist. The important point, however, is
that, according to this view, if there are any word-tokens,
then, necessarily, there are word-types. There is, that is
to say, no empirical question about the existence of word-
types as such; there is only the question about the exis-
tence of their tokens. According to the latter view,
however, there is an additional, non-philosophical question
whether there are any word-types, even if the existence of
their tokens is granted.
Crispin Wright's argument against Reductionism is that
names of and reference to abstract objects can not be elimi-s
nated. He considers, as a way of eliminating them, what are
commonly known as Contextual Definitions. Such a Definition
does not provide an explicit definition of names of abstract
objects: Rather, it shows how to translate sentences which
contain names of abstract objects into sentences which do
4 Compare here Dummett's discussion of the distinction
between what he calls Aristotelian and Strawsonian concep-
tions of the existence of abstract objects, in his Frege:
Philosophy of Language, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1981),
pp. 501-4.
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not. For example, once we have seen that the direction of
one line is the same as that of another line if and only if
those lines are parallel, we may offer the following elimi-
nation of names of directions: "
dir a = dir b =J1 a II b
F(dir a) dMR fa
Here 'dir a' is to be read 'the direction of a'; 'fC' is a
predicate which is a congruence with respect to the (equi-
valence) relation of parallelisut and which is suitably
related to 'Fe' (so that the truth-conditions come out
right). Note that these two conditions on 'ff' guarantee,
first, that the Definition of identity preserves its formal
properties (reflexivity, symmetricity, and transitivity)
a,4d, secondly, that names of 'the same direction' are inter-
substitutable salva veritate within statements 'about direc-
tions': I.e., they guarantee that Leibniz's Law is valid in
the extended language (assuming that it was valid in the
original language).
'See Wright, pp. 29ff. See also Gottlob Frege, The
Foundations of Arithmetic, 2nd. rev. ed., tr. by J.L. Austin
(Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press, 1980), §65.
"To say that a relation 'CRI)' is an equivalence rela-
tion is to say that it is reflexive--Vx(xRx)--symmetric--
VxVy(xRy f yRx)--and transitive--VxVyyYz(xRy & yRz + xRz). A
predicate 'FC' is a congruence with respect to a relation
'•t•R' if, and only if, VxVy(Fx & xRy + Fy). If 'tRf' is an
equivalence relation, then 'FC" is a congruence if, and only
if, VxVy(xRy + (Fx f Fy)). The notion of oongruence can be
extended to functions and many-placed predicates in obvious
ways.
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In general, a Contextual Definition is of the form:'
fnc a = fnc b Ed aRb
F(fnc a) =0d fa
Here, 'fnc C' is the (functional) expression to be elimi-
nated; 'tR•' is an appropriate equivalence relation; the
predicates 'ft' are suitably related to the various predi-
cates 'FC' which occur on the left-hand side and are con-
gruences with respect to the relation 'tRn'.
Wright argues, fur reasons I shall not discuss here,"
that no Contextual Definition can succeed in eliminating
reference to abstract objects. His argument, as I understand
it, commits him to the view that there are abstract objects
of various sorts corresponding to every equivalence rela-
tion. The point may, perhaps, be seen most clearly if we
conceive of Contextual Definitions, not ais a way of elimi-
nating names of abstract objects, but as a way of intro-
ducing names of abstract objects. So, consider the equi-
valence relation 'f was born on the same day as 1' (under-
stood as true only of pairs of people) and the Definition:
dap(a) - dap(b) EF- a was born on the same day as b
F(dap a) -d fa
(The predicates 'ff' are, of course, required to be con-
gruences with respect to the equivalence relation.) The
7 0'Of course, other parts of the Definition will be
required to deal with two- and many-place predicates. But
the generalization poses no special problems.
"See Wright. See also my "Whether Structure May Be
Misleading", forthcoming, for criticism of the view I am
about to attribute to Wright.
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functional expression 'dap C" may be read 'the day-person of
f'. Wright's view, as I understand it,' is that there are
such objects as day-persons: For his view is that, if
expressions in a given class function, so far as syntax is
concerned, as singular terms, and if those expressions occur
in some true sentences,"' then the terms in question refer.
Now, it seems to me implausible that there are any such
objects as day-persons. I shall be arguing that some but not
all such Contextual Definitions successfully introduce names
of abstract objects, names for abstract objects of some
particular sort. The apparent implausibility of the claim
that there are day-persons does not, however, constitute an
argument against the view there are. One might want to
suggest, for example, that names of day-persons are not
names of some kind of object which is sui generis but are,
'I should say that there are certain tensions in
Wright's position which speak against this interpretation.
See, for example, his remark, on p. 9, that "it is, admit-
tedly, obscure why any philosopher might endorse a general
policy of contextual definition". The force of the remark is
not, however, clear, and I do not, in any event, know how to
interpret Wright so as to avoid committing him to this
claim.
One possibility would be to take his views on the
Caesar problem as relieving him of a commitment to this
claim, so that, in some cases, we do not need to take the
names introduced to refer to abstract objects but may take
them to refer to concrete objects or, perhaps, to sets,
rather than to objects of some new, distinct type. But, as I
shall remark later, I do not know how to apply Wright's
views on this subject. See Wright, §xiv, esp. pp. 116-17.
So It is probably best to say 'true simple sentences'
here, since the occurrence of names of day-persons in e.g.
"dap a does not exist" will not entail the existence of day-
persons.
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rather, names of equivalence classes, i.e., of sets; hence,
there are such objects as day-persons, since these sets do
exist.
In order to sustain this view, we should need some
principled way to distinguish between the sorts of cases in
which names of abstract objects, such as day-persons, may be
taken to be names of equivalence classes and the sorts of
cases in which they must be taken to be names of objects
which are sui generis, One might hold, say, that names of
words and letters refer to words and letters, not sets, but
that names of day-persons refer to sets, not to day-persons.
But this view is but a re-formulation of the view for which
I shall be arguing. My view is that there are no day-
persons, by which I mean that there are no objects, which
have the identity-conditions stipulated in the Contextual
Definition and which are related to persons as directions
are related to lines. I mean to deny that there are any day-
persons, by which I mean to deny that there are any objects
which are sui generis and which we may take to be the refer-
ents of the names introduced by the Contextual Definition.
My view thus differs from that just stated only in emphasis:
For to say that names of day-persons name, not day-persons,
but sets is to say that there are no day-persons, in the
sense in which day-persons are of a kind unto themselves.
Thus, if we distinguish among names of abstract objects
whose referents are sui generis and those which name equi-
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valence classes, we are committed to holding that, say, day-
persons might not exist. If we make no such distinction, we
may hold that day-persons are sui generis and exist merely
in virtue of the fact that 'A was born on the same day as 11'
is an equivalence relation. (For that will guarantee that
'dap a = dap a' is true, for each name 'a'.) I shall argue
against this view in section three.
There is, however, another way of avoiding a distinc-
tion between names of abstract objects whose referents are
sui generis and those whose referents are sets. One might
hold, as Quine seems to hold, that all abstract objects are
sets, that, once we have decided that we must allow refer-
ence to sets, we do not need to countenance reference to
abstract objects of any other sort." This Quinean view is
thus a third alternative here: The other two alternatives
are (what I call) Naive Platonism, the view that names of
abstract objects (introduced by Contextual Definition)
always refer and refer to objects which are sui generis; and
the view for which I have said I shall argue, Neutral
Platonism. •
" See here Chapter 7 of Quine's Word and Object
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1960).
" The former tag is meant to suggest a similarity to
Moore's views. The latter is meant to suggest that this
variety of Platonism is neutral on the question whether
there are any abstract objects of any given type, that
question being one whose decision depends upon the outcome
of certain investigations uhich are the responsibility, not
of Philosophy, but of Mathematics, Psychology, or whatever
the relevant discipline.
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1. That Names of Abstract Objects Are Ineliminable
Arguments for the ineliminability of names of Abstract
Objects have classically focused upon the equivalence rela-
tion in terms of which the Contextual Definition is given.
Conversely, work towards the elimination of such names has
usually consisted in attempts to find a suitable equivalence
relation. On the one hand, an appropriate equivalence rela-
tion is easy to define. In the case of works of literature,
for example, one can appeal to the equivalence relation 'f
is a copy of the same work of literature as '', thus allow-
ing the following Definition:"
work a = work b s=d a is a copy of the same work of
literature as b
Apparently, however, such a Definition is circular: Refer-
ence to works is not eliminated from the left-hand side,
since reference is made to works on the right-hand side,
Such a Definition plainly preserves the meaning of the
sentences which occur on the left-hand side. In general,
however, it has proved difficult to find a Definition which
was not circular in this way and which preserved meaning.
Hence, debate often concerned just what sorts of conditions
'• To avoid confusion, I shall refer to works of
literature--in the sense in which there is only one
Macbeth--as works and refer to the physical objects which
are copies of them as books. I say that one book copies
another if they are copies of the same work.
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such a Definition should meet: Synonymy is too strong;
material equivalence, too weak.
Such problems too proved intractable, and I do not
intend to revive them here. I remind us of them only to
emphasize that my argument abstracts from such issues: It
does not turn on any such consideration, and any resolution
of these problems is irrelevant to the fundamental diffi-
culty facing any purported elimination of names of abstract
objects.
If we are to avoid these classical problems, we must
give an argument for the ineliminability of names of
Abstract Objects which applies to any Contextual Definition;
that is, an argument which could be formulated directly in
terms of the general form of Contextual Definition. We must,
that is, assume that the Contextual Definition offered meets
any constraints upon such a Definition which could possibly
be laid down and prescind from any considerations concerning
the character of the equivalence relation or the possibility
of finding predicates suitable to appear on the right-hand
side.
We have yet to say anything about sentences which
contain quantifiers which purport to range over abstract
objects. Wright discusses some such quantifiers when he
discusses Contextual Definition. Sentences which contain
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universal quantifiers, for example, may be treated via the
following sort of schema:
Yx(Fx) =4• Vx(fx)
Existential quantification may be handled similarly;
3x(Fx) =j 3x(fx)
With such Definitions of universal and existential quantifi-
cation, along with the Definition of identity, one may
define numerically definite and indefinite quantifiers in
the usual way.
Our conception of works of literature as objects is
connected with our understanding of the domain which they
constitute, the domain over which we take our quantifiers to
range. ~ But the character of this domain as a domain of
works of literature can not be captured by our understanding
of quantifiers such as the universal and existential ones:
The truth-conditions of sentences in which they occur are
not appropriately sensitive to the character of the domain.
A quantifier which is so sensitive is "Most", and it is upon
sentences containing quantifiers such as "Most", "Few", "At
least two-thirds", and so forth, that I want to focus our
attention.
x Wright, p. 30.
* Such a view is implicit in Frege and explioit, though
in a much different form than here, in W.V.O. Quine. See his
"On What There Is", in his From a Logical Point of View, 2nd
ed. rev. (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp.
1-19.
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I am going to assume, for the purposes of argument,
that the language in which the Contextual Definition is
being given contains primitive quantifiers of this sort,
which range over the sort of object to which reference is
made on the right-hand side of the Definition. So, for
example, in the case of the Definition of names of works of
literature, I am assuming that the language contains primi-
tive quantifiers "Most books", "Few books", and so forth.
The question is how we can define quantifiers such as "Most
works" in terms of these ones.
Consider the sentence "Most works are long". The fol-
lowing analysis plainly will not do:'"
Most works are long iff most books are long.
For most works might be long, though there are many more
copies of short works than of long ones, so that most books
are not long. What is required is that we select, for each
work of literature, some representative copy of it, and
formulate the right-hand side so that it says that most of
those books are long. Where 'EeC' is to be read 'f is a copy
"I am assuming here that it makes perfectly good sense
to speak of a (physical) book as being long, as containing
the word "dog", and so forth. I do think that this makes
perfectly good sense. But, however that may be, the require-
ment that we prescind from problems attaching to the Defini-
tion of identity and of simple sentences such as "Grundlagen
contains the word 'fantasy'" requires that we assume that
there is some way to make sense of such talk.
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of the same work as i', the right-hand side may be taken to
be :'7
34[VxVy(0x = 4y + xCy) & (Most x)(3y(x = 4y); long(x)]
The generalization to other sentances involving 'Most', and
to sentences involving similar quantifiers, is obvious
enough.
One worry about this sort of Definition might focus
upon the use of second-order quantifiers. It is true enough
that 'Most' is itself not a first-order quantifier. But one
might be struck by the fact that we have assumed that primi-
tive quantifiers such as "HMost books" are already present in
the language: One would not have thought that "Most works
are long" was any more involved with second-order notions
than is "Most books are long". But the argument need not
rest upon such intuitions.
The point concerns, rather, the character of the
second-order notions to which we have had to appeal. Con-
sider the right-hand side of the Definition again:
'7 'Most' is a binary quantifier. A sentence '(Most
x)(Fx; Gx)' is to be read "Most Fs are Gs".
Equivalently, of course, the quantifier which ranges
over first-order functions may be replaced by a second-
order quantifier which ranges over (what Frege called)
Concepts:
3J[Yx3y(*y) & VxVy(9x & *y + .xCy) &
(Most x)(Ix; long(x)]
Similarly, the second-order variable may be replaced by one
which ranges over sets.
I know of no proof that there is no way to represent
sentences like 'Most works are long' within an otherwise
first-order language, whose quantifiers range over books,
and which contains a primitive quantifier 'Most'.
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30(VxYy($x = ey * xCy) & (Most x)(3y(x -= y); long(x))
We have here introduced a quantifier whose range is restric-
ted to functions which satisfy the following conditions:
1. The function is defined for all books
2. The function does not distinguish copies of the same
work
3. The function does distinguish copies of different
works
We may simplify the Definition by introducing a fixed,
primitive first-order function, call it 'W(f)', which satis-
fies these three conditions. That is, we may introduce a
first-order functional constant subject to the following
axiom: e
VxVy(W(x) = W(y) xCy)
We may now re-write the right-hand side, in the general
case, as follows:
(Most x)[3y(x = W(y)); fx]
One can not but notice the similarity between this analysis
and this one:
(Most x)(3y(x = work y); Fx)
This last is the natural, Platonistic analysis of "Most
works are long", since '3y(t = work y)' may be read 't is a
work'.
~ I have omitted a constraint above and have not inclu-
ded it in this axiom: Namely, that the value of the func-
tion, for any given book, is some book which copies it. This
constraint is not important for our purposes. Properly,
however, the axiom should read: VxVy([W(x) = W(y) * xCy] &
xC (x)).
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An understanding of the Contextual Definition of iden-
tity for a class of names issues in a conception of the
domain over which quantifiers are intended to range, and it
is upon that conception which our understanding of state-
ments such as "Most works are long" draws. Our understanding
of the Definition issues immediately in an understanding of
these statements, no further explanation being required.'
The explanation of our understanding of such sentences must
proceed in terms of an explanation of our understanding of
some such function as 'W(C)'; Whatever else the Contextual
Definition succeeds in doing, it does succeed in introducing
such a function. (Indeed, this point, once stated, may seem
obvious.)
Once appeal to such a function has become necessary,
there can be no objection to its invocation in more familiar
contexts. For example, we may give the following Contextual
Definition of identity and of simple sentences:`'
work a = work b s-d W(a) = W(b)
F(work a) d=0 f(W(a))
This sort of Definition has qui.e definite advantages over
Definitions like those we considered earlier. First, a
S'One might wonder whether such a remark can possibly
apply to Contextual Definitions, such as that of names of
Numbers and Directions, which introduce names of infinitely
many objects. 'Most' does not, of course, have any natural
interpretation in such cases. This does not matter, however.
In the case of Numbers, for example, we may focus upon such
sentences as "Most numbers less that 12 are composite".
"' Note, of course, that 'W(U)' is still subject to the
non-logical axiom 'W(a) = W(b) iff aCb'.
143
Definition of this sort fully respects the apparent semantic
structure of the sentences on the left-hand side, Secondly,
the Definition makes the validity of intersubstitutivity
depend, not upon some special feature of the sorts of predi-
cates which occur on the right-hand side, but upon the fact
that expressions which purport to refer to the same object
do refer to the same object.
There is thus no possibility of eliminating the func-
tional expression 'the work of which e is a copy' via such
Contextual Definition. The right-hand side of these Defini-
tions must make use of a functional expression with formal
properties much like those of the functional expression
which occurs on the left-hand side. The Definition therefore
accomplishes nothing, if the goal was to eliminate names of
abstract objects--expressions of the form 'work a'--occur-
rences of functional expressions such as "the word of which
C is a token", and so on. The replacement of 'work(f)' by
'W(C)' hardly constitutes progress.
Nonetheless, it should be clear that this argument does
not show that the notion of reference to abstract objects is
not eliminable. For we saw above that, even should names of
abstract objects prove ineliminable, there is an alternative
course open to a Reductionist. The substitution of 'W(C)'
for 'work(C)' should be seen, not as an attempt to eliminate
an expression, but as reflecting a treatment of names of
works as referring to books, rather than to works. That is
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to say: The substitution of 'W(f)' for 'work(C)' suggests,
in the syntax, an elimination of reference to abstract
objects in the semantics.
The problem with which we are now left may seem
familiar: For it is misleading to say that, on such a view,
names of works do not refer to works. Of course names of
works refer to works, works being whatever names of works
name: The view is better explained as the view that works
are books. The dispute concerns the range of the function
'work(f)': Another option would be to take the range to
consist of equivalence classes, of sets of books. Our prob-
lem thus concerns, quite generally, when it is possible to
identify objects, which purport to be of one sort, with
objects of some other sort. Are works books? Are they sets?
Are words sets? Are countries directions? Are people natural
numbers?
This problem is Frege's famous Julius Caesar problem."
For the problem is how we are to decide questions about the
identity and distinctness of objects of apparently different
kinds: We may, borrowing a term from Michael Dummett, call
this the problem of Trans-sortal Identification.
t
'See Frege, §056, 66-8.
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2. Reference, Semantics, and Model Theory
The argument given in the last section does not, as I
have just emphasized, decide to what names, which purport to
refer to abstract objects, in fact refer. After all, the
argument is purely semantical in nature: It shows that we
require to appeal to a function which restricts the domain
to one of a certain cardinality. No purely semantical argu-
ment can show more, for no such argument can decide what
constitutes the domain. So far as concerns this argument,
the referents of names 'of works' might be books, sets,
works, or candlesticks, so long as we can find a way to fix
the cardinality of the domain they constitute.?
The view that we can 'take' the references of names of
works to be sets is therefore entirely trivial (as, indeed,
is the view that we can 'take' the references of these names
to be works) unless there are some sorts of constraints upon
what we may take the references of names of a given type to
be. That is to say, the view is trivial unless the notion of
reference is distinguished from the notion of the value of
an expression in a model, for of course we can take the
values of names of works, in some model, to be (almost)
anything we like. By saying that such views are trivial,
==That there is no formal obstacle to doing so or to
defining the various predicates appropriately is part of the
point of Hilary Putnam's papers "Models and Reality", in his
Realism and Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983), and "Model Theory and the 'Factuality' of Semantics",
in Reflections on Chomsky, ed. A. George (Oxford: Blackwell,
1989), pp. 213-32.
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I mean to be claiming that no such view poses a threat to
any form of Platonism, unless it incorporates a distinction
between reference and the value of an expression in a model:
For a Platonist should not be taken to be arguing anything
other than that we can, and do, refer to certain abstract
objects--such as letters, works of literature, and numbers--
in whatever sense we can, and do, refer to other sorts of
objects, be these sets, persons, or electrons.
We do not, therefore, need to resolve the question
whether it is possible to distinguish the notion of refer-
ence from that of value in a model in order to resolve the
dispute with which we are presently concerned: The viability
of Reductionism depends upon the validity of such a distinc-
tion. For suppose that there is no way to distinguish the
two notions, that there are no constraints upon what we may
take the referents of names 'of persons', 'of Numbers', or
'of letters' to be. Then there is no sense in which we can,
or must, take names 'of letters' to refer to certain sets or
inscriptions which accords any special place to sets or to
inscriptions: In precisely the same sense, we may take names
'of letters' to refer to letters or to Numbers. And in the
same sense, we may take names of people to refer to people
or to Numbers.
It is worth pausing here to reflect upon the question
which is now guiding our discussion and the argumentative
strategy which I shall deploy in answering it. The question
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is what, if anything, constrains what we may take the refer-
ences of names of a given kind to be. Intuitively, names of
people refer to people; names of rivers, to rivers; names of
cities, to cities; and so forth. Either these intuitions are
substantive or they are not. Any view which entails they are
not, that there is no 'deep' sense in which names of people
refer to people, rather than to objects of some other kind,
I shall call 'deflationary'. On such a view, either there is
no sense in which names of people refer to people, rather
than, say, places; or, while there is a sense in which names
of people refer only to people, this fact is a trivial
consequence of some philosophical thesis concerning the
notion of reference.
The view we discussed above, that there is no distinc-
tion between the notion of reference and the notion of
interpretation in a model, is an instance of the former sort
of deflationary view. My argument concerning it is that it
will not serve the purposes of a Reductionist. My view about
other deflationary strategies is similar. Consider, for
example, Putnam's reply to this problem: Names of people do
refer to people, and refer to the very people to whom we
think they refer; but this is merely because "we don't
intend" names of people to refer to anything but people.?=
And if that is why names of people refer to people, surely
we may also say that we do not intend names of letters to
=See his "Models and Reality", p. 24.
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refer to anything other than letters. We intend names of
letters to refer neither to people, nor to inscriptions,
nor, for that matter, to sets. 4
These remarks about Putnam's solution also indicate the
second strand of the argumentative strategy I am employing.
It is my view that we can say rather more about what fixes
the sort of object to which names in a given class refer: As
I said, that does not need to be established here, since
Reductionism is committed to this view. As deflationary as
Putnam's views are, he does say something in response to our
leading question: And what I argued was that, in so far as
his response works, it distinguishes reference to abstract
objects both from reference to concrete objects and from
reference to abstract objects of prima facie distinct kinds.
In general, then, the claim is that any way of distinguish-
ing the kinds of objects to which, say, names of people, of
rivers, of places, and so forth, refer will also distinguish
the kinds of objects to which names of Numbers, of letters,
of works of literature, and so forth, refer; it will distin-
guish the sort of object to which, say, names of letters
refer both from the sorts of objects to which names of
concrete objects refer and from the sorts of objects to
which names of other sorts of abstract objects refer.
= Similar remarks also apply to views, such as that of
Davidson, which hold that the notion of reference is purely
theoretical. See his "Reality Without Reference", Dialectica
31 (1977), pp. 247-58.
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One might want to suggest that we can not say, so to
speak, piecemeal what constrains the sort of object to which
terms in a given class refer; that the only constraints
which we may place on the references of names of some type
are universal, in the sense that the constraint applies
simultaneously to each class of names. For example, one
might hold that the semantic theory as a whole must provide
the simplest possible account of the truth-conditions of the
sentences of some given language and that this constrains
the sort of object to which a name may refer. This kind of
view may well be correct: But, again, it would not appear to
be available to a Reductionist. If there is one such theory,
there are many, which can be derived from it by re' lacing
reference to objects of one sort with reference to objects
of some other sort.' Of course, this may well be accepted,
if not stressed, by one who holds a position of this kind:
It may be said that the appropriate conclusion is that
reference is inscrutable, that ontology is relative. But, if
the references of names of abstract objects are inscrutable,
that is, for present purposes, fine with me, so long as it
is recognized that names of abstract objects are not, in
this regard, any worse off than are names of concrete
objects .-
2 Putnam's remarks also apply at this sort of point.
See his "Model Theory and the 'Factuality' of Semantics",
again.
"Compare Wright's discussion of Benacerraf, in §xv.
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Two other points should be made about this Holistic
view, however. First, that the theory should be as 'simple'
as possible can not be taken to entail that the ontology of
the theory should be as parsimonious as possible. Whatever
the virtues of parsimony elsewhere (say, in physics), I for
one know of no very good, independent argument for the
virtues of parsimony in semantics. To invoke such a concep-
tion would be to beg the question against the Platonist, who
is not obviously party to such a view. Secondly, the discus-
sion in this paper might well be read as a discussion of the
relative virtues of a theory which appeals to a notion of
reference to abstract objects (in addition to reference to
sets) and a theory which does not. The former may well give
us the simpler, though not the more parsimonious, theory.
The point of the discussion so far should be clear
enough: A Reductionist must hold that we may take the refer-
ents of names of abstract objects to be, not abstract
objects, but objects of some other sort, in a sense in which
we may not take names of, say, persons to refer to Numbers.
Any such view is committed to demonstrating that there is
some kind of special problem for the Platonist here: And, to
show this, one must distinguish the notion of reference from
that of value in a model. One must, that is, show that there
are certain constraints upon what we may take the referents
of names of a certain kind to be and show that we may,
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nonetheless, take names of abstract objects to refer either
to sets or to representatives of those sets.
A Reductionist of the sort I have labelled an Epis-
temological Reductionist might reply here that I have mis-
characterized her position. Her view is that abstract
objects pose a special epistemological problem, that no
account is possible of how we can have knowledge about
abstract objects, even if there are any such things. The
goal is not to show why we must do away with abstract
objects: Rather, the goal is to show how we can make sense
of talk of words or Numbers, without supposing ourselves to
refer to abstract objects. The claim is that we may take
names of abstract objects to refer to concretfe objects or to
sets, and that we may not take names of, say, people to
refer to, say, works, because of the epistemological dif-
ficulties such an identification would pose. Nor does taking
the referents of names of persons to be people raise com-
parable problems."7
I do not mean to ignore this sort of view: But I want
to consider it as a view which is committed to a particular
sort of solution to the problem we are discussing. Quite
generally, one may say that such a view holds that we may
not take names in a given class to refer to objects of a
given kind unless it is possible to give some account of how
"7 I should thank Bob Stalnaker for emphasizing and
helping me to understand this reply.
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we may have knowledge of such objects. Presumably, we can
all agree with that claim: But one who is attracted to Epis-
temological Reductionism usually is so attracted because she
has quite specific epistemological views. In particular,
many of those who have argued that there is no coherent
acccount of how we could have knowledge of Numbers, or of
words, or of works of literature have so argued on the basis
of a causal theory of knowledge, which has gone hand-in-
hand with a causal theory of reference.
In this context, however, the causal theory, whether of
knowledge or of reference, suffers, if not from circularity,
then from specificity--if, I emphasize, it is intended to
function as an objection to the possibility of supplying an
acceptable epistemology or theory of reference where
abstract objects are concerned. The causal theory of refer-
ence, for instance, has no antecedent claim to be a theory
of reference at all: The theory is developed, motivated,
explained, and defended wholly in terms of examples which
fundamentally concern concrete objects. If abstract objects
do not cause anything, then, in so far as the sorts of
examples which motivate the causal theory can be formulated
at all, no causal theory is going to resolve them; and, if
such examples can not be formulated, neither the causal nor
any other such theory will be required to resolve them. It
is a fallacy cf hasty generalization to develop a theory on
the basis of 'xamples which concern objects which unproble-
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matically do have causal powers," to generalize the theory
to one about reference in general, and then to argue that
this general theory raises insuperable problems for the view
that we can refer to objects which do not have causal
powers.
Similar remarks apply to the causal theory of
knowledge .
Moreover, not all abstract objects are, in the required
sense, causally inert. Consider, for example, the statement,
"John believes that p because he read the Grundlagen.
John's reading of the Grundlagen is an event in which the
Grundlagen figures, and this evesnt causes something. It
might be suggested that John really believes that p because
he read a certain copy of the Grundlagen, because he had a
causal interaction with some physical book. But that may not
be true, unless the 'book' is spatially discontinuous, the
mereological fusion of parts of different copies of the
Grundlagen. And furthermore, the claim that John's belief
was caused by a specific copy of the Grundlagen is far too
SI do not, of course, hereby commit myself to the
intelligibility of any such use of the notion of an object's
having causal powers.
" For more specific objections, see Wright, §xi-xii and
Hale, Chs. 4, 6. I do not mean to be cavalier about the
problem of providing a coherent epistemology for mathematics
or for any other sort of talk about abstract objects. Nor do
I mean to be cavalier about the problem of explaining what
does fix the references of names of abstract objects. The
former problem I am not going to be able to discuss here,
however. The latter problem just is our topic.
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specific: For he would have had the same belief no matter
which copy of the Grundlagen he had read.
Moreover, the causal theorist ought not to get carried
away with such manoeuvers, unless she is to find herself
committed to the claim that reference to people is impos-
sible, on the grounds that no-one ever interacts causally
with a person, but only with some person-stage, or even only
with some clump of matter at some time."" It is natural to
take such objects as persons to be among the objects which
may figure in the sorts of events which are causes of, among
other things, our beliefs. We naturally take our beliefs
about, say, John Doe to be caused by events in which John
Doe figures, because they are sensitive to how things stand
with John Doe, with that particular person or organism, not
one part or one stage of him. But if that is the sort of
thing we must say if we are to allow persons to be the
references of names of them, if the causal theory of knowl-
edge or of reference is to be compatible with the claim that
we have knowledge about and refer to persons, then it is
clear enough how a corresponding story could be told about
the Grundlagen: Our beliefs about it are sensitive, not to
""
4 We shall return to this view at the end of the paper.
For the moment, I am assuming that we do require an account
of what distinguishes the sort of object to which names of
people refer from the sort of object to which names of
rivers refer.
155
how things stand with some copy of it, but to what is said
in any copy of it."7
These last remarks may also be directed against a quite
different deployment of causal notions. One might suggest
that, by appeal to causality, we may fix the sorts of
objects to which names of concrete objects refer. If so, and
if no such answer can be given in the case of names of
abstract objects, then we have thereby established the right
sort of difference between names of concrete objects and
names of abstract objects: Reference, in the latter case, is
free-floating in a way in which reference is not free-
floating in the case of names of concrete objects. In the
case of names of abstract object", one might then say, we
can take their references to be of any sort we like, so long
as we get the cardinality of the domain right and suitably
define the relevant predicates: But we can not similarly
take The referents of names of concrete objects to be any-
thing we like.
My argument against such a view does not depend upon
any claim to the effect that the appeal to causality will
not work in the case of names of concrete objects. What I
have argued are two points which it is worth re-emphasizing
here. First, it is important to state such a view, as it has
been stated here, as incorporating a claim that, if no
' Sylvain Bromberger defends just such a view about
linguistic types in his "Types and Tokens in Linguistics",
in A. George, ed., pp. 58-89.
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answer can be given to the question what fixes the sort of
object to which names of abstract objects refer, then we
require no notion of reference to them. The supposed fact
that abstract objects do not have 'causal powers' can not,
for the reasons given above, constitute reason to think no
such answer can be given. And secondly, there is some ini-
tial reason to think that the kind of answer offered, by our
new causal theorist, in the case of concrete objects can be
seen as a special case of a more general answer to our
question, which would also fix the sorts of objects to which
names of abstract objects refer: This is part of the point
of the discussion of the causes of beliefs such as those
caused by my reading of the Grundlagen.
Lacking any detailed proposal for a causal account of
what fixes the sort of object to which various names of
concrete objects refer, we can not show in any detail that
such a view must allow generalization to an account of what
fixes the sort of object to which names of abstract objects
refer. Moreover, we can not show, in any detail, that any
such generalization must entail that names of (what seem to
be) abstract objects are not names of concrete objects.
Instead, I shall be suggesting a particular account of what
does fix the sort of object to which names in a given class
refer: Plausible causal accounts are compatible with this
more general view.
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3. The Existence of Abstract Objects
Before embarking on that project, however, we need to
lay the foundations for the discussion. In the course of
doing so, I shall present an argument against the view that,
for any given Contextual Definition, the names introduced by
means of it refer and refer to objects which are sui gene-
ris. My view is thus that, while there are abstract objects
of some sorts, there are not abstract objects of other
sorts.
Consider again the Contextual Definition of names of
day-persons:
dap a = dap b a# a was born on the same day as b
F(dap a) -Ed fa
What sorts of things may bu said about day-persons? Well,
one suitable predicate 'ff' is 'all persons born on the same
day as I have red hair': So the sentence 'Red-haired(dap a)'
is defined in terms of 'All persons born on the same day as
a have red hair'. We may form arbitrarily many similar
predicates, not only by means of the (restricted) quantifier
'all persons born on the same day as V', but by making use
of such (restricted) quantifier.s as 'some person born on the
same day as 4', 'most persons born on the day before C', and
so forth.
Now, one might want to say that 'Red-haired(C)' is
rather peculiar, that, intuitively, it does not express a
property of day-persons (whatever 'day-persons' may be). And
there is a distinction between sorts of predicates which we
158
use with various names which is important here." Consider,
for instance, the sentences:
The father of John is six feet tall.
The father of John has only blue-eyed children.
Intuitively, the former sentence attributes a property of
persons to the father of John; the latter does not. My
intuitions about the following sentences are similar:
The work of which a is a copy contains the word 'dog'.
The work of which a is a copy has only copies which
have a torn page.
Again, it is tempting to say that, while the former sentence
attributes a property of works of literature to a work, the
latter does not,
This distinction needs to be made more precise: The
notion of a property can serve no more than a heuristic
purpose here.
One feature which distinguishes predicates which occur
in sentences of the former sort from those which occur in
sentences of the latter sort, is that, to determine whether
a sentence like "The work of which a is a copy contains the
word 'dog'" is true, one need only look at any given copy of
the work in question: One need only look at a itself or at
any book which copies a. On the other hand, to determine
whether a sentence like "The work of which a is a copy has
only copies which have a torn page" is true, one, ordi-
narily, must know whether, and if so which, other books oopy
T I have discussed this distinction in more detail
elsewhere. See my "Whether Structure May Be Misleading".
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a. And, again, in order to know whether the former sentence
is true, one does not, ordinarily, need to know whether any
other books copy a or, if so, which books copy it.
By saying that one must ordinarily know whether, and if
so which, other books copy a to determine whether each copy
of it has a torn page, I mean to recognize that, one may, on
any given occasion, be able to determine that not all copies
of some work have a torn page without knowing whether any
other books copy the given copy a--if a itself has no torn
page--or without knowing which other books copy a--if, say,
b copies a and has no torn page. In general, one's ability
to determine whether each copy of a has a torn page depends
upon one's ability to determine which books copy a. There is
a generally (or universally) applicable procedure for deter-
mining whether each copy of a has a torn page, and the
application of this procedure requires one to determine
which other books copy a. On the other hand, while there is
such a procedure for determining whether a given work con-
tains the word "dog", there is also a procedure which does
not require one to determine which other books copy a." It
is the existence of such a generally applicable procedure in
"There is an obvious connection here with Dummett's
distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' means of verifi-
cation. See his "What Is a Theory of Meaning? (II)", in
Gareth Evans and John McDowell, eds., Truth and Meaning
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 87-137, at pp.
115ff.
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the one case, though not in the other, which distinguishes
the two sorts of predicates.
With the use of the word 'ordinarily' explained in this
way, we may continue to use it as above.
Let us call those predicates like "contains the word
'dog'" variant predicates; other predicates, like "has only
copies which have a torn page", constant predicates.' A
constant predicate (of works) is, thus, a predicate which is
such that, in order to determine whether a given work falls
under it (i.e., in order to know whether a given sentence of
the form "C(work a)" is true), one must ordinarily know
whether, and if so which, other books copy some given book.
A variant predicate, on the other hand, is a predicate which
is such that one may determine whether a given work falls
under it without knowing whether, and if so which, other
books copy some given copy of it.
The distinction between variant and constant predicates
is closely connected to what one might have thought was the
point of our speaking of works of literature. There is much
which can be said about books: That they are dirty, that
they have some mass, that they contain some word, and so
The point of the terminology is that the (generally
applicable) means for determining the truth-va'.ue of a
sentence 'V(work a)', which contains a variant predicate,
will vary significantly as 'a' is replaced by names of other
books; the (most obvious) means for determining the truth-
value of a sentence 'C(work a)', which contains a constant
predicate, will, on the other hand, remain constant as 'a'
is replaced by names of other books.
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forth. But we distinguish what we can discuss, verify,
investigate, and question without concerning ourselves with
which copy of a given work happens to be to hand at a given
time. Our use of names of works would be largely without
point if there we not certain predicates of books such as
those which play this special role in our discourse about
works: Namely, those whose satisfaction by some book implies
(in some sense) its satisfaction by any other book which
copies it, and whose satisfaction, by a given book, may be
determined in the absence of a knowledge of which, if any,
other books copy it.
I shall, borrowing the term from the philosophy of
science, say t-it a predicate Projects over the R-equiva-
lence classes, if the satisfaction of the predicate by x
implies that, for each y such that xRy, y also satisfies the
predicate.'" (Explaining the sense in which the word
'implies' is used here is a large part of the goal of our
discussion.)
On this analysis, the intuition that 'Red-haired(C)'
does not express a property of day-persons derives from the
fact that 'Red-haired(t)' is a constant predicate of day-
persons: For, in order to know whether a sentence containing
'Red-haired(C)' is true, one must know whether, and if so
" I shall capitalize "Projects" to remind the reader of
tihe fact that I am not necessarily, nor am I claiming to be,
using the term in the standard way. Plainly, there are
similarities which give the use of this term here a point.
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which, other persons were born on the same day as some given
person; to determine whether 'Red-haired(dap(Vanessa
Redgrave))' is true, one must know whether, and if so which,
other persons were born on the same day as Vanessa Redgrave.
The predicate of persons 'red-haired(U)' does not Project
over the relevant equivalence classes.
The distinction between variant and constant predicates
has here been explained only for the case of predicates
introduced by Contextual Definition. (At best, the sort of
explanation just given extends also to predicates as they
occur in sentences of the form 'F(fnc a)'.) A full defense
of the coherence and importance of this distinction would
surely require a more general formulation, an explanation of
the distinction as it applies to any predicate. Even if such
an explanation is not now to hand, it is perhaps worth
noting some reasons to be optimistic about the prospects for
its provision.
If a copies b, then the terms 'work a' and 'work b' are
names of the same work: That is, we may, by using one or the
other, refer to the same object. Let us say that to refer to
a work by means of such an expression is to refer to it
basically. To say that a predicate is variant is therefore
to say that, to determine whiether a given work, referred to
basically, satisfies it, one need not know how else one may
refer to it basically. With respect to variant predicates,
each basic means of reference has a kind of autonomy: The
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ability to determine the truth-value of a sentence contain-
ing a variant predicate and a term which refers basically to
an object does not depend upon an ability to determine
whether it is possible to refer to that same object in any
other way." It is for this reason that Leibniz's Law can be
used to extend our knowledge: For acquisition of the knowl-
edge that a is F need not depend upon one's knowing how else
one may refer to the a." 7
We may put the point slightly differently. The fact
that one can determine whether a is F without knowing how
else one may refer to a is what makes Frege's puzzle about
the morning star and the evening star possible. For I can
know tha* Hesperus is F without knowing that I may also
refer to Hesperus as Phosphorus. To explain the distinction
between variant and constant predicates is therefore pre-
cisely to explain what makes Frege's puzzle possible and to
explain how the application of Leibniz's Law can extend our
knowledge. And, conversely, to explain these things, one
needs a distinction like that between variant and constant
predicates: For if one must know in what ways one can refer
.' Note that this remark is strictly correct only for
one-place predicates. Identity is a good example of a two-
place predicate for which such a characterization would need
to be re-stated.
" Compare David Wiggins, who argues that a proper
account of the oritezion of identity for objects of a given
kind should entail the truth of Leibniz's Law: See his
Sameness and Substance (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), pp. 48-
53.
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to a given object to know whether it satisfies a given
predicate, then the application of Leibniz's Law, in the
case of such a predicate, will not ordinarily extend our
knowledge.
These remarks are clearly programmatic: Much more needs
to be said to formulate a generalized distinction between
variant and constant predicates. But I hope that enough has
been said to motivate the distinction, to show that it is
probably of some importance, and to show that the distinc-
tion, as drawn for cases of the sort we are discussing, is
plausibly a special case of a more general distinction.
Now, my suggestion is that the intuition that there do
not exist such objects as day-persons is closely related to
the fact that we do not understand many variant predicates
of day-persons, i.e., that we do not understand manya
predicates which, intuitively, express 'properties' of day-
persons. How might it have been otherwise? Some years ago,
there was a fad about what were called 'bio-rhythms': There
were supposed to be certain higher-level affective states
which each person had--degrees of awareness, laxity, happi-
ness, and so forth--and persons who were born on the same
. We do understand some such predicates, namely, those
which are constructed from the very equivalence relation we
used to define names of day-persons in the first place.
Identity is itself a variant relation, and we can define
variant predicates in terms of such predicates of persons as
... was born on 21 March 1939', and so forth. The important
difference between such predicates and the variant predi-
cates relevant to the question of existence should become
clear during our discussion.
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day were supposed to have the same such higher-level affec-
tive states. Persons were, that is, said to have the same
bio-rhythms if they were born on the same day: And these
bio-rhythms were themselves a measure, so to speak, of
certain of one's affective states.
Idealizing, let us suppose that there is a specific
theory, Bio-rhythm Theory, making more precise and enlarg-
ing upon this idea. This Theory might have been true. Had it
been true, then there would have been a great many predi-
cates of persons which Projected over the classes of persons
born on the same day. That is to say, there should have been
a great many predicates of day-persons which were variant
prf 4icates. Had Bio-rhythm Theory been true, then there
would have been such objects as day-persons: What I am
calling day-persons would just have been bio-rhythms. For a
bio-rhythm would be an abstract object, a kind of structure
of a person's affective states, which would be shared by
persons born on the same day, just as parallel lines share a
direction, as tokens which copy one another share a type.
But, supposing that Bio-rhythm Theory is not true, it
seems to me that there are no bio-rhythms and that this
judgment is here in accord with common sense. The sorts of
objects to which speakers would have referred had Bio-rhythm
Theory been true do not, since Bio-rhythm Theory is not
true, exist. Platonism need not commit itself to the exis-
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tence of such strange and wonderful objects: It ij, in my
opinion, better off without them.
One formulation of my proposal would be as follows: A
given Contextual Definition successfully introduces names
which refer to abstract objects of a given sort if, and only
if, we understand a wide variety of variant predicates of
those objects. But that can not be correct. The reason is
that such a view would make the existence of objects of a
given sort depend upon our understanding of predicates of a
given kind, and Platonism need not gratuitously commit
itself to Idealism. This formulation does not entail that,
if we do not understand such predicates, then there are no
such objects: For the claim is that the names introduced by
the Contextual Definition will refer if, and only if, we
understand a variety of variant predicates of those objects.
The objects may, for all this view says, exist even if we
can not refer to them, due to lack of the appropriate under-
standing of sentences containing what might otherwise be
names of them.
The problem, rather, is that we do, or at least we seem
to, understand a variety of variant predicates of bio-
rhythms: Less strongly, some people do (or did) understand
such predicates, though they are (or were) not able to refer
to bio-rhythms. Our description of how the world might have
been, if Bio-rhythm Theory were true, is eo ipso a descrip-
tion of how those who believe that Bio-rhythm Theory is true
167
believe the world is. A description of how we should use
certain predicates, of what aspects of that use would corre-
spond to their being variant predicates of dayr-persons, if
Bio-rhythm Theory were true, is also a description of how
those who believe that Bio-rhythm Theory is true do use
those predicates.
That is; Those who believe that Bio-rhythm Theory is
true, understand (or, less strongly, use) a variety of
predicates of day-persons as variant predicates of day-
persons. Similarly, I may presumably come to understand what
they say about day-persons, about Bio-rhythms, even though I
do not believe Bio-rhythm Theory to be true: Hence, I can
come to understand certain predicates as variant predicates
of day-persons, though I do not believe myself to refer to
bio-rhythms and though I do not refer to bio-rhythms, there
being no such objects. How else, one might ask, can I intel-
ligibly debate or investigate whether there are any such
objects? How else, for that matter, can I intelligibly deny
that there are any bio-rhythms?"
"'Of course, one might suggest that none of us under-
stand the predicates we take ourselves to understand, that,
as Evans suggested that one does not understand a proper
name unless it refers, one can understand neither variant
predicates nor names of day-persons unless day-persons
exist. I expect that Tom Kuhn would want to caution against
similar remarks about certain kinds of examples, though not
necessarily about this example.
This sort of dispute is not directly relevant here,
however, since my view about existence is, so far as I can
tell, compatible with such views. In the Evans-style case,
we need to give some account of the sense of negative exis-
tentials, anyway; and, in the Kuhn-style case, we need an
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We must, therefore, distinguish the question whether
one understands a predicate as a variant predicate of day-
persons from the question whether, in fact, the predicate of
persons in terms of which it is defined Projects over the
classes of persons born on the same day."' Those who believe
that Bio-rhythm Theory is true believe, say, that the predi-
cate "I is lethargic" Projects over classes of persons born
on the same day, and it is in their use of the corresponding
predicate of day-persons in accord with this belief that
their understanding of the predicate as a variant predicate
is manifested. That is: The understanding of the predicate
(of day-persons) 'Lethargic(O)' as a variant predicate of
day-persons partly consists in the [nowledge that a sen-
tence of the form 'Lethargic(dap a)' is true only if the
predicate of persons 't is lethargic' Projects over classes
of persons born on the same day.
account of what it would be to understand such a language
(or theory) and a demonstration that such understanding is,
in a certain sense, incompatible with our understanding of
our own language. As I understand his current work, appeal
to something like a class of variant predicates is essential
to this project.
s' I think that, properly, we should say that we must
distinguish the question whether we understand the predi-
cate, as a variant predicate, from the question whether the
predicate refers. That is: One might deny that the variant
predicates of day-persons we do understand refer to any
Concept (in the Fregean sense) at all. However, there is
much confusion about Frogean Concepts and reference to them;
hence, I shall avoid such language here.
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Conversely, even if 'lethargic(f)' does project over
classes of persons born on the same day and even if a is
lethargic, the sentence 'Lethargic(dap a)' may not be true.
For the truth of 'Lethargic(dap a)' requires that dap a
exist and therefore that day-persons, or bio-rhythms, exist.
Hence, the truth of a sentence such as 'Lethargic(dap a)'
requires not only that a certain predicate of persons, in
this case, 'lethargic(t)', project but also that there be a
variety of predicates of persons which project: For only if
a variety of predicates of persons project, only if (some-
thing like) Bio-rhythm Theory is true, are there any bio-
rhythms at all.
4. The Notion of an Ideology
The view being developed here is best explained in
terms of the notion of an Ideology. An Ideology about
objects of a certain kind is not a specific theory about
those objects: Rather, to understand the Ideology associ-
ated with objects of a given kind is to understand what
sorts of properties such objects typically have, to under-
stand certain predicates of those objects as variant predi-
cates.4" In the case of names of day-persons, the asso-
4 My use of the term 'Ideology' should echo the dis-
tinction between ideology and ontology which one finds, for
example, in Quine. The ideology of a theory is, for Quine, a
matter of what the admissible or primitive predicates of the
theory are. This is plainly related to my use of the term,
but is just as plainly different. See W.V. Quine, "Onto-
logical Reduction and the Theory of Numbers", in The Ways of
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ciated Ideology is not any specific theory of bio-rhythms;
it is, rather, a part of such a theory, the part which
states that certain, or some kinds of, predicates of persons
project over classes of persons born on the same day.
My view is thus, first, that an understanding of names
of abstract objects of a given sort depends upon an under-
standing of the associated Ideology. I shall not argue for
this view in any detail here:^2 A full argument for it would
require us to show, first, that to understand any given name
it is necessary to understand a criterion of identity for
that name; and, secondly, that, to grasp the criterion of
identity for the name, one must understand some associated
Ideology. The discussion in the next few sections bears
directly upon this problem: For the discussion concerns what
fixes the kind of object to which a term refers. Unfortu-
nately, however, that discussion shows only that an appeal
to the notion of an Ideology can solve this problem, not
that appeal to the notion is required.
It is prima facie plausible that one who does not
understand the associated Ideology does not understand names
Paradox (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 199-207, at p.
202, and "The Scope and Language of Science", in the same
volume, pp. 215-32, at p, 232.
" For a defense of a view with a great deal of simi-
larity to this view, see David Wiggins's Sameness and
Substance. The similarity comes out in such principles as
his D(v): "f is a substarnce concept only if f determines
either a principle of activity, a principle of functioning
or a principle of operation for members of its extension".
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of day-persons. One who knows only that 'Lethargic(dap a)'
was 'defined' in terms of the sentence 'Vx(x was born on the
same day as a + letharegic(x)', who does not know that the
former sentence is true only if B4o-rhythm Theory is true
and if 'lethargic(%)' Projects will be quite unable to
understand 'Lethargic(dap a)'. For such a person will take
the accidental lethargy of all persons born on the same day
as a to establish the truth of this sentence, though a
justification of that sort would be rejected by those who
speak as I have supposed them to speak.
It is also worth noting a further explanatory conse-
quence of the view that the understanding of names depends
upon an understanding of the associated Ideology. It is no
accident that, upon first encountering the Contextual
Definition of names of day-persons, one may have the sense
that one has not the slightest idea what sorts of objects
these are meant to be (if not just equivalence classes);
But, upon explanation of the associated Ideology, one imme-
diately has a much better idea what sorts of objects are in
question. And, indeed, we can imagine quite different
Ideologies which might be associated with names introduced
by Contextual Definition otherwise just like that of names
of day-persons: Some people might believe that other states
of mind--say, certain sorts of beliefs--do not vary among
persons born on the same day; or, that certain physiological
properties do not vary; or that certain gross anatomical
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features do not vary. Our conception of what sort of object
a day-person is varies as we vary the associated Ideology.
It is easy to overlook the presence of the Ideology
entirely. Consider, for example, Frege's definition of names
of what he calls 'orientations . The orientation of a plane
a is the same as the orientation of a plane b if, and only
if, the planes are parallel.q  It is an interesting fact
that, immediately upon encountering this definition, one
immediately has the sense that one knows precisely what
Frege means to be talking about when he speaks of orienta-
tions. Why does it seem so obvious what sort of object an
orientation is? as contrasted with our utter failure to
discern a conception of 'bio-rhythms' in the mere Contextual
Definition of names of day-persons? The reason is that, in
the former case, it is obvious what the Ideology is intended
to be. Orientations are geometrical objects; the associated
Ideology, as is clear from the context of Frege's discus-
sion, is geometrical: The theory of orientations is to be a
geometrical theory."4 4
The second component of my view is that the existence
of abstract objects of a given sort depends upon the truth
SSee Frege, Foundations, §64. The remarks made here
were suggested to me by discussions with George Boolos.
4 The importance of this Ideology can, again, be seen
by imagining variations, One wouldr have been surprised, at
the very least, if Frege had gone on to explain that the
study of orientations is the responsibility of physics,
certain distributions of physical particles being invariant
among parallel planes.
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of some Theory which incorporates the associated Ideology.
Part of the reason our understanding of the associated
Ideology is of importance to our understanding of names of
abstract objects is that it is essential to our understand-
ing of in what the existence of such objects consists. One
way to put this point is as follows:"4 Among the sentences
of which we, as theorists, want to give an account are
certain negative existential statements, such as "There are
no bio-rhythms'". Surely such a statement is intelligible and
(at least my) intuition tells me it is true (given that Bio-
rhythm Theory is not true). If the sentence is to be capable
of being true, there can be no guarantee that, given that
names of abstract objects are introduced by Contextual
Definition, there are such objects; and, moreover, we need
some account of the senses of statements asserting and
denying the existence of such objects.
I expect that many will have wanted to object that
there is no need to look to semantics for a resolution of
problems of this kind; Pragmatics might resolve them. If
Bio-rhythm Theory is not true, then, while it would be true
to say that dap a exists, it might be misleading to say so
(perhaps because this assertion implicates the truth of Bio-
rhythm Theory or some variant of it). Moreover, if the
predicate 'lethargio(C)' does not project, then, while the
4 5 This way of putting the point was suggested to me by
Bob Stalnaker.
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assertion 'Lethargic(dap a)' might be true, to say so would
again be misleading (perhaps because it implicates the
Projectibility of 'lethargic(f)'). Such a view may, indeed,
be favored, not by one who hopes to defend the view that
day-persons exist and are sui generis, but by one who,
instead, maintains that day-persons exist, but are mere
equivalence classes.
I am not going to pursue such a proposal in any detail.
It is worth noting, however, that any such proposal is
either revisionary of ordinary linguistic practices. The
crucial sentences are again the negative existentials. It
seems natural and true to say that there are no bio-rhythms:
And, if we are to pursue the pragmatic course, this asser-
tion is simply false. (This kind of revisionism is rather
more amenable to the :ort of Reductionist who would identify
day-persons as sets than to a Platonist.)
Naive Platonism may take two forms here. I have so far
been speaking of it as embodying the cla.m that the objects
about which we would speak, were Bio-rhythm Theory true, are
just the same objects about which we in fact speak, though
it is not. It is this view against which I have so far
argued: Such a view fails to take seriously the connection
between existence and Ideology. However, there is an alter-
native view, that day-persons are not bio-rhythms, that bio-
rhythms do not exist, but that day-persons do and are sui
generis. On this view, were Bio-rhythm Theory true, we
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should be able to refer both to bio-rhythms and to day-
persons. Surely there is a parallel between the case of bio-
rhythms and day-persons and, for example, the case of word-
types: That is, there must also be, so to speak, 'purely
abstract' word-types as well as ordinary ones. It is diffi-
cult to believe that such duplication of objects can serve
any purpose; And moreover, it would seem that the only
abstract objects in which we have any interest are precisely
not the purely abstract ones. As soon as we have anything
interesting to say about objects of a certain kind, this
constitutes our possession of an Ideology about them; and,
at that point, we are no longer talking about the purely
abstract objects.
Matters stand quite differently if we are concerned
with a reply offered by a Reductionist. But I am not going
to rest my case against Reductionism upon the nature of the
distinction between semantics and pragmatics; Rather, we
need now to turn to a more direct argument that bio-rhythms
are neither sets nor persons, but must be construed, given
the associated Ideology, as sui generis.
5. Trans-sortal Identification
The question which we left unanswered earlier is: What
constrains the sort of object to which we may take the names
in a given class to refer? What, for example, constrains the
sort of object to which we may take names of persons to
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refer? It is intuitively obvious that names of persons do
not refer to celestial bodies; It is not an intelligible
possibility that the name "George Bush" (as, of course, we
now use it) refers to a planet. Nor, for that matter, is it
an intelligible possibility that the name "Julius Caesar"
refers to a natural number." But why not?
For the moment, let us focus our attention on func-
tional expressions, such as "the father of f", whose range
consists of concrete objects. Now, it seems obvious enough
that the father of John is a person: And one might suppose
that the fact that John and Jane have the same father if,
and only if, the same male human is immediately causally
implicated in their creation is what determines that 'the
father of John' refers to a person.'7 Surely, it is of great
importance that 'the father of a = the father of b' is true
if, and only if, the same male human is immediately causally
implicated in the creation of a and of a. But this does not
49There is a peculiar difference here between the
statements "Julius Caesar is (or, might have been) the
number 0" and "The number 0 is (or, might have been) Julius
Caesar". The former seems, at least to me, to say that
Caesar is (might have been) an abstract object--in parti-
cular, a number. The latter, on the other hand, seems to say
that zero is (might have been) a concrete object, a person.
I have no idea what the significance of this point
should be taken to be.
"7I am abstracting here from the fact that 'the father
of E' is used with names of other sorts of animals: The
discussion could be rephrased in such terms.
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entail that 'the father of John' refers to a person. For
consider the following expressions:"
the set of all persons who have the same father as John
the oldest paternal half-sibling of John
the singleton of the father of John
the (current) location of the oldest paternal half-
sibling of John
Each of these expressions has the same weak identity-
conditions as 'the father of John': That is, the reference
of any one of these expressions will remain unchanged if,
and only if, the same male human is immediately causally
implicated in the creation of John and any person whose name
is substituted for his. But not all of these expressions
refer to objects of the same sort, and those which do do not
refer to the same object.
A similar point applies to names of directions. Con-
sider the following expressions:
the direction of X
the line through the Origin parallel to X
the set of lines parallel to N
the angle at which intersects the x-axis
4
"A point not unlike this one was, I am told, made in a
lecture by Michael Dummett. Dummett remarked that if (what I
am calling) the weak identity-conditions determine the sort
of object to which a name refers, then it is philosophically
confused to think that the eccentricity of an ellipse is a
real number.
Warren Goldfarb gave another good example: Let us say
that the architect of x = the architect of y if, and only
if, x and y are buildings designed by the same person.
Surely, we may take 'the architect of the John Hancock
Tower' to refer to I.M. Pei--a person. But, of course, there
is a set of buildings designed by Pei, a first building
designed by Pei, and so forth; and we might think, rightly
or wrongly, that there are distinguishing features which
each building has, which it shares with all and only those
buildings designed by the same person.
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Again, substitution, for x, of the name of any line parallel
to N will leave the referent of each of these expressions
unchanged; and only the substitution of names of lines
parallel to x will do so. Nonetheless, not all of these
expressions refer to objects of the same sort: One refers to
a line; one, to a set; one, to a real number.
This point can be stated quite precisely. Let '0(4)' be
a function from objects of sort S to objects of any sort T
(not necessarily different from S). Then 'O(4)' induces an
equivalence relation '•C'' on objects of sort S, which we
define as follows:
VxVy(xfy 1 4(x) = (y))
Distinct functions from S to T induce the same equivalence
relation, and various functions from S to sorts T' (distinct
from T) also induce the same equivalence relation. There are
thus many distinct functions whose domain is objects of sort
S and which have the same weak identity-conditions.
Now, it might be said that what fixes the reference of
an expression like 'the father of John', or 'the set of
lines parallel to X', is the presence of the relevant sortal
concept, be it 'father' or 'set'.4' That is, presumably,
right: But it is not an answer to our question, for our
question is how sortals fix the referents of expressions in
4" A sortal concept is one whose understanding requires
an understanding of "a notion of identity for the things
which fall under it", as Wright says: p. 2. See also
Wiggins, pp. 58ff.
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which they occur. Our question is what kind of sortal, say,
'direction' is. Is 'direction' just another way of saying
'set of such-and-such a kind' or 'line which passes through
the origin'? Why is 'father' a sortal under which only
persons fall? Indeed, why is 'person' not a sortal under
which only sets fall?
Moreover, there must be some difference between to what
the use of the sortal concepts 'person' and 'set' commit us
when we use them in given functional expressions: That is,
there must be some difference between the kind of use we
make of an expression of the form 'the male person who is
immediately causally implicated in the creation of V' and
'the set of all persons who have the same father as U'.
Presumably, there is no reason we could not use expressions
containing the former functional expression as names of
sets, use them, so to speak, idiomatically. And that is to
say that we may ask how we must use the expression if we are
not to use it idiomatically, in what sort rf way we must use
it if we are to use it consistently with the plain intention
that it is to be used to refer to persons.
The simplest answer to this question is that the sort
of object to which a name refers is determined by the
criterion of identity' for the names in question: No names
which have distinct criteria of identity refer to the same
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object."7 By 'criterion of identity', here, I mean no more
than the condition for the truth of identity-statements
containing such names, what is common to the truth-condi-
tions of statements of the form 'the direction of \ = the
direction of a' or 'the father of John = the father of
Jane'. It is important here that this notion of a criterion
of identity is intensional, not in the sense that reference
is made to intensional entities in a specification of the
criterion of identity; for no such reference is made.
Rather, the notion is intensional in the sense that substi-
tution of a co-extensive relation for any relation mentioned
in such a specification need not preserve its status as a
correct specification of the criterion of identity.
This claim would immediately entail that, say, direc-
tions are neither lines, nor sets, but are sui generis. For
identity-statements of the form 'the direction of x = the
direction of o' are true if, and only if, X is parallel to
P: The identity of sets, however, is determined by co-
extensiveness; the identity of lines, by something else
still. This simple answer is, however, incorrect. For con-
sider the Contextual Definitions:
dir a = dir b E= a II b
dor a = dor b s3 3x(a I x & b I x)
dur a - dur b =-d 3x(angle(a,x) = angle(b,x))
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:I"This view is very similar to that offered by Bob
Hale: See p. 215.
It seems to me that 'dorections' and 'durections' might well
be our old friends directions. Perhaps they are distinct,
but any principle which immediately entails that we can not
identify them is too strong.
It is possible to weaken this view: Wright's condition
N' is such a weakening. Suppose that Fx is a sortal concept,
names of objects falling under which are explained by means
of a Contextual Definition given in terms of some equiva-
lence relation 'CR•' which holds between objects of sort S.
Then, Wright's view is thate
Gx is a sortal under which instances of Fx fall if and
only if there are, or could be, terms, 'a' and 'b',
which recognisably purport to denote instances of Gx,
such that the sense of the identity statement, 'a=b',
can be adequately explained by fixing its truth-condi
tions to be the same as those of a statement which
asserts that the given equivalence relation (['RI']
holds between a pair of objects (of sort S1.
We may understand this condition as follows: Objects of a
sort F may be identified with objects of another sort G if,
and only if, identity-statements concerning (some) Gs may be
" Wright, p. 114. It is tempting to read this passagr
as entailing the following: Gx is a sortal under which
instances of Fx fall if there is, or could be, a class of
terms recogaizably purporting to denote instances of Gx
which could themselves be intelligibly introduced (or
explained) by means of a Contextual Definition otherwise
identical to that by means of which names of objects falling
under Fx were introduced. I do not know, however, whether
Wright would accept this reading.
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explained in the same way that identity-statements concern-
ing Fs are explained."
This view resolves the problem of directions and dorec-
tions. For, plausibly, identity-statements of the form 'the
dorection of N = the dorection of P' can be explained in
terms of the parallelism of N and u; plausibly, identity-
statements of the form 'the direction of X = the direction
of P' can be explained in terms of there being some line
perpendicular to both N and M. The difficulty with Wright's
proposal, however, is that it is not clear how to apply it
in general. Can identity-statements of the form 'the work of
which f is a copy = the work of which M is a copy' be
explaineld in terms of the co-extensiveness of the relevant
equivalence classes? Conversely, we may presumably take the
relevant names which 'recognizably purport' to refer to sets
to be those of the form 'the set of all books which copy f'.
Is it then possible to explain the senses of statements of
"o There seems no reason not to suppose that the con-
verse must alho be true: If some Fs are Gs, then some Gs are
Fs, so we must, presumably, also be able to explain iden-
tity-statements conuerning (some) Fs in the same way we
explain identity-statements concerning (some) Gas. Of course,
since the condition, as formulated, applies only to sortals
F', names of instances of which are introduced by Contextual
Definition, we will not be able to apply the condition as
formulated unless Gx is also such a sortal.
This view would seem to inherit further plausibility
from the fact that, if such explanations are possible, then
it will be possible to explain the truth-conditions of mixed
identity-statements--.jch as 'the direction of N = the
dorection of X'---both in terms of the criterion of identity
for directions and in terms of the criterion of identity for
dorections.
183
the form 'the set of all books which copy a = the set of all
books which copy b' in terms of 't copies '1'?
Perhaps not: But we need, at least, to be told more
about what is packed into the notion of explanation here.
For this reason, I shall propose a different sort of answer
to our opening question and leave open the question whether
it is compatible with Wright's view.
Let us return to a question we raised earlier. Consider
the functional expressions 'the set of all books which copy
V' and 'the oldest extant book which copies V'. Plausibly,
these expressions refer to objects of different sorts: The
former, to a set; the latter, to a book. Now, I said earlier
that our use of the word 'set' in the former, and ou use of
the word 'book' in the latter, expression must commit us to
using these expressions in a particular way: That is, there
is some sort of way we must use these expressions if we are
to use them with the senses they appear to have. One might
say, echoing Wittgenstein,"c that we understand to what sort
of object such an expression refers only because "the place
for it was already prepared": That is, we already know how,
in general, names of sets or names of books are used, and we
are being told that, with this expression, we are to form
names which are used in that kind of way. But in what way?
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"Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations,
3rd ed., tr. by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958),
§31.
One would, to be sure, be surprised to hear such
remarks as 'the set of books which copy a is in Texas', or
...was printed in 1935', or '...contains a torn page'.
These are not the sorts of things one says of sets. The
problem is not that we could not give an appropriate sense
to such statements: We may say that a particular set is in
Texas if all (or most) of its members are; we may say that a
set contains a torn page if all (or some) of its members do.
This point too can be formulated quite generally. For any
functional expressions 'fncl(C)' and 'fnc2(Q)', which share
weak identity-conditions, there will be, for any predicate
'F(E)' fit to be satisfied by objects to which we refer by
means of the former expression, a predicate 'F^(I)', fit to
be satisfied by objects to which we refer by means of the
latter expression, with the following property:
F^(fnc2(a)) F(fncl(a))
Anything which can be 'said about', say, the set of all
books which copy a can be 'said about' the oldest extant
copy of a, and vice versa: For example, the predicate cor-
responding to membership in such a set is just 'f copies
a .
Thus, neither the weak identity-conditions associated
with a given class of terms, nor the class of predicates one
" This point, of course, is just an 'object-language'
re-formulation of the 'meta-language' point made earlier,
that, so far as getting the truth-values correct is con-
cerned, it matters not what we take the domain to be.
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may intelligibly use with those terms, nor the sort of thing
which can be said using those terms can determine the sort
of object to which such terms refer.
Intuitively, however, even if there are always predi-
cates which will serve to 'say about the set' the same thing
we 'say about the book', nonetheless the book and the set
have different sorts of properties. Having introduced the
notions of a variant predicate and of an Ideology, we may
now explain this intuition as reflecting the fact that we
associate very different sorts of Ideologies with names of
sets, on the one hand, and with names of books, on the
other. What distinguishes a function from which we form
names of sets from one from which we form name' of books is
the associated Ideology. There are certain sorts of predi-
cates which one must understand how to use in conjunction
with an expression like 'the set of books which copy a' if
one is to understand it as a name of a set at all. And, in
the same way, there are certain sorts of predicates which
one must understand how to use in conjunction with an
expression like 'the work of which a is a copy' if one is to
understand it as a name of a work; with 'the father of b',
if one is to understand it as a name of a person; with 'the
location of b', if one is to understand it as a name of a
place.
Given that we do not have a general account of the
notion of a variant predicate and that, therefore, we have
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no general account of the notion of an Ideology, this propo-
sal, in full generality, necessarily remains somewhat pro-
grammatic. But the proposal has a great deal to recommend
it. Firstly, it has a compelling intuitive motivation,
explained here in terms of the notion of a 'property'.
Secondly, it gives us some kind of answer to the question
what fixes the sort of object to which terms in a given
class refer: That is, it gives us an answer to the question
what distinguishes terms which share weak identity-condi-
tions but which, intuitively, refer to objects of different
sorts,
Thirdly, the account of what fixes the kind of object
to which terms in a given class refer coheres with the
earlier offered account of in what the existence of the
referents of such terms consists, I argued that the exis-
tence of the referents of, e.g., names of day-persons con-
sists in the truth of some theory which incorporates the
relevant Ideology. It is natural to expect that our concep-
tion of the kind of object to which such terms refer should
be closely connected with our conception of what it is for
such objects to exist. For to say that a term refers to a
day-person (if it refers at all) entails that At refers only
if day-persons exist.
As I said earlier, however, a general defense of this
proposal is beyond us at this time: And, presumably, the
coherence of the proposal in any particular case depends
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upon its defense in the general case. Nonetheless, we do
have an explanation of the distinction between variant and
constant predicates in the case of names introduced by
Contextual Definition: Hence, we have an explanation of the
notion of an Ideology as it applies to such cases. It is
possible, therefore, to make some further progress
evaluating the proposal as it applies to such cases.
Consider the case of works of literature again. To
understand the relevant Ideology in this case is, at least,
to have a conception of what is said in a work and to know
that (in the basic cases) what is said in a given work may
be determined from any copy of it, that what is said is
invariant among the copies. One who doer not know such
things does not understand our talk about works. Depending
upon just what she does know, such a person's use of names
of works should be all but indistinguishable from her use
(or from others' use) of names of some different kind. For
example, if she understood only statements such as 'work a =
work b' or 'Each copy of work a has a torn page', and if she
understood statements such as 'In work a, it is said that p'
on the model of 'It is said that p in each copy of work a',
her use of names of works would be all but indistinguish-
able from our use of names of sets of books."
"b It is worth mentioning here that the Ideology asso-
ciated with sets (in such cases, equivalence classes) is in
a certain sense minimal: For, with a few exceptions, every
statement about an equivalence class contains a constant
predicate. That is to say, the determination of the truth or
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Why should this matter? Why should it matter that,
unless a speaker understands some variant predicates of
works, we are tempted to say that she does not understand
names of works (as we do, anyway)?--We are in search of a
justification for the claim that this fact shows that names
of works do not refer to sets. At least a partial justifi-
cation is available to us: We have parallel intuitions in
other cases; this is the point of our consideration of such
functions as "the set of all books which copy C" and "the
oldest extant copy of C". If a speaker uses, with expres-
sions such as "the oldest extant copy of the Grundlagen",
only such predicates as are fit to be used with names of
sets, the speaker does not understand this expression as we
do, as a name of a book. It is important not only that a
speaker understand predicates of the relevant sort (say,
variant predicates of books), but that she know that that
clata of predicates is the relevant class in a given case.
If an understanding of the Ideology associated with
such functions as "the set of all books which copy V" and
"the oldest extant copy of 4" is required if one is to
understand them to refer to objects of the appropriate sort,
falsity of a statement about the equivalence class ordi-
narily depends upon one's knowledge of what members the set
has: I.e., which, if any, other objects bear the relevant
equivalence relation to some given object. It is fcr- his
reason that, in the absence of any indication of a more
substantial Ideology, we can not help but take names intro-
duced by Contextual Definition as names of sets. The more
substantial the Ideology, the less 'set-like' the objects
become.
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surely we must say the same about such functions as "the
work of which f is a copy". The only relevant contrast is
that, in the former case, we assume, for the sake of argu-
ment, that there are such objects as books and sets and we
are asking how reference to them is to be distinguished: In
the latter case, we are arguing that the kind of thing which
distinguishes expressions which refer to books from those
which refer to sets also distinguishes our use of names of
works from our use of expressions of either of these sorts.
Since these expressions must refer to something, they must
refer to something other than books or sets.
6. Closing
The most plausible reply to such considerations is
that, in talking about such aspects of the use of certain
functions, we have assumed that we are thereby talking about
features of a speaker's understanding of names in a given
class: The objection is that semantics ought not to be
expected to concern itself with such matters. From this
perspective, there is no deep distinction between predicates
of the sort I have called 'variant' and those of the sort I
have called 'constant': What is said in a given work of
literature is merely what interests us most, rather than,
say, whether all copies of it have torn pages: This kind of
distinction falls within the domain of pragmatics, not
within that of semantics.
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This view appears to be committed to the claim that
there is but one sort of object. Even the view that all
abstract objects are sets would not be sufficient here. For
consider, again, the contrast between "the set of all copies
of e( and "the oldest extant copy of f". Either (terms
formed from) these refer to objects of the same sort or they
do not: If they do not, then we are owed some account of the
distinction, which is therefore of semantical significance.
An account which is an alternative to mine might well be
offered; whatever it is like, the dispute then concerns the
nature of such an account, not its semantical or pragmatic
nature. We shall return to this point.
If the objection is to be that any such distinction is
merely pragmatic, (terms formed from) any two functional
expressions must refer to objects of the same sort. But this
entails that there is only one sort of object. This follows
from the observation that, for each sort of object, there is
a functional expression (with the same weak identity-condi-
tions) whose range purportedly consists of objects of that
sort. Hence, if all names formed from functional expressions
refer to objects of the same sort, there is only one sort of
object. This consequence can only be avoided by denying that
a name such as "the oldest extant copy of a" refers, as it
appears to refer, to a book: On this view, all (names formed
from) functional expressions refer to objects of the same
sort, a sort which is distinct fron any to which names not
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formed by means of functional expressions refer. But this
view does not appear to be coherent. And the alternative
view, that there is only one sort of object, faces objec-
tions I shall not rehearse here: The fundamental difficul-
ties facing a physicalistic construal of mathematics (other,
I should again emphasize, than a Fictionalist account) are
conclusively enough presented by Frege.t
To develop an alternative to the view presented here,
however, it is not necessary to claim that any such dis-
tinction is of only pragmatic significance. The argument
given above was predicated upon the assumption that we shall
want to make distinctions among the sorts of objects to
which different classes of e..pressions which refer to con-
crete objects refer. The general form of the argument was:
Once we have found a way to distinguish among expressions
which refer to different sorts of concrete objects, we shall
thereby have found a way to distinguish among different
sorts of abstract objects.
If this is the structure of the argument, however, it
is clear what sort of view constitutes an alternative. What
is required is a way of drawing a distinction between names
of concrete and names of abstract objects. The claim would
then be that there are essentially two sorts of objects,
concrete and abstract. The former may plausibly be iden-
tified as the concrete mereological atoms and their fusions;
QSee Grundlagen, §7.-10, 23-5.
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the latter, as sets.'" One may be skeptical that there is
any very definite line between abstract and concrete
objects.; The choice of the example of day-persons was
intended to reinforce such skepticism. Nevertheless, it may
well prove possible to draw this distinction in a principled
way: "b And, if it is, a defender of this alternative view
could well take over such an account as an account of what
distinguishes names which refer to abstract objects from
those which refer to concrete ones.
I can not offer any appraisal of this view here. It is,
however, clear upon what its appraisal rests. Its tenability
rests upon the tenability of the view that we need not
distinguish among sorts of concrete ohjects. Such a view is
of far greater generality than any I have been able to
consider here; its evaluation similarly depends upon far
more general considerations. '  But it is enough to have
reduced the dispute over the intelligibility of reference to
abstract objects to one about the necessity for a distinc-
b' And, indeed, sets may be taken to be abstract mereo-
logical atoms (singletons) and their fusions. If so, then
there will likely also be peculiar 'mixed' objects--the
fusion of myself with my singleton, for example: But that is
beside the point. See David Lewis's Parts of Classes
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
SThis lesson might be gleaned from Dummett's discus-
sion of the distinction in Ch. 14 of his Frege: Philosophy
of Language.
"' For an attempt, see Hale, Ch. 3.
"For a presentation of some of these considerations,
see, of course, Wiggins's Sameness and Substance.
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tion among sorts of concrete objects. Indeed, one might well
emphasize, at this point, that the notions of reference to
works of literature, to numbers, and so forth, as distinct
from the notion of reference to sets, is now no worse off
than are the notion of reference to persons, to stars, to
statues, and, indeed, to books themselves as distinct from
the notion of reference to the matter which constitutes
them .&I
" I should like to thank George Boolos, Sylvain
Bromberger, Bob Hale, Jim Higginbotham, Thomas Kuhn, Bob
Stalnaker, and Crispin Wright for their comments upon and
criticisms of earlier versions of this material. I should
also like to thank those who attended a reading at the
Wolfson Colloquium in Oxford for the helpful discussion.
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